State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, Kan.

• Decision Date: 10 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 81074,81074
• Citation: 962 P.2d 543,265 Kan. 779
• Parties: STATE of Kansas ex rel. Nick A. TOMASIC, Wyandotte County District Attorney, Relator, v. THE UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF WYANDOTTE COUNTY/KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, Respondent.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 543

962 P.2d 543

265 Kan. 779

STATE of Kansas ex rel. Nick A. TOMASIC, Wyandotte County District Attorney, Relator, v. THE UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF WYANDOTTE COUNTY/KANSAS CITY KANSAS, Respondent.

No. 81074.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

July 10, 1998.

Syllabus by the Court

1. It is fundamental that our state constitution limits rather than confers powers. Where the constitutionality of a statute is involved, the question presented is, therefore, not whether the statutory act is authorized by the constitution, but whether it is prohibited thereby.

2. In determining constitutionality of a statute, it is the court's duty to uphold a statute under attack rather than defeat it, and if there is any reasonable way to construe the statute as constitutionally valid, that should be done.

3. Statutes are not stricken down unless the infringement of the superior law is clear beyond substantial doubt.

4. There is no precise definition of what constitutes a valid public use, and what may be considered a valid public use or 5. Traditionally, the test utilized in determining if a legislative enactment violates equal protection principles is whether the classification bears a rational relationship to the purpose of the legislation. The legislature is presumed to act within its constitutional power despite the fact that the application of its laws may result in some inequity.

purpose changes over time. As long as a governmental action is designed to fulfill a public purpose, the wisdom of the governmental action generally is not subject to review by the courts.

6. The rational basis test contains two substantive limitations on legislative choice: Legislative enactments must implicate legitimate goals, and the means chosen by the legislature must bear a rational relationship to the goals.

7. A statute is rationally related to an objective if the statute produces effects that advance, rather than retard or have no bearing on, the attainment of the objective. So long as the regulation is positively related to a conceivable legitimate purpose, it passes scrutiny; it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages.

8. Because a legislature is not required to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. A legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.

9. Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or inferred from the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenges if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.

10. The legislature is not prohibited from making distinctions between classifications of persons. Rather, these constitutional limitations amount to a requirement that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.

11. In taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom of classification.

12. Great latitude is granted to the legislature to delegate certain functions to the administrative branch of government. Courts start with the presumption that the legislature and the people have the right to assume that public officials will exercise their express and implied powers fairly, honestly, and reasonably. While standards must accompany a delegation of authority, great leeway should be allowed the legislature in setting forth guidelines or standards, and the use of general rather than minute standards is permissible. When the standard expressed in the statute is merely a finding of necessity, such a determination of need is constitutionally adequate when coupled with the assumption that it will be made fairly, honestly, and reasonably.

13. The modern trend is to require less detailed standards and guidance to the administrative agencies in order to facilitate the administration of laws in areas of complex social and economic problems.

14. The standard of whether a redevelopment plan will "enhance the major tourism area," as set forth in L.1998, ch. 17, § 2, meets the test articulated by this court regarding delegated authority in that it allows the Governor to know his rights, obligations, and limitations thereunder.

15. L.1998, ch. 17 contains laws of a general nature, operating, in both fact and theory, with geographic uniformity in the application of the law throughout the state. The legislation contemplates uniform application throughout the state, and the entire body of urban redevelopment/tax increment financing statutes, including the authority to designate major tourism areas, applies to all cities in Kansas.

16. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires only that just compensation be paid for the taking of private property. It does not prohibit a condemning 17. The constitutionally required just compensation is a minimum, not a maximum entitlement. The legislature cannot require an owner to accept less, although it is free to provide for more.

authority from paying more than what is determined to be just compensation.

Nick A. Tomasic, District Attorney, and Michael P. Howe and Thomas M. Martin, of Lewis, Rice & Fingersh, L.C., Kansas City, MO, argued the cause and were on the brief, for relator.

N. Cason Boudreau, Deputy Chief Counsel of Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, argued the cause, and Harold T. Walker, Chief Counsel, and Stephen P. Chinn, T. Chris Williams, and David W. Bushek, of Stinson, Mag & Fizzell, P.C., Kansas City, MO, were with him on the brief, for respondent.

Joseph R. Borich, III, argued the cause, and Douglas J. Patterson, Leawood, was with him on the brief, for amicus curiae Property Owners.

ABBOTT, Justice.

This is an original proceeding in quo warranto. The action was filed by Wyandotte County District Attorney Nick Tomasic, seeking rulings concerning the proposed construction of an auto race track facility and related projects in Wyandotte County. Respondent is the Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, Kansas.

In general, relator seeks (1) a determination that some of the amendments to the urban redevelopment statutes, K.S.A. 12-1770 et seq., (also sometimes referred to as the tax increment financing statutes) contained in L.1998, ch. 17 are unconstitutional, (2) an order prohibiting the Unified Government from exercising its powers under those amendments to develop the proposed auto race track facility and related projects within Wyandotte County, (3) a determination that certain provisions found in the Development Agreement (Agreement) between Kansas International Speedway Corporation and the Unified Government violate the State's Cash Basis Law as well as the full faith and credit provision found in L.1998, ch. 17, § 3, and (4) a determination that the Unified Government has been acting in violation of state law by acquiring interests in real property in furtherance of the auto race track redevelopment project prior to the adoption of a redevelopment plan and a relocation assistance plan.

FACTS

The facts involving recent preparations for this proposed auto race track facility are not in dispute and were presented by the parties in a stipulation of facts and agreed-upon record. In early 1997, International Speedway Corporation (ISC) approached the City of Kansas City, Kansas, the predecessor of the Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, Kansas (Unified Government), and expressed an interest in constructing a super speedway auto race track facility within its jurisdictional boundaries. Following several meetings between the representatives of the Unified Government and ISC, ISC created a wholly owned Kansas subsidiary corporation named Kansas International Speedway Corporation (KISC).

KISC and the Unified Government entered into the Agreement on December 16, 1997, which established a plan for the development of the auto race track facility. The Agreement set forth the obligations of the parties; established dates for accomplishing certain actions in furtherance of the project; contained covenants, warranties, and conditions precedent; and established termination rights, events of default, and remedies for breach of the Agreement. One of the conditions precedent was the adoption of a tax increment financing plan. Another was the requirement that certain portions of the urban redevelopment/tax increment financing statutes be amended. Among other things, these statutes authorize cities to exercise specified redevelopment powers in designated areas, including areas designated by the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Commerce and Housing (KDOCH) as major tourism areas of the State. Financing of the auto race track facility was to proceed, in large part, pursuant to these statutes.

The Agreement also provided for the formation of a committee to establish procedures for the acquisition of property interests necessary for the project and gave the committee the authority to hire an acquisition/relocation consultant. The committee consists of two representatives from KISC and two representatives of the Unified Government. The Agreement also provided for the establishment of an escrow account to pay certain costs incurred in connection with the project prior to the issuance of special obligation bonds. KISC, the Unified Government, and the State of Kansas pooled certain funds together in the escrow account. The escrow funds, although separated for accounting purposes, have been commingled and...