State ex rel. Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit v. Jones

• Decision Date: 17 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. 73848,TWENTY-SECOND,73848
• Citation: State ex rel. Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit v. Jones, 823 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. 1992)
• Parties: STATE of Missouri ex rel.JUDICIAL CIRCUIT and the Honorable Jack L. Koehr, Relators, v. Virvus JONES, Thomas A. Villa and Vincent C. Schoemehl, Jr., Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 471

823 S.W.2d 471

STATE of Missouri ex rel. TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT and the Honorable Jack L. Koehr, Relators, v. Virvus JONES, Thomas A. Villa and Vincent C. Schoemehl, Jr. Respondents.

No. 73848.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.

Jan. 17, 1992.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Feb. 25, 1992.

G. Keith Phoenix, Elkin L. Kistner, Tyrone A. Taborn, St. Louis, for relators.

James J. Wilson, City Counselor, Julian L. Bush, Associate City Counselor, Brian S. Witherspoon, Asst. City Counselor, St. Louis, for respondents.

David Collins, Macon, for amicus curiae Presiding Judges.

Alan C. Kohn, St. Louis, for amicus curiae Metropolitan Assoc. of St. Louis.

HOLSTEIN, Judge.

This mandamus proceeding was transferred here following opinion by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District. At issue is whether the Board of Estimates and Appropriations for the City of St. Louis (the Board of E and A) has discretion to delete or modify certain items included in the circuit court's budget estimates without first obtaining relief from the Judicial Finance Commission. We conclude that the Board does not have such discretion, and the writ of mandamus will be made peremptory.

The courts have discretion to issue a writ of mandamus in cases where ministerial duties sought to be coerced are simple and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved and imposed by law. State ex rel. Bunker Resource Recycling and Reclamation, Inc. v. Mehan, 782 S.W.2d 381, 389 (Mo. banc 1990). If the Board of E and A has a clear duty to include the budget estimates of the circuit court in its appropriation bill without modification, that duty may be enforced by mandamus.

Section 50.640.1, RSMo 1986, provides in part:

The estimates of the circuit court, including all activities thereof and of the circuit clerk, shall be transmitted to the budget officer by the circuit clerk. The estimates of the circuit clerk shall bear the approval of the circuit court. The budget officer or the county commission shall not change the estimates of the circuit court or of the circuit clerk without the consent of the circuit court or the circuit clerk, respectively, but shall appropriate in the appropriation order the amounts estimated as originally submitted or as changed, with their consent.

Section 50.641.1 provides:

The estimates of the circuit court referred to in section 50.640 which are to be included within the county budget by the budget officers and the county commissions without change shall include those categories of expenditures to support the operations of the circuit court which are attributable to the business of the circuit judges, associate circuit judges and the staffs serving such judges.

Before 1982 § 50.640 provided that neither the budget officer nor the county court could "change the estimates of the circuit court ... without the consent of the circuit court." That provision had been construed to require counties to appropriate all funds requested unless the county challenged the budget estimates as unlawful. State ex rel. Judges for the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit v. City of St. Louis, 494 S.W.2d 39, 40 (Mo. banc 1973). "Lawful" expenditures included three categories: (1) those fixed by statute or absolutely reposed in the court's discretion; (2) those the local government unit is required to provide because such expenditures were authorized previously; and (3) those reasonably necessary for the court to carry out its function. In re 1979 Budget of the Juvenile Court, 590 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Mo. banc 1980). However, because the statute provided no procedure for review, this Court made provision for such review. In State ex rel. Weinstein v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Mo. banc 1970), this Court said, "If ... the County Council deems [the budget estimates] unreasonable, the County Council may file a petition for review and final determination of such question in this Court, which has final superintending control over the Circuit Court [under] Article V, § 4 Const. of Mo.1945, V.A.M.S." This procedure was not altogether satisfactory and some believed a "different approach" was demanded. In re 1979 Budget of the Juvenile Court, 590 S.W.2d at 902-03 (Donnelly, J., concurring in result).

In 1982 the statute was amended to make provision for the Judicial Finance Commission. That commission was to provide an expedited and less formal proceeding for a review of the circuit courts' budget estimates. § 50.640.2, RSMo 1986. If either the circuit court or the governing body of the county was dissatisfied with that determination, the statutes authorized review before this Court. § 477.600.7, RSMo 1986. With these principles in mind, we turn to the circumstances presented in this case.

The City of St. Louis is recognized as both a city and a county. Mo. Const. art. VI, § 31. Insofar as the City provides budgetary support for the circuit court, it performs the functions of a county. In its charter the City does not use the statutory terms "budget officer" or "county commission." Pursuant to the City charter, expenditures of the City must be appropriated by ordinance passed by the Board of Aldermen, and no appropriation may be adopted without the recommendation of the Board of E and A. City of St. Louis Charter, article IV, § 25 (1980). The Board of E and A is the agency of the City to which annual budget estimates of the various offices, including that of the circuit court, must be submitted. City of St. Louis Charter, article XVI, § 2 (1980). The Board of E and A prepares and submits the annual appropriation bill to the Board of Aldermen. The Board of Aldermen may decrease any item in the appropriation bill but may not increase any item or insert any new item unless the Board of E and A has failed to perform its duty in a timely fashion. City of St. Louis Charter, article XVI, § 3 (amended January 30, 1987). Items of appropriation are subject to veto by the mayor unless overridden by a vote of two-thirds of the Board of Aldermen. City of St. Louis Charter, article IV, §§ 17, 25 (1980). Thus, the Board of E and A, the Board of Aldermen, and the mayor share responsibility for approval of the budget.

From the above discussion it appears that in the context of Chapter 50, RSMo, St. Louis City is a county, the Board of E and A is the "budget officer," and the Board of E and A, the Board of Aldermen, and the mayor jointly constitute the "county commission." The Board of E and A is currently comprised of the respondents, Mayor Vincent Schoemehl, Comptroller Virvus Jones, and President of the Board of Aldermen Thomas Villa. See City of St. Louis Charter, article XVI, section 1.

On March 19, 1991, the circuit court submitted a proposed budget for the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1991. The Board of E and A deleted a $61,017,561.00 line item for capital improvements from the budget estimates and made an "across-the-board" 11.1% reduction of all remaining line items. These changes were contained in the budget bill submitted to the Board of Aldermen on April 30, 1991.

On May 13, 1991, a petition for writ of mandamus was filed in the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District. The named relators were the "Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit" and Honorable Jack L. Koehr, presiding judge of that circuit. The named respondents were the City of St. Louis, the budget director for the City, Joanne LaSala, and the three individuals who comprise the Board of E and A. The petition sought an order requiring the Board of E and A to reinstate those items that had been deleted from the budget estimates of the circuit court. On May 23, 1991, the court of appeals issued a preliminary order alternatively ordering the Board of E and A to answer the petition or, failing that, a judgment granting the relief sought would be entered. On that same date the writ of mandamus was denied as to the City and Joanne LaSala. On June 27, 1991, following an accelerated briefing schedule, a peremptory writ was issued requiring the Board of E and A to reinstate the budget request for the circuit court's budget estimates in the appropriation bill except for the line item for capital improvements.

The respondents complied and reinstated the 11.1% across-the-board reduction. However, the item for capital improvements was apparently omitted in its entirety from the appropriations bill that was adopted by the City. Following an opinion by the court of appeals in August of 1991, this case was transferred here.

Essentially all the facts as recited above are admitted or appear in the record. No claim is now made that the respondents had discretion to make the 11.1% across-the-board deletion. The issues submitted here are 1) whether relators have capacity and standing to bring this action, and 2) whether respondents have a nondiscretionary duty to include the "capital improvements" line item of the budget estimates of the circuit court in the appropriation bill.

I.

The first argument here is that the circuit court is neither a natural person nor corporate entity and, therefore, has no capacity to bring this mandamus action. The fact that a statute creates a governmental entity does not necessarily give that entity the ability to sue and be sued. But that does not end the inquiry.

In Parker v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 358 Mo. 365, 214 S.W.2d 529 (1948), a question arose as to whether the Division of Employment Security had capacity to sue in its official name. The statutes creating the Division of Employment Security had no provision giving it specific authority to sue or be sued in its official name. Nevertheless, this Court noted several statutory provisions that suggested at least limited capacity by the Division to be a party to litigation. The Court concluded that the legislature must have intended the Division to be a legal entity, at least for the limited purposes provided by the statutes. 214 S.W.2d at 534.

The circuit court is a...