State ex rel. UMWA Intern. Union v. Maynard

• Decision Date: 16 October 1985
• Docket Number: No. 16682,16682
• Citation: 176 W.Va. 131,342 S.E.2d 96
• Parties: STATE ex rel. UMWA INTERNATIONAL UNION v. Hon. Elliott R. MAYNARD, Judge Circuit Court of Mingo County, et al.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

Page 96

342 S.E.2d 96

176 W.Va. 131

STATE ex rel. UMWA INTERNATIONAL UNION v. Hon. Elliott R. MAYNARD, Judge Circuit Court of Mingo County, et al.

No. 16682.

Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia.

Oct. 16, 1985.

Concurring Opinion March 12, 1986.

Dissenting Opinion Dec. 19, 1985.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A writ of prohibition shall lie as a matter of right in all cases of usurpation and abuse of power, when the inferior court has not jurisdiction of the subject matter in controversy, or, having such jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers.

2. "Where prohibition is sought to restrain a trial court from the abuse of its legitimate powers, rather than to challenge its jurisdiction, the appellate court will review each case on its own particular facts to determine whether a remedy by appeal is both available and adequate, and only if the appellate court determines that the abuse of powers is so flagrant and violative of petitioner's rights as to make a remedy by appeal inadequate, will a writ of prohibition issue." Syllabus Point 2, Woodall v. Laurita, 156 W.Va. 707, 195 S.E.2d 717 (1973).

3. "Whether a contempt is classified as civil or criminal does not depend upon the act constituting such contempt because such act may provide the basis for either a civil or criminal contempt action. Instead, whether a contempt is civil or criminal depends upon the purpose to be served by imposing a sanction for the contempt and such purpose also determines the type of sanction which is appropriate." Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Robinson v. Michael, 166 W.Va. 660, 276 S.E.2d 812 (1981).

4. "[W]hen a party is required to pay a fine to the State in order to purge himself of contempt the imposition of such fine makes the action one for criminal contempt." Syllabus Point 10, in part, Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Doe, 159 W.Va. 200, 220 S.E.2d 672 (1975).

5. A circuit court has no authority to impose a prospective penalty in an indirect criminal contempt proceeding whereby a specific fine was imposed payable to the State for a subsequent violation of the court's order.

James B. McIntyre, James M. Haviland, Gary A. Collias, McIntyre, Haviland & Jordan, Charleston, Larry Harless, Morgantown, Bradley J. Ryles, Logan, for appellant.

Forrest A. Roles, Smith, Heenan, Althen & Zanolli, Charleston, Howard Persinger, Williamson, Bradley J. Pyles, Logan, for appellees.

MILLER, Chief Justice:

This case presents the question of whether a fine of $200,000 imposed by virtue of a prior order setting a prospective fine of $10,000 for each future violation of the circuit court's order was beyond the jurisdiction of the circuit court.

In the proceedings below, the Circuit Court of Mingo County issued a preliminary injunction on January 3, 1985, to limit picketing and other activities of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) and other union defendants involved in a labor dispute with Sprouse Creek Processing Company and Rocky Hollow Coal Company. ¹ This labor dispute arose at the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement between the UMWA and the respondent employers.

Soon after the preliminary injunction order was issued, the respondent employers filed a motion to have the UMWA and other union defendants adjudged in contempt. This motion was heard on January 30 and 31, 1985. On January 31, 1985, the court entered an order finding the UMWA in contempt and stating that a "prospective fine of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) per future violation be imposed upon the United Mine Workers of America, to be paid by it into this Court if it be upon notice and hearing, hereafter found to have violated an order of this Court in this case."

Subsequently, on February 16, 1985, the respondent employers filed a motion to have the UMWA found in contempt and hearings were held in response to this motion beginning March 22 and ending March 27, 1985. Thereafter, the court determined that the UMWA was in violation of the court's January 31, 1985 order on February 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, and March 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, and, in accordance with the prospective fine previously set, imposed a $200,000 fine for those twenty days of violation, which fine was payable to the State of West Virginia. ²

I.

The fact that the UMWA has sought to challenge the underlying jurisdictional basis of the lower court's order with a writ of prohibition rather than by appeal is not legally foreclosed. We recognized the duality of the two remedies in Hinkle v. Bauer Lumber & Home Building Center, Inc., 158 W.Va. 492, 495, 211 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1975): "A trial court may be reversed on appeal, as well as prohibited, when it exceeds its lawful jurisdiction. Bowles v. Mitchell, 146 W.Va. 474, 120 S.E.2d 697 (1961)."

We have traditionally couched the right to bring prohibition in the language of W.Va.Code, 53-1-1, which states that a writ of prohibition "shall lie as a matter of right in all cases of usurpation and abuse of power, when the inferior court has not jurisdiction of the subject matter in controversy, or, having such jurisdiction, exceeds its legitimate powers." See, e.g., Syllabus Point 3, State ex rel. McCartney v. Nuzum, 161 W.Va. 740, 248 S.E.2d 318 (1978); Syllabus Point 5, State ex rel. Smith v. Bosworth, 145 W.Va. 753, 117 S.E.2d 610 (1960).

In several cases we have permitted parties to utilize an original writ of prohibition in this Court to challenge the validity of a final order of a circuit court on a claim that the court had acted beyond its legitimate powers. In Rakes v. Ferguson, 147 W.Va. 660, 130 S.E.2d 102 (1963), we issued a writ of prohibition where the judge had refused to permit interest to run on a judgment in violation of W.Va.Code, 56-6-31.

Earlier in Thacker v. Ferguson, 127 W.Va. 177, 32 S.E.2d 47 (1944), while acknowledging that the matter could have been corrected on appeal, we issued a prohibition against the entry of an order that awarded attorney's fees to a wife in order to prosecute the appeal.

Similarly, prohibition was permitted in State ex rel. Winter v. MacQueen, 161 W.Va. 30, 239 S.E.2d 660 (1977), where the court had granted probation in violation of the provisions of W.Va.Code, 62-12-2.

We have also recognized that where the prohibition seeks to correct an abuse of power rather than going to the issue of the lower court's jurisdiction, inquiry into the efficacy of an appeal is proper along with other matters, as we stated in Syllabus Point 2 of Woodall v. Laurita, 156 W.Va. 707, 195 S.E.2d 717 (1973):

"Where prohibition is sought to restrain a trial court from the abuse of its legitimate powers, rather than to challenge its jurisdiction, the appellate court will review each case on its own particular facts to determine whether a remedy by appeal is both available and adequate, and only if the appellate court determines that the abuse of powers is so flagrant and violative of petitioner's rights as to make a remedy by appeal inadequate, will a writ of prohibition issue."

See also State ex rel. Williams v. Narick, 164 W.Va. 632, 264 S.E.2d 851 (1980).

In the present case, the claim is made that the circuit court lacked authority to impose the fine and, therefore, prohibition is proper to test this issue.

II.

Before addressing the specific issue raised in the present case, it is useful to review the law of contempt that has developed in this State. Our procedural law surrounding contempt proceedings, whether civil or criminal, has always been rather stringent in an attempt to fully protect the rights of alleged contemnors. In State ex rel. Arnold v. Conley, 151 W.Va. 584, 587, 153 S.E.2d 681, 683 (1966), overruled on other grounds, State ex rel. Koppers Co. v. International Union of Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 171 W.Va. 290, 298 S.E.2d 827 (1982), we said: " 'Whether the proceedings are civil or criminal, a contempt of court is in the nature of a criminal offense, and the proceeding for its punishment is criminal in its character, and the rules of evidence governing criminal trials are applicable.' "

In State ex rel. Hoosier Eng'g Co. v. Thornton, 137 W.Va. 230, 239, 72 S.E.2d 203, 208 (1952), we reiterated our rule regarding the sufficiency of an affidavit for contempt:

"In State [ex rel. Ben Franklin Coal Co.] v. Lewis, 113 W.Va. 529, 168 S.E. 812 [ (1933) ], this Court stated: '* * * And, since a prosecution for contempt is in the nature of a prosecution for a crime, such affidavit or information should state the acts constituting the offense with as great certainty as is required in criminal proceedings.' ... In State [ex rel. Mineral State Coal Co.] v. Komar, 113 W.Va. 526, 168 S.E. 810 [ (1933) ], this Court held: 'To support an adjudication of contempt the information or affidavit, upon which the rule is issued, must show on its face facts sufficient to constitute the offense.' " (Citations omitted).

Furthermore, we have traditionally held that proof in a criminal contempt proceeding must be beyond a reasonable doubt, as stated in Syllabus Point 2 of State ex rel. Cox v. Taft, 143 W.Va. 106, 100 S.E.2d 161 (1957):

" 'A trial for criminal contempt is a quasi criminal proceeding, and the rules of evidence in criminal trials apply thereto. In such trial the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.' Point 2, Syllabus, State ex rel. Continental Coal Co. v. Bittner, 102 W.Va. 677 [136 S.E. 202, 49 A.L.R. 968 (1926) ]."

Because of the nature of a contempt proceeding, we also held in Smoot v. Dingess, 160 W.Va. 558, 560, 236 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1977), that: "Regardless of whether a contempt proceeding is civil or criminal, a defendant has the right to be represented by counsel, and if he is indigent counsel must be appointed to represent him. Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Doe, 220 S.E.2d 672 (1975)." ³

The right to have a jury trial in a criminal contempt proceeding under Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution was...