State ex rel. Uzelac v. Lake Criminal Court, No. 30881
| Docket Nº | No. 30881 |
| Citation | 7 Ind.Dec. 205, 247 Ind. 87, 212 N.E.2d 21 |
| Case Date | December 07, 1965 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
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v.
LAKE CRIMINAL COURT, John H. McKenna, as Judge of the Lake
Criminal Court, Respondents.
[247 IND 88] Max Cohen, Gary, for appellant.
Henry S. Knowalczyk, Raymond C. Sufana, Crown Point, William A. Kowalski, East Chicago, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
The relator was charged with the crime of murder in the respondent court and has
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filed a petition for a writ of prohibition claiming he is entitled to be discharged under Rule 1-4D which became effective July 1, 1965. He was arrested for the crime as a result of the filing of an affidavit in the respondent court on January 28, 1965 and indicted on May 12, 1965. The pertinent sections of this rule involved in this case are Sections 1 and 2, which read as follows:'1. Defendant in jail.--No defendant shall be detained in jail on a charge, without a trial, for a continuous period embracing more than six months from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge (which ever is later); except where a continuance was had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such period because of congestion of the court calendar; provided, however, that in the last mentioned circumstances, the prosecuting attorney shall make such statement in a motion for continuance not later than ten days prior to the date set for trial, [247 IND 89] or if such motion is filed less than ten days prior to trial, the prosecuting attorney shall show additionally that the delay in filing the motion was not the fault of the prosecutor.
'2. Defendant in Jail.--Motion for Early Trial.--If any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to trial within fifty judicial days from the date of such motion, except where a continuance within said period is had on his motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such fifty judicial days because of the congestion of the court calendar: Provided, however, that in the last mentioned circumstance, the prosecuting attorney shall file a timely motion for continuance as under paragraph one (1) of this rule.'
Relator claims that the rule should be applied retroactively and to all criminal cases pending on July 1, 1965. Since he was initially detained in jail and charged by affidavit on January 28, 1965, he claims under Section 1 of the above rule he would be entitled to be discharged six months thereafter (July 28, 1965)unless brought to trial. The rule states it 'shall be effective on and after July 1, 1965.
Relator further contends that after July 1, 1965 he made a demand (on August 5, 1965) for immediate trial and that he is now entitled to be discharged, since fifty judicial days had elapsed without a trial since the demand, as provided in Rule 1-4D. The respondent contends this period was interrupted by reason of an insanity inquest of defendant ordered by the respondent court. We need not, however, consider that point since it becomes moot in view of our interpretation of the effective application of the rule fixed by this opinion.
The respondents state that this Court is without authority to enact Rule 1-4D, since 'it affects substantive rights' and is not procedural in effect; that the appropriate law, being Burns' Ind.Stat.Anno. Sec. 2-4718 (1946 Repl.), delegates to the Supreme Court the power to make rules only of practice and procedure and that this Court, [247 IND 90] although it has inherent power to make rules of practice and procedure, cannot enact substantive law.
We are unable to follow the respondents' contention in this respect. It is the Constitution which grants the 'substantive right' to a trial...
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Fall v. Indiana University Bd. of Trustees, No. 3:96-CV-205.
...a statute is not to be applied retroactively merely because it is procedural in nature. See State ex rel. Uzelac v. Lake Criminal Court, 247 Ind. 87, 212 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1965) ("It is true, statutes and rules as to procedural and remedial matters may be made to operate retroactively, but it ......
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In re Hershman, Bankruptcy No. 07-22840 JPK.
...may be made to operate retroactively, it is not the case that they must apply retroactively. State ex rel. Uzelac v. Lake Crim. Ct., 247 Ind. 87, 212 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1965). As we held in Gosnell v. Indiana Soft Water Service, Unless there are strong and compelling reasons, statutes will norm......
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Western Smelting & Metals v. Slater Steel, Inc., Civ. No. F 85-364.
...Oil Co., 561 F.2d 41, 45 (7th Cir.1977); Herrick v. Sayler, 245 F.2d 171, 174 (7th Cir.1957); State ex rel. Uzelac v. Lake Criminal Court, 247 Ind. 87, 212 N.E.2d 21 (1965); Davis v. State, 464 N.E.2d 926, 928 (Ind.App.1984). An exception to this general rule exists for remedial statutes wh......
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Shack v. State, No. 1270S290
...At the threshold it must be decided which is applicable, the statute or the rule. In State ex rel. Uzelac v. Lake Criminal Court (1965), 247 Ind. 87, 93, 212 N.E.2d 21, 24, it was 'Obviously, the end of uniformity and simplicity can be best achieved by applying Rule 1--4D to cases where 'th......
-
Fall v. Indiana University Bd. of Trustees, No. 3:96-CV-205.
...a statute is not to be applied retroactively merely because it is procedural in nature. See State ex rel. Uzelac v. Lake Criminal Court, 247 Ind. 87, 212 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1965) ("It is true, statutes and rules as to procedural and remedial matters may be made to operate retroactively, but it ......
-
In re Hershman, Bankruptcy No. 07-22840 JPK.
...may be made to operate retroactively, it is not the case that they must apply retroactively. State ex rel. Uzelac v. Lake Crim. Ct., 247 Ind. 87, 212 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1965). As we held in Gosnell v. Indiana Soft Water Service, Unless there are strong and compelling reasons, statutes will norm......
-
Western Smelting & Metals v. Slater Steel, Inc., Civ. No. F 85-364.
...Oil Co., 561 F.2d 41, 45 (7th Cir.1977); Herrick v. Sayler, 245 F.2d 171, 174 (7th Cir.1957); State ex rel. Uzelac v. Lake Criminal Court, 247 Ind. 87, 212 N.E.2d 21 (1965); Davis v. State, 464 N.E.2d 926, 928 (Ind.App.1984). An exception to this general rule exists for remedial statutes wh......
-
Shack v. State, No. 1270S290
...At the threshold it must be decided which is applicable, the statute or the rule. In State ex rel. Uzelac v. Lake Criminal Court (1965), 247 Ind. 87, 93, 212 N.E.2d 21, 24, it was 'Obviously, the end of uniformity and simplicity can be best achieved by applying Rule 1--4D to cases where 'th......