State ex rel. v. Safley

• Decision Date: 12 February 1938
• Citation: 112 S.W.2d 831,172 Tenn. 385
• Parties: STATE ex rel. v. SAFLEY, Chalrman, et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

112 S.W.2d 831

172 Tenn. 385

STATE ex rel. v. SAFLEY, Chalrman, et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

February 12, 1938

Appeal from Chancery Court, Van Buren County; T. L. Stewart Chancellor.

Bill by the State, on the relation of certain taxpayers, against C R. Safley, Chairman, and others to enjoin the issuance of school bonds under a resolution of the county court. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainants appeal.

Affirmed.

C. P Hutcheson, of Sparta, for appellants.

Turner & Haston, of McMinnville, for appellee.

CHAMBLISS Justice.

The bill was filed by taxpayers to enjoin issuance of $20,000 of bonds as provided by resolution of the county court adopted by a majority vote at its October session, 1937. The chancellor dismissed the bill, and complainants appealed.

The county court acted under the authority of Code 1932, §§ 2557-2569, being chapter 5, "Bonds for Schoolhouses; and for Repairing, Furnishing, and Equipping them," under Title 7 of the Code, headed "Education."

The original bill challenged the action of the county court (1) on the ground that there existed no necessity for the proposed school building, and that the expenditure would involve a waste of money; and (2) because the provisions of Code, §§ 10215-10217, were not complied with.

The chancellor correctly held (1) that the discretion vested in the county court could not be thus challenged; that the judgment of the complainants, or of the court, could not be thus substituted for that of the county court. See State ex rel. v. Brown, 159 Tenn. 591, at page 596, 21 S.W.2d 721, citing Reams v. Board of Mayor & Aldermen of McMinnville, 155 Tenn. 222, 291 S.W. 1067. And (2) it was also correctly held that the Code, sections 10215-10217 were without application; these sections referring to "applications for appropriations" by the county court, requiring such applications to be made in advance and to be entered on a book to be kept by the clerk for such purpose. The authorization of the issuance of bonds here involved was not an "appropriation" within the purview of these sections. The action was here taken under other specific sections of the Code which provide in detail the procedure. Section 2557, being the first section of chapter 5, is as follows:

" Quarterly county courts may issue and sell bonds for school buildings, etc.--The counties through their respective quarterly county courts are authorized to issue and sell bonds for the purposes and in the manner hereinafter provided."

And, after prescribing various details respecting the form, sale, terms, redemption, etc., of the bonds, section 2567 reads:

" Quarterly county court may issue said bonds, how; limit of amount.--Said bonds may be issued by the quarterly county court of any county by resolution by a majority of said members of said quarterly county court at any regular meeting thereof; provided, however, that said county shall not issue an amount of bonds to exceed three per cent. of the value of the taxable property for said county."

It is conceded that all provisions of this chapter 5 have been complied with, and there is no claim that the 3 per cent. limitation above quoted has been violated.

But by an amendment to the original bill the issuance of these bonds is challenged because not authorized by an election of the qualified voters of the county, as provided by Code, § 10248, chapter 69, Acts of 1923.

We are of opinion that the chancellor was again correct in holding that the general provisions of this section are not applicable to a proceeding under the special provisions of chapter 5, specifically relating to the issuance of bonds for the limited purposes described; that it, for schoolhouses.

It will be seen that by section 2567, supra, it is specifically provided that bonds for this purpose may be issued by the quarterly county court "by resolution by a majority of said members of said quarterly county court at any regular meeting thereof." This specific statutory authorization prevails over the general requirement of section 10248 for a majority vote of the qualified voters of the county, and constitutes an exception. This is true not only because the special provision of the Code prevails over the general provision invoked (see 25 R.C.L. page 927, citing authorities), but if there be apparent conflict, section 13 of the Code has controlling application, reading as follows:

" Conflicts.--If provisions of different chapters or articles of the Code appear to contravene each other, the provisions of each chapter or article shall prevail as to all matters and questions growing out of the subject matter of that chapter or article."

Both of the allegedly conflicting sections under consideration are parts of the Code of 1932, and in this sense were enacted contemporaneously. And looking to the acts thus...