State ex rel. Wahl v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 01 December 1917
• Docket Number: No. 20331.,20331.
• Citation: 272 Mo. 588,199 S.W. 978
• Parties: STATE ex rel. WAHL v. REYNOLDS et al., Judges.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

199 S.W. 978

272 Mo. 588

STATE ex rel. WAHL v. REYNOLDS et al., Judges.

No. 20331.

Supreme Court of Missouri. In Banc.

December 1, 1917.

Rehearing Denied December 22, 1917.

Application by certiorari by the State of Missouri, at the relation of George A. Wahl, against George D. Reynolds, William H. Allen, and William Dee Becker, constituting the judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, to declare the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals, published in 193 S. W. 56, to be void. Writ ordered quashed.

John Cashman, of St. Louis, for relator. R. P. & C. B. Williams, of St. Louis, for respondents.

BOND, J.

I. This is an application by certiorari to declare the majority opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals to be void for want of jurisdiction, in that the legal doctrine announced in that decision was in conflict with the last previous rulings of this court in the cases cited by relator. The point as to which the petitioner alleges errancy in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, depriving it of jurisdiction, is so much of its opinion as affirms the admissibility of evidence tending to show the plaintiff in a legal action for fraud and deceit was a man of weak mentality, inexperienced, overcredulous, and unqualified in business dealings, and therefore more likely to rely upon the false representations of defendant than if he had been a man of average capacity. It is urged on the part of the relator that such evidence was inadmissible in view of the fact that the petition filed by plaintiff stated the facts necessary to the sustention of an action for damages for fraud and deceit, without any averment of any insufficiency on the part of plaintiff in the respects shown by the testimony.

In dealing with the point thus presented to it, the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals (after reciting the substance of the testimony tending to show that plaintiff was weak-minded and easily influenced) disposed of the question as follows:

"The only question before us in this connection is whether testimony of this character is admissible at all in the absence of an allegation in the petition to the effect that plaintiff Charles D. Flack was weak-minded or mentally incapable of protecting himself in a business transaction. * * * From the record before us it appears that the trial court ruled as it did upon the theory that this testimony was admissible under the allegations of the petition that plaintiffs relied upon the alleged false representations of defendant, believing them to be true, and were thereby induced to enter into the contract in question and consummate the same. A consideration of this assignment of error has led us to the conclusion that this view is sound. It was, of course, unnecessary for plaintiffs to plead anything respecting the mental capacity of plaintiff Charles D. Flack as an essential element of their action for fraud. The petition alleges all of the substantive facts constituting the cause of action sued upon. Among these is the necessary averment that plaintiffs relied upon the representations alleged to have been made to them. It was essential that plaintiffs sustain this averment by proof, and it would seem that it was proper to receive for this purpose any evidence having any probative force and effect — and not otherwise inadmissible — which tended to support such averments. An allegation that Flack was weak-minded would seem to have no proper place in this petition. The Code requires a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action (section 1794, Rev. Stat. 1909), and provides that only the substantive facts necessary to constitute the cause of action shall be stated (section 1813, Rev. Stat. 1909), and provides further that a party shall not be required to state evidence in his pleading or to disclose therein the means by which he intends to prove his case (section 1818, Rev. Stat. 1909). Here the substantive facts to be alleged are that defendant made certain specified false representations of material facts in connection with an exchange of properties; that defendant knew such representations to be false — or made them of his own knowledge when he had no knowledge as to their truth or falsity; that they were made with the intent and purpose that they be acted upon by plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs did rely and act thereupon, to their damage. All of these substantive facts were properly alleged. It would have been unnecessary and improper to plead the evidence by which plaintiffs expected to prove such substantive facts. The fact that Charles D. Flack was meak-minded, if true, was not one of the substantive facts constituting the cause of action, and hence was not alleged. Were the action one to rescind the contract on the ground that Flack was mentally incapable of contracting, the question would be quite a different one. But in the instant case it seems quite clear that the question is not whether plaintiffs should have pleaded this matter, but whether evidence of this character is admissible at all in an action of this precise character. It was not admissible for any purpose except to prove that the representations were relied upon. In such cases reliance is a question of fact, to be established not alone by a party's own assertion, but to be gathered from probative facts and circumstances which cast light upon the matter. And if the party alleging fraud be ignorant, inexperienced, and of weak intellect, and hence guileless and readily susceptible to the artful designs of a fraud-feasor, and easily imposed upon, proof thereof ought to be held admissible in support of the allegations of reliance. Particularly is this true here, we think, since defendant strongly contended and sought to make it appear that plaintiffs had full opportunity to investigate, and did investigate, and are not in a position to assert that they relied and acted upon the representations alleged.

"In a leading encyclopedic compendium of our law, the rule concerning this matter is thus stated: `Evidence is admissible of any facts tending to show reasons for reliance upon defendant's representations — as that the discovery of the true condition of things was difficult, that the relations of the parties were of a confidential nature, that plaintiff was ignorant of the matters to which the representations related while defendant was familiar with them, or that plaintiff was of weak intellect and easily imposed upon.' See 20 Cyc. 117. (Italics ours.)

"In Bloomer v. Gray, 10 Ind. App. 326, 37 N. E. 819, cited in support of the italicized portion of the text above quoted, the action was one for fraud and deceit. A witness was permitted to state that the plaintiff was weak-minded at the time of the transaction in question. As to the propriety of admitting his testimony, the appellate court said: `We fully concur in the statement of counsel for the appellant, that the gravamen of the action is not to recover on account of the weak-mindedness of the appellee, but we cannot for that reason say that this evidence was not competent; on the contrary, we think it was proper for the purpose of showing his susceptibility to the representations of the decedent. The representations made, if false, would have created a liability against the decedent, whether the appellee was weak-minded or not, and to show that he was weak-minded did not increase the liability or entitle him to a recovery which otherwise he did not have. The fraud consisted in misleading the appellee and then taking advantage of him after he had been thus deceived. Any fact which tends to throw light on the manner in which the artifice was perpetrated is proper. True, the wrong done was no greater on account of appellee's weak mental condition, yet he was probably more susceptible to the wiles and cunning of the artful than if his mental faculties were strong and unimpaired. The jury were to determine the question of fraud from all the facts and circumstances, hence were entitled to know not only what the representations were which the decedent made, but what the probable effect of the same was upon the mind of the appellee, and what influence, if any, they had upon his making the trade.' It is true that in that case the petition alleged that certain false representations were made to plaintiff, `who was weak-minded.' But these words, thus thrown into a petition charging actual fraud, did not, in our opinion, affect the question of the admissibility of the testimony mentioned. And it appears from the quotation above that the...