State ex rel. Washington v. Crane
Decision Date | 10 June 2022 |
Docket Number | WD85356 |
Parties | STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. RASHAD P. WASHINGTON, Relator, v. THE HONORABLE KEVIN CRANE, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Before: Karen King Mitchell, Presiding Judge, and Gary D Witt and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judges
Relator Rashad Washington seeks a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court of Boone County, Missouri, to release Washington on probation following his successful completion of a shock incarceration program under § 559.115.3.[1] Following our receipt of suggestions in support of the writ from Washington and suggestions in opposition to the writ from the circuit court, we now issue a permanent writ of mandamus and direct the circuit court to release Washington on probation as provided in § 559.115.3.[2]
On October 1, 2021, Washington pled guilty to the following charges arising from multiple cases: two counts of possession of a controlled substance under § 579.015, and one count each of second-degree kidnapping under § 565.120 second-degree domestic assault under § 565.073 third-degree domestic assault under § 565.074, second-degree trafficking under § 579.068, resisting arrest under § 575.150, and first-degree burglary under § 569.160. In each case, the circuit court sentenced Washington to concurrent terms of incarceration ranging from 4 years to 9 years and, in each case, the court ordered Washington to participate in a 120-day shock incarceration program under § 559.115.3, pursuant to the State's recommendation.
On January 4, 2022, the Department of Corrections notified the circuit court that Washington successfully completed the 120-day program and would be statutorily discharged on February 4, 2022, unless otherwise ordered by the court. The following day, the circuit court entered an order denying Washington probation and executing all sentences in each case, indicating that it would be an abuse of discretion to release Washington. The court also set a hearing for January 28, 2022.
Washington's counsel then asked the court to allow Washington to withdraw his guilty pleas as a result of counsel's advice to Washington that, if Washington successfully completed the 120-day shock incarceration, he would be released on probation. The court advised counsel that granting probation was still discretionary, and he chose not to grant probation. Counsel advised the court that, in denying probation, the court was required to have some evidence or reason apart from merely the nature of the underlying charges. The court disagreed, denied the request to allow Washington to withdraw his pleas, and continued to deny Washington release on probation. Washington subsequently filed the underlying petition for a writ of mandamus.
"Mandamus is a discretionary writ that is appropriate when a court has exceeded its jurisdiction or authority, and where no remedy exists through appeal." State ex rel. Kizer v. Mennemeyer, 421 S.W.3d 558, 559 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). "A litigant seeking mandamus must allege and prove a clear, unequivocal, specific right to a thing claimed." Id. "Ordinarily, mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the discharge of ministerial functions, but not to control the exercise of discretionary powers." Id. ( ). "However, if the respondent's actions are wrong as a matter of law, then []he has abused any discretion []he may have had, and mandamus is appropriate." Id. Section 559.115.3 allows a court to "recommend placement of an offender in a department of corrections one hundred twenty-day program." "When the court recommends and receives placement of an offender in a department of corrections one hundred twenty-day program, the offender shall be released on probation if the department of corrections determines that the offender has successfully completed the program . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). Id. (emphasis added). Thus, "[u]nder section 559.115.3, the trial court is 'required' to release an offender on probation if he or she successfully completes the program absent a finding that probation would not be appropriate." State ex rel. Hunt v. Seay, 622 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Mo. App. S.D. 2021).[3]
"A trial court's 'determination that probation was not appropriate must be supported by evidence.'" Id. (quoting State ex rel. Cullen v. Cardona, 568 S.W.3d 492, 495 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019)). "Pre-sentencing evidence does not, by itself, make [Relator] unfit for probation." Id. ( ). While "a court may look to evidence concerning the offender's conduct prior to sentencing" when deciding whether probation is appropriate, the court "may not base its decision exclusively upon that evidence." Id. (quoting State ex rel. Dane v. State, 115 S.W.3d 876, 878 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003)) (emphasis added).
Here, in direct contravention of case law, the court very plainly indicated that its decision to deny probation was based solely on the nature of Washington's underlying charges and pre-sentencing evidence. Thus, the court was wrong as a matter of law in denying Washington release on probation under § 559.115.3.[4]
In its suggestions in opposition, the court argues that Hunt was wrongly decided insofar as it relied upon Beggs, which was decided under a prior version of § 217.362, rather than the current version of § 559.115.[5] In making this argument, however, the court overlooks the fact that Hunt also relied on Cullen, which interpreted the current version of § 217.362, containing nearly identical language to the current version of § 559.115.3.[6] Both §§ 217.362.3 and 559.115.3 relate to an offender's potential release on probation following successful completion of a department of corrections program. And, under the doctrine of in pari materia, "statutes relating to the same subject matter [must] be construed together even [if] the statutes are found in different chapters [or] were enacted at different times." State ex rel. Dir. of Revenue v. Gaertner, 32 S.W.3d 564, 566 (Mo. banc 2000). It would make little sense to allow a court to rely solely on pre-sentencing evidence to deny probation under § 559.115.3 but not allow the same under the nearly identical language of § 217.362.3. As the circuit court's interpretation would lead to an absurd result, we reject it. Fox v. State, 640 S.W.3d 744, 757 (Mo. banc 2022) .
The circuit court was aware of the nature of the charges against Washington when it accepted the State's recommendation to order Washington to participate in a 120-day shock incarceration program under § 559.115.3. The circuit court's decision to deny Washington release on probation following Washington's successful completion of the 120-day shock incarceration program was wrong as a matter of law insofar as the court's sole reason supporting its decision was the nature of Washington's underlying charges and pre-sentencing evidence. Accordingly, Washington's petition for a writ of mandamus is granted.
We issue a permanent writ in mandamus directing the circuit court to rescind its January 5, 2022 order denying Washington release on probation. The circuit court is directed to enter an order releasing Washington on probation on conditions the circuit court determines to be appropriate.
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