State ex rel. Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney v. Bennis

Decision Date19 July 1993
Docket NumberDocket No. 132568
Citation200 Mich.App. 670,504 N.W.2d 731
PartiesSTATE of Michigan ex rel. WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Charles BENNIS and Tina B. Bennis, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., John E. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Andrea Solak, Chief, Sp. Operations, and Larry L. Roberts, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

ACLU Fund of Michigan by Paul J. Denenfeld, Detroit, for defendants-appellants.

Before JANSEN, P.J., and MURPHY and MARILYN J. KELLY, JJ.

MURPHY, Judge.

Defendants appeal from a judgment of the circuit court declaring their 1977 Pontiac automobile to be a nuisance and abating the nuisance, thereby terminating their interest in the automobile. We reverse.

Defendant John Bennis was convicted of gross indecency, M.C.L. § 750.338b; M.S.A. § 28.570(2), following an incident in which police officers observed Mr. Bennis engaging in a sexual act with a woman in defendants' 1977 Pontiac. Plaintiff then filed this action, alleging that Mr. Bennis used defendants' car for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution, in violation of M.C.L. § 600.3801; M.S.A. § 27A.3801, and that the car was therefore a nuisance subject to abatement pursuant to M.C.L. § 600.3825; M.S.A. § 27A.3825. The circuit court declared the car to be a nuisance and abated the nuisance, terminating defendants' interest in the automobile.

Defendants first contend that they were entitled to summary disposition pursuant to M.C.R. § 2.116(C)(8) because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendant Tina Bennis had knowledge that her husband, defendant John Bennis, was using the vehicle, which they jointly owned, for purposes of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution. We agree that the prosecution was obligated to demonstrate that defendants knew of the use of the vehicle as a nuisance before the nuisance could be ordered abated.

The statutes relating to public nuisance provide for declaring certain property to be a nuisance where "lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling" takes place on that property. M.C.L. § 600.3801; M.S.A. § 27A.3801 provides, in pertinent part:

Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes or other disorderly persons, ... is declared a nuisance, ... and all ... nuisances shall be enjoined and abated as provided in this act and as provided in the court rules. Any person or his or her servant, agent, or employee who owns, leases, conducts, or maintains any building, vehicle, or place used for any of the purposes or acts set forth in this section is guilty of a nuisance.

M.C.L. § 600.3805; M.S.A. § 27A.3805 authorizes prosecuting attorneys, among others, to bring an action for equitable relief to abate a nuisance. M.C.L. § 600.3825; M.S.A. § 27A.3825 provides for the issuance of an order of abatement and sale of property found to be a nuisance, including vehicles.

M.C.L. § 600.3815(2); M.S.A. § 27A.3815(2) provides that "proof of knowledge of the existence of the nuisance on the part of the defendants or any of them, is not required." The Michigan Supreme Court, however, has held that, regardless of this statutory language, proof of knowledge is required for abatement. In People v. Schoonmaker, 241 Mich. 177, 181, 216 N.W. 456 (1927), our Supreme Court stated:

Defendants did not maintain a nuisance unless they permitted such illegal use of the premises; that is, consented to it or acquiesced, and whether they did so was a question of fact, not established by efforts to prevent misuse of the premises but only by some evidence disclosing permissive use....

... That transgressions may happen is possible, but remain offenses of the wrongdoer unless tolerated by the occupant to the extent of permissive use of the premises for such purpose or indifference thereto. The statute does not deprive one person of the use of his property by reason of the illegal acts of another, unless the owner's use bears a participating relation to the violation.

In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has held that the statute obviates the need for proof of knowledge, and apparently has ignored Schoonmaker, as noted by this Court in State ex rel. Oakland Co. Prosecutor v. Motorama Motel Corp., 105 Mich.App. 224, 228, 307 N.W.2d 349 (1981). See People ex rel. Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v. Bitonti, 306 Mich. 115, 119, 10 N.W.2d 329 (plurality) (1943); People ex rel. Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v. Tate, 306 Mich. 667, 669, 11 N.W.2d 282 (1943); State ex rel. Attorney General v. Robinson, 250 Mich. 99, 103, 229 N.W. 403 (1930). The Schoonmaker view has recently received support, however, in State ex rel. Wayne Co. Prosecuting Attorney v. Levenburg, 406 Mich. 455, 462, n. 1, 280 N.W.2d 810 (1979), in which our Supreme Court stated in dicta: "However, we acknowledge that a judgment for abatement in a prosecution of this nature cannot be rendered without a finding of knowledge of the accosting and soliciting on the part of the owners or operators of the place found to be a nuisance and their acquiescence in those activities."

Considering that Schoonmaker has never been expressly overruled, and in light of the comment in Levenburg, we follow the Schoonmaker analysis, as this Court did in Motorama, supra, and State ex rel. Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v. Weitzman, 21 Mich.App. 705, 710-711, 176 N.W.2d 463 (1970). We therefore hold that the prosecutor was required to prove that defendants knew that their vehicle was being used for a purpose set forth in M.C.L. § 600.3801; M.S.A. § 27A.3801. We further hold that the record in this case does not support a finding that Mrs. Bennis knew that the vehicle was being used for such purpose.

Defendants next contend that the claimed nuisance could not be abated because only one incident of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution was alleged before the trial court, and that this is insufficient to demonstrate a nuisance. We agree. In Motorama, the plaintiff alleged that, on one occasion, a police officer was accosted and solicited by an unknown female at a bar and that she then took the officer across the street to the defendant's hotel. The trial court granted the defendant summary disposition, holding in part that the one instance of lewdness and assignation alleged by the plaintiff was insufficient to support a claim of nuisance. This Court affirmed, holding that a single alleged incident is insufficient to create a nuisance unless circumstances are such that a reasonable inference can be drawn that the conduct was habitual. Id., 105 Mich.App at 229-230, 307 N.W.2d 349; see also Bitonti, supra, 306 Mich. at 119-120, 10 N.W.2d 329 (Justice Chandler). The facts in Motorama were insufficient to permit such an inference, even though the affidavit of the police officer in question stated that there had been numerous arrests of females in that area for solicitation at the bar across from the defendant's hotel. Id., 105 Mich.App. at 226, 229-230, 307 N.W.2d 349.

The Motorama approach best effectuates the purpose of the statute. The abatement statute was enacted to subject houses of prostitution to abatement as nuisances. State ex rel. Wayne Co. Prosecutor v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 396 Mich. 244, 246-250, 240 N.W.2d 460 (1976). The purpose of the act has also been described as eliminating the use of property in connection with gambling, prostitution, and the illicit sale of liquor. People ex rel. Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v. Sill, 310 Mich. 570, 575, 17 N.W.2d 756 (1945); State ex rel. Oakland Prosecuting Attorney v. Ginell, 159 Mich.App. 679, 681-682, 407 N.W.2d 59 (1987). The statute is not intended to regulate the morality of individuals, or to prevent incidents of immorality in, for example, hotels that are otherwise respectable establishments. See Diversified Theatrical Corp., supra, 396 Mich. at 247, 240 N.W.2d 460.

As in Motorama, we hold that a single incident is insufficient to establish a nuisance. Further, the circumstances of this case do not permit a reasonable inference that the conduct was habitual. In this case, the prosecution has alleged only a single incident to support the contention that defendants' car was a nuisance. While the prosecution discusses at length the reputation and record of Kathy Palarchio, the woman found in the car with Mr. Bennis, this does not establish that defendants' car was used on more than that occasion for lewdness, assignation, or prostitution. Similarly, testimony was presented that Mr. Bennis was seen on more than one occasion driving in that area and talking to women. Not only does this observed conduct not prove that defendant was involved in lewdness, assignation, or prostitution, there was no evidence to establish that this conduct, if it occurred, took place in the vehicle in question. In fact, defendants allegedly purchased the car only three weeks before the incident that gave rise to this action.

The dissent in this case states that the mobile nature of a vehicle, as compared to real property, justifies finding the vehicle to be a nuisance upon proof of only one incident of prohibited conduct. The dissent reasons that to require proof that the vehicle was used on more than one occasion for a purpose proscribed by the statute would thwart the purpose of the public nuisance statute. While the prohibited conduct would indeed have to be observed on more than one occasion, that is the very nature of a nuisance. Motorama, supra, 105 Mich.App. at 229- 230, 307 N.W.2d 349. In fact, if conduct happens so rarely that authorities investigating the situation are unable to observe a recurrence of the conduct, we would hesitate to find a nuisance. Just as one incident of prostitution...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • December 30, 1994
    ...In fact, defendants allegedly purchased the car only three weeks before the incident that gave rise to this action. [200 Mich.App. at 675-676, 504 N.W.2d 731.] In Motorama, 1 the panel stated that "[a] nuisance involves the notion of repeated or continuing conduct and should not be based up......
  • Bennis v. Michigan
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • March 4, 1996
    ...qualify as a public nuisance because only one occurrence was shown and there was no evidence of payment for the sexual act. 200 Mich.App. 670, 504 N.W.2d 731 (1993). The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the abatement in its entirety. 447 Mich. 719, 527 N.W......
  • State ex rel. Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney v. Dizzy Duck, Docket Nos. 134045
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • January 18, 1994
    ...definition is nevertheless limited by reference to the definition of "prostitution." See also State ex rel. Wayne Co. Prosecuting Attorney v. Bennis, 200 Mich.App. 670, 504 N.W.2d 731 (1993). In determining the meaning of "lewdness," we note the direction in Levenburg, supra, 406 Mich. at 4......
2 books & journal articles
  • In Rem Civil Forfeiture
    • United States
    • University of Nebraska - Lincoln Nebraska Law Review No. 76, 2021
    • Invalid date
    ...1987). 55. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 997 (1996). 56. Id. 57. Id. 58. Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecuting Atty. v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Mich Ct. App. 1993). 59. Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483 (Mich. 1994). 60. Id. at 491. 61. Id. at......
  • The Supreme Court rejects Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protection against the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property.
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 87 No. 3, March 1997
    • March 22, 1997
    ...Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729). (80) Id. at 6. (81) Id. at 5. (82) Id. at 5 nA (83) Id. (84) Michigan v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731, 732-33 (Mich. Ct. App. (85) Id. at 733. The Michigan appellate court recognized that requiring the prosecution to prove such knowledge is......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT