State ex rel. West v. Gray

• Decision Date: 16 February 1954
• Citation: 70 So.2d 471
• Parties: STATE ex rel. WEST v. GRAY et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 471

70 So.2d 471

STATE ex rel. WEST v.GRAY et al.

Supreme Court of Florida, En Banc Feb. 16, 1954.

J. Frank West, Williston, for relator.

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Howard S. Bailey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for R. A. Gray, Secretary of State.

Francis P. Whitehair, De Land, and Lawrence A. Truett, Tallahassee, for Charley E. Johns.

J. Lewis Hall, Tallahassee, for Brailey Odham, amicus curiae.

Ausley, Collins & Ausley and Messer & Willis, Tallahassee, for LeRoy Collins, amicus curiae.

PER CURIAM.

In original mandamus proceedings filed in this court, we are required to determine the effect of Section 5 of Article III of the Constitution, F.S.A., of this state on the eligibility of the Honorable Charley E. Johns to become a candidate for the office of Governor to fill the unexpired term of the late Governor Dan McCarty.Senator Johns has announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination for governor and has qualified with the Secretary of State, a respondent here, for such office.The relator seeks to compel the respondent to expunge from his records all matters pertaining to Senator Johns' candidacy.We exercised our discretion in favor of granting the alternative writ in view of the great public interest in the question presented, and the cause is now before the court on motion of the respondent to quash the alternative writ.

The section of the Constitution involved in the present controversy provides that 'no Senator or member of the House of Representatives shall during the time for which he was elected, be appointed, or elected to any civil office under the Constitution of this State that has been created, or the emoluments, whereof shall have been increased during such time.'Section 5, Article III, Constitution of Florida.

Senator Johns was elected to the Senate at the general election in November 1952 for a four-year term, so that his term of office as Senator will not expire until the general election in 1956.The General Appropriations Bill of 1953, Chapter 28115, F.S.A. § 282.01, subd. 1(22), carried an appropriation of $15,000 for the salary of the Governor for the biennium ending June 30, 1955.This was an increase of $3,000 per year over the statutory salary of $12,000 per year fixed by Chapter 22913, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1945, for this office.

The only real question involved in this proceeding is whether the 1953 Appropriations Bill, which provided for an increase in the salary of the office of Governor in the manner noted above, and which, by its own limitation, expires in what would have been approximately the middle of the four-year term of the late Governor McCarty, had he lived, constituted an increase in the emoluments of the office of Governor, within the purview of Section 5 of Article III, supra.

It is a firmly-settled principle of law that in 'construing and applying provisions of a Constitution, the leading purpose should be to ascertain and effectuate the intent and the object designed to be accomplished.'Mugge v. Warnell, 58 Fla. 318, 50 So. 645, 646;State ex rel. Nuveen v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102 So. 739, 37 A.L.R. 1298.And the intention to be ascertained must be that of the framers and the people adopting it, for that intention is the 'spirit' of the Constitution.Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So. 308;Sullivan v. City of Tampa, 101 Fla. 298, 134 So. 211;City of Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co., 113 Fla. 168, 151 So. 488;State v. City of Miami, 113 Fla. 280, 152 So. 6;City of Tampa v. Tampa Shipbuilding & Engineering Co., 136 Fla. 216, 186 So. 411;State ex rel. McKay v. Keller, 140 Fla. 346, 191 So. 542;Sylvester v. Tindall, 154 Fla. 663, 18 So.2d 892;Story on the Constitution, 5th Ed., Section 400.

In determining intent and purpose of a constitutional provision the courts'should constantly keep in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.Effect should be given to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used [but the] intent may be shown by implications as well as by express provisions.'16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 16, pp. 51-54.Amos v. Mathews, supra;Getzen v. Sumter County, 89 Fla. 45, 103 So. 104;State v. Greer, supra;State ex rel. McKay v. Keller, supra;In re Warner's Estate, 160 Fla. 460, 35 So.2d 296.

The first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of a constitution is to construe it according to the sense of the terms and the intention of the framers of such constitution and the people who adopted it.Where the words are plain and clear and the sense distinct and perfect arising on them, there is generally no necessity to have recourse to other means of interpretation.But where there is some ambiguity or doubt arising from other sources then interpretation has its proper office.'There may be obscurity as to the meaning, from the doubtful character of the words used, from other clauses in the same instrument, or from an incongruity or repugnancy between the words and the apparent intention derived from the whole structure of the instrument or its avowed object.In all such cases interpretation becomes indispensable.'Story on the Constitution, 4th Ed., Vol. I, Secs. 400, 401, pp. 305, 306.

Where the words of a constitution, although they express the intention, when they are rightly understood, are themselves of doubtful meaning, recourse must be had to probable or rational conjectures to find out in what sense such words are used.When the words in a constitution admit of two or more senses, each of which is agreeable to common usage, the sense in which they were intended to be used must be collected partly from the words and partly from conjecture as to their intention.In short, the words must be construed 'according to the subject matter, in such a sense as to produce a reasonable effect, and with reference to the circumstances of the particular transaction.'Ibid., Sec. 402, p. 306.

To accomplish this object, light may be obtained 'from contemporary facts or expositions; from antecedent mischiefs, from known habits, manners, and institutions; and from other sources almost innumerable, which may justly affect the judgment in drawing a fit conclusion in the particular case.'Ibid.

'Where the words admit of two senses, each of which is conformable to common usage, that sense is to be adopted which, without departing from the literal import of the words, best harmonizes with the nature and objects, the scope and design, of the instrument.'Ibid., Sec. 404, p. 308.

All of the authorities are in agreement that such a provision as is involved in this proceeding is inserted in a constitution for the purpose of taking from a senator or a representative 'any personal motive which might operate upon him to create a new office or increase the emoluments of any office, new or old.'Tucker on the Constitution, Vol. I, p. 442.As the matter is stated by Mr. Justice Story, 'The reasons for excluding persons from offices who have been concerned in creating them, or increasing their emoluments, are to take away, as far as possible, any improper bias in the vote of the representative, and to secure to the constituents some solemn pledge of his disinterestedness.'Story on the Constitution, 5th Ed., Vol. I, section 867, p. 633.(Emphasis supplied.)

Our own court, speaking through Mr. Justice Terrell in State ex rel. Hawthorne v. Wiseheart, 158 Fla. 267, 28 So.2d 589, 592, has aptly stated that the purpose is 'to remove the temptation on the part of the Legislature or any of its members to 'featherbed' on the public domain during the period of their election, by raising the salary of or creating public offices and getting themselves appointed thereto.'

The expressions of other courts of last resort are also illuminating on the question of the purpose of similar constitutional provisions.Thus, the Mississippi court, in Brady v. West, 50 Miss. 68, says: 'This is a wise provision of the constitution, designed as far as possible to preserve the purity of legislation, by putting the sting of disability into the temptation of members of the legislature to create offices of profit with a view to taking and holding them themselves.'And the Alabama court, in Montgomery v. State ex rel. Enslen, 107 Ala. 372, 18 So. 157, said: 'The evident intention of the framers of the Constitution was to prohibit the legislature from creating offices, or increasing the salary of officers for the possible benefit of any members thereof, and thereby to remove the temptation of prostituting their positions for private gain or preferment.'From the Maryland court, in Mayor & Com'rs of Westernport v. Green, 144 Md. 85, 124 A. 403, 404, we have this expression: 'It was the obvious intent of the Constitutional provision we have quoted to protect the members of the Legislature from the influence, upon their judgment and conduct, of any personal interest in the creation of new offices or the increase of the salaries or emoluments of any offices * * *.'It will prohibit any person, being a member of either branch of the General Assembly, from legislating * * * in order that he may be benefited by it".(Emphasis supplied.)

The delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1885, at which our present constitution was adopted, were quite as well aware then, as we are now, of the problems and temptations which beset our legislators.'The problem to be dealt with was venality.Its dimensions were well known in 1895.It had theretofore often and variously manifested itself in public life.It was not the product of the machine age, the passing of frontiers, or social and industrial developments.It was and is the corrupt product of a quality of human nature confined to no age, class, or race--self interest.'State ex rel. Jugler v. Grover, 102 Utah 41, 125 P.2d 807, at page 822.The authors of our constitution sought to meet this problem by the enactment of the...