State Ex Rel. William A. Stinson v. The Honorable Ted House
| Citation | 316 S.W.3d 915 |
| Decision Date | 31 August 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 90364.,SC 90364. |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. William A. STINSON, Relator,v.The Honorable Ted HOUSE, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Theodore G. Pashos and Scott E. Simpson, Niedner, Bodeux, Carmichael, Huff, Lenox and Pashos LLP, St. Charles, Ann P. Hagan, Hagan, Hamlett & Maxwell LLC, Mexico, for Relator.
William Stinson was ordered by the trial court to execute a medical records authorization to release his healthcare records in a wrongful death action filed against him and his parents. This Court granted Mr. Stinson's request for a preliminary writ of prohibition preventing the trial court from compelling execution of the authorization. Because the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Mr. Stinson to sign a medical records authorization permitting disclosure of his medical records that are protected by the physician-patient privilege, the preliminary writ is made permanent.
On August 14, 2004, William A. Stinson was involved in a high-speed automobile collision that resulted in the death of Ricky J. Young. Mr. Young's daughter, Shauna Young, is the plaintiff in the present wrongful death suit. Her amended petition for wrongful death contains two counts. The first count seeks damages against Mr. Stinson for negligently operating the motor vehicle that caused her father's death. The allegations in the petition state that, at the time of the collision, Mr. Young was attempting to turn off of the interstate when Mr. Stinson, who was approaching from behind, moved into the left lane to pass and struck Mr. Young's vehicle. The petition further alleges that Mr. Stinson was under the influence of intoxicants at the time of the crash and was traveling in excess of the posted speed limit.
The second count in Ms. Young's petition seeks damages against Mr. Stinson's parents and their automobile dealership 1 for negligently entrusting Mr. Stinson with the vehicle involved in the collision. The petition alleges that Mr. Stinson's parents knew or should have known that Mr. Stinson was addicted to alcohol and drugs that impaired his driving ability, that he had received medical treatment for such addictions, and that he had been charged and convicted of numerous alcohol-related driving offenses prior to the August 14 collision.
In the course of discovery, Ms. Young served Mr. Stinson with a request for production asking him to execute a medical records authorization permitting the disclosure of all medical and psychological records pertaining to treatment he had received for alcohol, drug, or substance abuse problems dating back to 1990. Mr. Stinson objected to the request on the ground that the records sought were protected by physician-patient privilege, which had not been waived. The trial court overruled Mr. Stinson's objection and ordered him to execute the medical records authorization.
Thereafter, Mr. Stinson filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals to prevent the trial judge from compelling Mr. Stinson to sign the medical records authorization. After granting a preliminary order in prohibition, the court of appeals quashed its order and denied Mr. Stinson's writ petition. Mr. Stinson then petitioned this Court for a preliminary writ of prohibition, which the Court issued. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 4.
In his sole point relied on, Mr. Stinson argues that he is entitled to a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from enforcing its order requiring execution of the medical records authorization because his medical records are protected by the physician-patient privilege, which has not been waived. Mr. Stinson contends that by ordering the execution of the medical records authorization form, the trial court acted in excess of its authority, thereby entitling him to a writ of prohibition.
Prohibition is an appropriate remedy when a party is ordered to produce material that is protected from discovery by some privilege. State ex rel. Rogers v. Cohen, 262 S.W.3d 648, 650 (Mo. banc 2008). Otherwise, if privileged material were produced, the damage to the disclosing party would be irreparable and could not be repaired on appeal. Id. ().
The physician-patient privilege is established by section 491.060. 2 The statute provides that a licensed physician or psychologist is “incompetent to testify ... concerning any information which he or she may have acquired from any patient while attending the patient in a professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him or her to prescribe and provide treatment for such patient as a physician....” Section 491.060(5). The physician-patient privilege “applies to medical records and all aspects of discovery.” State ex rel. Dean v. Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d 561, 567 (Mo. banc 2006). See also Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 62 (Mo. banc 1999); State ex rel. Benoit v. Randall, 431 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Mo. banc 1968).
In the present case, the medical records sought by Ms. Young fall within the protective scope of the physician-patient privilege. The medical records authorization form submitted with Ms. Young's request for production sought disclosure of “all personal health information pertaining to any care, treatment, evaluation, diagnosis and/or observation for medical, psychiatric or psychological services arising out of, or in any way relating to, alcohol, drug or substance abuse problems and any medical, psychiatric or psychological conditions relating thereto from January 1, 1990 to the present.” By its terms, the request seeks access to records containing information used to evaluate, diagnose, and treat Mr. Stinson. Such records assuredly would include information acquired from Mr. Stinson by a physician or psychologist to prescribe and provide treatment and, therefore, fall within the scope of the physician-patient privilege.
Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Stinson placed any of his medical conditions in issue or took any other steps to affirmatively waive the privilege. The mere fact that Mr. Stinson has denied liability and is defending against the present suit...
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