State ex rel. Wright v. Weyandt

• Decision Date: 15 June 1977
• Citation: 50 Ohio St.2d 194,363 N.E.2d 1387,4 O.O.3d 383
• Parties: , 4 O.O.3d 383 The STATE ex rel. WRIGHT et al., Appellants, v. WEYANDT, Summit County Sheriff, Appellee. No 76-1152.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 194

50 Ohio St.2d 194

363 N.E.2d 1387, 4 O.O.3d 383

The STATE ex rel. WRIGHT et al., Appellants, v.WEYANDT, SummitCounty Sheriff, Appellee.

No 76-1152.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

June 15, 1977.

Syllabus by the Court

The law favors the prevention of litigation by compromise and settlement.(Shallenberger v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 167 Ohio St. 494, 505, 150 N.E.2d 295, approved and followed.)

In June 1974, relators, Paul Wright, Charles Hughes, Tom Casenhiser and Kenneth Lockard were discharged from their positions as deputy sheriffs by Summit County SheriffRobert Campbell.Ronald Weyandt, relator herein, succeeded Campbell as Summit County Sheriff in July 1975.He abolished military ranking within the position of deputy sheriff shortly thereafter.The relators appealed their discharges to the State Personnel Board of Review which, in December 1975, ordered that they be 'reinstated to their positions effective on the date of their termination.'The Court of Common Pleas of Summit County affirmed that order in January 1976.

In February 1976, relators ¹ signed a release with respondent Weyandt and other Summit County officials in which relators waived 'any and all claims' against those officials arising out of their 'discharges from employment' and the Common Pleas Court's affirmance of the board's order.In exchange for this release relators were promised $57,535.51 in back pay and 'immediate reinstatement * * * to their former positions of employment with the office of the Sheriff of Summit County, at a rate of compensation not less than that received at the time of their respective terminations from employment * * *.'

In March 1976, relators filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals requesting a writ of mandamus directing Sheriff Weyandt 'to reinstate relators to their former positions or positions of comparable degree, to further restore relators to the rank held on termination, to make them whole for their loss of earnings since reinstatement, and to order the respondent to properly pay relators.'

The Court of Appeals granted a writ 'to adjust the pay of relators to effect all across-the-board pay raises made after the return to service of relators,' but otherwise denied the requested writ.Relators Wright and Hughes appealed that denial of their requests for payment, reflecting 'all across-the-board increases granted during the period of termination'(emphasis added), and for a return to positions identical with or comparable to the ranks which they held on termination.

The cause is now before this court on an appeal as of right.

Miller & Morris Co., L.P.A., George B. Vasko, Akron, and James L. Wagner, Mentor, for appellants.

Gillen, Miller & Tipping Co., L.P.A., Harry A. Tipping and David E. Beitzel, Akron, for appellee.

WILLIAM B. BROWN, Justice.

The sole issue raised by this cause is whether a writ of mandamus should issue directing respondent Weyandt (1)'to adjust the pay' of relators 'to reflect all across-the-board increases granted during the period of termination' and (2)'to restore relators-appellants to their former positions or positions of comparable degree and to restore them to the rank held on termination.'

In State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm.(1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631, paragraph one of the syllabus, the prerequisites of an action in mandamus are set forth as follows:

'Where a public officer or agency is under a clear legal duty to perform an official act, and where there is no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, an action in mandamus will lie originally in the Supreme Court or in the Court of Appeals.'

Mandamus will not lie unless there is a clear legal duty, and there is no adequate alternative remedy in the ordinary course of the law.SeeState ex rel. Sibarco, Corp. v. City of Berea(1966), 7 Ohio St.2d 85, 218 N.E.2d 428, paragraph one of the syllabus and R.C. 2731.05.

Relators have such an adequate alternative remedy.Although a releasor is estopped from enforcing those rights which the relinquishes in a valid release (in this case the rights granted by the board's order)(47 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, Release, Section 18;Jones v. Jones(1898), 15 C.C. 618, 8 C.D. 628, affirmed, 61 Ohio St. 665, 57 N.E. 1133;seeO'Donnell v. Langdon(1960), 170 Ohio St. 528), he gains the right to sue on the release itself.²

Relators argue, however, that they do not have an adequate remedy based on their release because their request for a return to positions identical with or comparable to the rank which they held on termination cannot be obtained in an action for damages or, under traditional contract law, in a request for specific performance.SeeMasetta v. Nat. Bronze & Aluminum Foundry(1953), 159 Ohio St. 306, 112 N.E.2d 15.

The circumstances giving rise to relators' right to reinstatement are not typical, however, of those in actions where one party requests specific peformance of personal service contracts.

It is common sense that the law favors 'the prevention of litigation, by the compromise and settlement of controversies.'White v. Brocaw(1863), 14 Ohio St. 339, 346;Shallenberger v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co.(1958), 167 Ohio St. 494, 505, 150 N.E.2d 295.Relators undertook to settle their cases by signing a release that expressly and unambiguously promised them, in language virtually identical to that of the order, 'immediate reinstatement * * * to their former positions of employment.'Given the unequivocal promise of reinstatement contained in the release, it is clear that ralators did not intend to forfeit that right by settling with the respondent.It is also clear that, were it not for the fact that they agreed to the release, relators would be entitled to a writ of mandamus enforcing the board's order.SeeState ex rel. Dean v. Huddle(1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 234, 344 N.E.2d 138.Therefore, if specific performance is denied in the instant cause, then the intent of the parties will be ignored and relators will have given up their right, pursuant to the board's order, to be reinstated to their former positions solely because they signed a release purporting to promise reinstatement, and because they attempted the kind of contractual solution to their legal dispute which this court and most jurisdictions favor.See 15A American Jurisprudence 2d, Compromise and Settlement, Section 5.

Equitable relief such as specific performance was originally developed to insure fairness and good faith dealings between parties.1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 61, Section 56.And, although the application of equitable relief has been limited by the maxim that 'equity follows the law'(Pomeroy, supra, at page 793, Section 425), equitable relief has been granted where a writ was unavailable or the legal remedy of damages...