State ex rel. Wyrick v. City of Ritzville

• Decision Date: 29 December 1942
• Docket Number: 28769.
• Citation: State ex rel. Wyrick v. City of Ritzville, 132 P.2d 737, 16 Wn.2d 36 (Wash. 1942)
• Parties: STATE ex rel. WYRICK et al. v. CITY OF RITZVILLE et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

132 P.2d 737

16 Wn.2d 36

STATE ex rel. WYRICK et al. v. CITY OF RITZVILLE et al.

No. 28769.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 29, 1942

Department 1.

Action by the State of Washington, on the relation of E. H. Wyrick and Warren A. Smith, against the City of Ritzville, a municipal corporation of the third class, Edward G. Cross its treasurer, and others, to restrain payments of compensation to mayor and councilmen of defendant city pursuant to an ordinance authorizing such payments. From a judgment prohibiting further payments, the defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Adams County; Matt L. Driscoll, judge.

George H. Freese, of Ritzville, for appellants.

Miller & Miller, of Ritzville, for respondents.

STEINERT Justice.

This case comes to us on an agreed statement of facts. The city of Ritzville is a municipal corporation of the third class. The present mayor clerk, treasurer, and four of its councilmen were regularly elected on December 10, 1940, and took office on the first Tuesday in January, 1941. Another of its councilmen was elected in December, 1938, and took office in January, 1939. Two others of its councilmen were appointed on January 7, 1941, and August 10, 1941, respectively, to fill the unexpired four-year terms of two former councilmen who had been elected in 1938 and qualified in 1939. At all times hereinafter mentioned, all of the foregoing officers were serving in their respective capacities by virtue of their election or appointment as indicated above.

Prior to July, 1941, these respective officers, with the exception of councilman Bill Thiel, who was a subsequent appointee, had all served without salary or other compensation, there being no warrant in law at that time for compensating them for the performance of their official duties. At its 1941 session, the legislature enacted chapter 115, Laws of 1941, providing for reimbursement of expenses and for payment of salaries of certain officials of cities of the third and fourth classes. The legislative act became effective June 11, 1941.

Following the passage of that act, the city of Ritzville, through its council, enacted ordinance No. 355, which provided that the mayor and councilmen should each be paid the sum of five dollars for each council meeting attended by him not in excess of two such meetings a month. Pursuant to that ordinance, the mayor and councilmen were each paid the prescribed amount for their services rendered during the month of July, and it is alleged that unless otherwise prohibited they will continue to be paid such amount.

This action was brought by two resident taxpayers of Ritzville to restrain the issuance or payment of any warrants for compensation provided by the above mentioned ordinance. Upon a hearing by the court, a judgment was entered peremptorily prohibiting the further issuance or payment of any such warrants. From that judgment the city of Ritzville and its officers have appealed.

The only question presented upon the appeal is whether the legislative act and the ordinance referred to above, in so far as they may be said to permit the payment of salaries to persons holding office under a then existing term, are in conflict with Article II, § 25, and Article XI, § 8, of the Washington constitution.

Section 1 of chapter 115, Laws of 1941, amending § 7 of chapter 184, Laws of 1915, Rem.Rev.Stat. § 9120 (P.C. § 790), reads as follows: 'The Mayor and the members of the City Council may be reimbursed for actual expenses incurred in the discharge of their official duties upon presentation of a claim therefor, after allowance and approval thereof by resolution of the City Council; and each City Concilman may be paid for attending council meetings an amount not exceeding five dollars ($5.00) per meeting and for not more than two (2) council meetings each month, as the City Council may fix by ordinance. The Treasurer, Clerk, City Attorney and Health Officer shall severally receive, at stated times, a compensation, to be fixed by ordinance by the City Council which compensation shall not be increased or diminished after their election, or during their several terms of office. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the City Council from fixing such several amounts of compensation, in the first instance, during the term of office of any such officer or after his election. The Mayor and other officers shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by the City Council at the time the estimates are made as provided by law.'

We have italicized that portion of the act upon which appellants especially rely as permitting the payment of salary compensation to them during their present terms of office.

Article II, § 25, of the constitution provides: 'The legislature shall never grant any extra compensation to any public officer, agent, servant, or contractor after the services shall have been rendered or the contract entered into, nor shall the compensation of any public officer be increased or diminished during his term of office.'

Article XI, § 8, reads, in part, as follows: '* * * The salary of any county, city, town, or municipal officers shall not be increased or diminished after his election or during his term of office. * * *'

If the statute or the ordinance here in question had specifically provided that fixed compensations then attaching to certain municipal offices might be increased and paid to incumbent officers during their then existing terms, there could be no doubt that such enactments, whether formulated by the legislature or by the city council, would be unconstitutional and void.

Appellants contend, however, that the inhibitions of the constitution do not apply to situations where, as here, no compensation formerly attached to the office, and where ' in the first instance' provision is made for compensation during the term of the particular office. The argument may be plausible but, in our opinion, it is unsound. It is as much in violation of the spirit and purpose of the constitution to permit payment of compensation to an officer during his term of office, where previously the office carried no compensation, as it is to permit the amount of compensation previously fixed, to be...