State ex rel. Young v. Noble Circuit Court
Decision Date | 06 August 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 1274S252,1274S252 |
Citation | 263 Ind. 353,332 N.E.2d 99 |
Parties | STATE of Indiana on the relation of Ruth Anna YOUNG, Relatrix, v. The NOBLE CIRCUIT COURT et al., Respondents. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Howard E. Petersen, LaGrange, Louis G. Ketcham, Albion, for relatrix.
R. Stan Emerick, Kendallville, Virginia D. McCarty, Indianapolis, for respondents.
On December 24, 1974, this Court issued an alternative writ of prohibition at the instance of relatrix Ruth Anna Young. The writ restrained the Noble Circuit Court, The Honorable John C. Hagen, regular judge of the Noble Circuit Court, and several judges pro tempore of that court from taking further action in the matter of a recount petition filed by Jack E. Reidenbach. Upon consideration of respondents' return and relatrix's brief, we dissolve the alternative writ.
Relatrix Young, by official canvass of votes cast on November 5, 1974, was declared the victorious candidate in the race for auditor of Noble County. The only other candidate, Jack E. Reidenbach (hereinafter called Reidenbach) sought a recount pursuant to IC 1971, 3--1--27--1, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 29--5401 (Burns 1969 Repl.) which provides:
'--Any candidate for any public office voted upon at any election held within the state of Indiana shall have the right to have the votes cast for the office for which he was a candidate recounted in any voting precinct or precincts in any county or counties, as the case may be, under the conditions and in the manner and with the effect as in this article provided.'
The General Assembly, recognizing that the orderly transition of governmental power is facilitated by the early resolution of election disputes, has required that such petitions be filed within fifteen days after the polling date. IC 1971, 3--1--27--3, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 29--5403 (Burns 1969 Repl.). Reidenbach's petition was timely filed on November 19, 1974.
The contents of a recount petition are governed by IC 1971, 3--1--27--5, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 29--5405 (Burns 1969 Repl.), which provides:
(Emphasis added.)
Reidenbach's petition was captioned 'In the Matter of the Petition of Jack E. Reidenbach for a Recount of Votes.' It contained all averments required by IC 1971, 3--1--27--5, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 29--5405 (Burns 1969 Repl.). On receipt of a copy of the petition, relatrix Young filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, premised upon this Court's unanimous decision in Marra v. Clapp (1970), 255 Ind. 97, 262 N.E.2d 630. In Marra, the Court held that language in the election contest statute, 1 similar to the italicized portion of the recount statute set out above, required dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, where the petition contained in the body thereof 'the names of all persons who were candidates,' as prescribed by the statute, but the caption of the petition failed to name each of the contestees as party defendants.
In response to the motion to dismiss, Reidenbach filed on November 22, a motion to amend his petition and submitted therewith a petition identical to the first petition, but captioned:
'RUTH ANNA YOUNG, Respondant' (sic).
On November 26, the motion to dismiss was granted and the motion to amend was denied. Thereafter, a number of events transpired which had the effect of reversing the determination made on November 26, and led to this original action.
In reviewing the Marra decision, we are constrained to consider the meaning of subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction refers only to the power of a court to hear and decide a particular class of cases. The only relevant inquiry in determining whether any court has subject matter jurisdiction is to ask whether the kind of claim which the plaintiff advances falls within the general scope of the authority conferred upon such court by the constitution or by statute. Brown v. State (1941), 219 Ind. 251, 37 N.E.2d 73. This determination uniformly entails an examination of the jurisdictional grant and does not, in the ordinary case, turn upon technical intricacies of pleading. 2
An affirmative decision that a court has subject matter jurisdiction carries with with it profound implications for the litigants.
Snelson v. State (1861), 16 Ind. 29, 32--33.
Such awesome power may not be conferred by mere consent of the parties, Indiana Real Estate Comm'n. v. Blue (1963), 135 Ind.App. 121, 190 N.E.2d 32, and the lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be, and if then noted by the court must be, raised for the first time on appeal. Wedmore v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 545, 122 N.E.2d 1.
With these principles in mind, we conclude that Reidenbach's petition for recount was not subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and any decisions inconsistent with this holding are hereby overruled. The reason for our holding is obvious. In determining whether the Noble Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction of election recount petitions it is necessary only to examine the jurisdictional grant expressed in IC 1971, 3--1--27--3, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 29--5403 (Burns 1969 Repl.). The statute provides:
'The candidate desiring a recount of votes shall file a verified petition . . . in the circuit or . . . superior court of the county . . . in which is located . . . the voting precinct or precincts in which he desires a recount * * *.'
Reidenbach's petition was addressed to the Noble Circuit Court and sought a recount of Noble County Precinct No. 20. No further information was required to properly invoke the subject matter jurisdiction invested in the circuit court by IC 1971, 3--1--27--3, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 29--5403 (Burns 1969 Repl.).
The question remains, however, whether Reidenbach's improperly captioned petition was subject to dismissal. The answer, under the Marra decision, is most assuredly yes. From the foregoing it will be observed that the basis for such dismissal is not lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is a familiar principle that one who seeks the benefit of a statutory proceeding must comply with all procedural terms of the statute. State ex rel. Wilson v. Howard Cir. Ct. (1957), 237 Ind....
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