State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Powell
| Decision Date | 21 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-207,95-207 |
| Citation | 906 P.2d 198,274 Mont. 92 |
| Parties | STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Darrell POWELL, and Jack Smith, as guardian ad litem for Natasha Smith, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Christina Smith, deceased, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Lyman H. Bennett, III, Morrow, Sedivy & Bennett, Bozeman, for Appellant.
Anne Biby, Bottomly Law Offices, Kalispell, for Smith.
The plaintiff, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eighth Judicial District in Cascade County in which it sought a declaratory judgment to the effect that the insurance The issue on appeal is whether the District Court correctly concluded that the vehicle operated by Darrell Powell at the time of his collision with Christina Smith was an "insured vehicle" according to the terms of State Farm's policy issued to Powell.
policy it issued to Darrell Powell did not provide liability coverage for his collision with Christina Smith on August 8, 1994. State Farm moved for summary judgment. Jack Smith, who represented Christina Smith's estate and her daughter, also moved for summary judgment. State Farm's motion was denied and Smith's motion was granted. State Farm appeals the District Court's disposition of the summary judgment motions. We affirm the judgment of the District Court
In December 1993, Darrell Powell entered into an oral agreement to buy a 1971 Ford truck from his brother and sister-in-law, Walter and Amanda Powell. Walter and Darrell agreed that Darrell would make payments for the Ford when able and that he would become the owner of the truck after he had paid the full $1200 purchase price. Until the full purchase price was paid on July 10, 1994, Walter continued to insure the Ford with his own carrier. On one occasion, Darrell paid the premium amount to Walter, who then sent the premium to his carrier.
During the seven month period that Darrell made payments to Walter, Walter and Amanda kept the truck at their home and used it as their own. From time to time, Darrell would notify Walter and Amanda that he wanted to use the truck, and he would do so if it was available at the time he needed it. Walter and Amanda, however, continued to use the truck in exactly the same manner they had used it prior to their oral purchase agreement with Darrell.
In January 1994, while Darrell was making payments to Walter, the truck's registration expired. Walter and Darrell agreed that Darrell should register the truck in his name so that he would not have to re-register the vehicle later that year. In order to register the truck, Darrell's name had to appear on the title. Walter transferred the title, and Darrell registered the Ford truck in his name on January 28, 1994. A new title was issued in Darrell's name on March 11, 1994.
On July 10, 1994, Darrell made the final payment for the Ford truck. On that date, Walter and Amanda cancelled their insurance policy which covered the truck and executed a bill of sale which stated:
We, the undersigned, hereby sell to Darrell L. Powell, a 1971 3/4 Ton 2 Wheel Drive Ford Pickup--green and white in color. Debt is paid in full on this date.
DATED this 10th day of July, 1994.
Although Darrell continued to leave the truck at Walter's house after July 10, Darrell then used the truck at will, whereas Walter asked Darrell's permission to borrow it. According to their affidavits, Walter and Amanda intended that ownership of the truck pass to Darrell on the date he finished paying for it. After July 10, 1994, Walter and Amanda no longer considered themselves the owners of the Ford truck.
On August 8, 1994, while attempting to walk across U.S. Highway 2 near Havre, Christina Smith was struck by the Ford truck which was being operated by Darrell. Christina died seven hours later as a result of injuries caused by the collision.
Jack Smith, as personal representative of Christina's estate and guardian ad litem of her five-year-old daughter, filed an action against Darrell Powell in the District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District in Hill County. That action is still pending. Powell's insurance provider, State Farm, then filed this declaratory judgment action to avoid coverage for Powell's potential liability. State Farm insured Powell's 1986 Mazda pickup truck at the time of the collision, but maintained that the Ford truck he was operating was not an insured vehicle.
On April 4, 1995, the District Court granted Smith's cross-motion for summary judgment, based on its determination that the Ford truck was insured as a "newly acquired vehicle" according to the terms of Powell's insurance policy. On April 20, the court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of Smith.
This Court reviews a summary judgment order entered pursuant to Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., based on the same criteria applied by the district court. Brinkman and Lenon v. P & D Land Enterprises (1994), 263 Mont. 238, 241, 867 P.2d 1112, 1114. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., provides that summary judgment is proper only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Because our review of summary judgment is plenary, we decline to review two of State Farm's claims on appeal: first, that the trial court failed to consider State Farm's reply brief before issuing its order; and second, that the court did not state with sufficient particularity its reasons for granting Smith's summary judgment motion. Since we review the entire record, including State Farm's reply brief, de novo, we hold that the District Court's failure to consider that brief was, at best, a harmless error. Furthermore, there was nothing in State Farm's three-page reply brief which even addressed the issue on which the District Court's judgment was based. Therefore, State Farm's substantial rights could not have been affected by the District Court's failure to consider it.
We also hold that the District Court's order granting summary judgment, though not exhaustive, was sufficient to apprise the...
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