State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Falley

• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Before GERNON, P.J., ROYSE, J., and WILLIAM F. LYLE, Jr.; ROYSE
• Citation: State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Falley, 926 P.2d 664, 23 Kan.App.2d 21 (Kan. App. 1996)
• Decision Date: 08 November 1996
• Docket Number: No. 74767,74767
• Parties: STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO., Appellee, v. Larry C. FALLEY, Defendant, and Donald G. Legleiter, Appellant.

Page 664

926 P.2d 664

23 Kan.App.2d 21

STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO., Appellee, v. Larry C. FALLEY, Defendant and Donald G. Legleiter, Appellant.

No. 74767.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Nov. 8, 1996.

Review Denied Feb. 6, 1997.

Syllabus by the Court

l. The rules of construction applicable to insurance policies are stated and applied.

2. An exclusion in an automobile liability policy "for any damages arising from an intentional act" encompasses any injury which is a natural and probable consequence of the insured's intentional acts.

William J. Pauzauskie, Topeka, for appellant.

Michael J. Dutton, of Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown & Enochs, Chartered, Overland Park, for appellee.

Before GERNON, P.J., ROYSE, J., and WILLIAM F. LYLE, Jr., District Judge, Assigned.

ROYSE, Judge:

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (State Farm) filed this declaratory action to obtain a determination that its policy issued to Larry C. Falley did not cover injuries sustained by Donald G. Legleiter. The district court granted summary judgment to State Farm, and Legleiter appeals.

Falley went to the Phillips 66 service station at Sixth and Fairlawn in Topeka and filled his car with gas. A disagreement arose regarding Falley's failure to pay for the gas. Although the parties disagree about how Legleiter came to be there, they agree that Falley drove away from the station with Legleiter spread-eagled on the hood of the vehicle. Falley drove east on Sixth Street, finally slowing at the intersection of Sixth and Gage. At that point, Legleiter landed on the ground and was injured. A controversy remains as to whether Falley simply slowed his car or slammed on his brakes at the intersection, whether Legleiter was thrown off the car or got off the hood of the car, or whether Legleiter was knocked to the ground or fell to the ground.

State Farm had issued an automobile liability policy to Falley. It provides, in pertinent part:

"We will:

1. pay damages which an insured becomes legally liable to pay because of:

a. bodily injury to others ... caused by accident resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of your car."

The policy, however, excludes coverage "FOR ANY DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INTENTIONAL ACT." State Farm's exclusion repeats verbatim the exclusion authorized by K.S.A. 40-3107(i)(6).

The district court concluded that State Farm's intentional act exclusion applied in this case. Relying on the principle that a party is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts, the district court concluded Falley intended to cause injury to Legleiter as a result of his intentional act of driving his car with Legleiter on the hood. Legleiter appeals.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in granting State Farm's motion for summary judgment. This issue first requires interpretation of the State Farm exclusion.

"The burden on the party seeking summary judgment is a strict one. The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issues in the case. On appeal we apply the same rule, and where we find reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment must be denied." Mitzner v. State Dept. of SRS, 257 Kan. 258, 260-61, 891 P.2d 435 (1995).

The interpretation of State Farm's exclusion is a question of law, subject to unlimited review by this court. See Harris v. Richards, 254 Kan. 549, 552, 867 P.2d 325 (1994). Just as coverage clauses are interpreted broadly to afford the broadest protection to the insured, exclusionary clauses are interpreted narrowly against the insurer. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Kan.App.2d 580, 582, 584 P.2d 1264 (1978). See Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Evans, 7 Kan.App.2d 60, 62, 637 P.2d 491 (1981), rev. denied 231 Kan. 800 (1982).

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Harris is helpful in resolving the question presented here. The facts of that case were as follows:

"Donald Harris was seated in the cab of his pickup truck with Kimberly Hawley. Douglas Hawley, Kimberly's ex-husband, fired two shotgun rounds into the back window of the pickup. Harris was on the driver's side and Kimberly was on the passenger side of the cab. When Douglas fired theshots he could not have seen whom he was shooting at due to darkness. The pellets struck Harris on the right side of his face, causing facial scarring and blindness. Douglas walked around to the side door and fired a third shot, which killed Kimberly. He then killed himself." 254 Kan. at 550, 867 P.2d 325.

Harris filed a petition against the administrators of Douglas' estate to recover his damages. The district court determined Harris' claim against the estate was limited to any available insurance coverage. The district court further concluded: (1) the shooting was not a covered occurrence under the terms of the applicable homeowners policy, and (2) the intentional acts exclusion of that policy applied. The Supreme Court affirmed. 254 Kan. at 550, 867 P.2d 325.

The Supreme Court first considered whether the shooting was an occurrence covered under the homeowners policy. The policy provided coverage for bodily injury caused by an occurrence. The term "occurrence" was defined in the policy as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions." 254 Kan. at 552, 867 P.2d 325.

Although the policy did not define "accident," the court explained that

" '[t]he word accident does not have a settled legal signification. It does have, however, a generally accepted meaning, which is the same whether considered according to the popular understanding or the approved usage of language. An accident is simply an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event, usually of an afflictive or unfortunate character, and often accompanied bya manifestation of force.' Gilliland v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771, 773, 180 Pac. 793 (1919)." 254 Kan. at 553, 867 P.2d 325.

The Supreme Court, applying the natural and probable consequences test, concluded the shooting of Harris did not fall within the policy coverage:

"The insured's intent to injure can be inferred when the resulting injury is a natural and probable consequence of the insured's act. [Citation omitted.] Douglas fired two shotgun blasts into the cab of Harris' pickup when he knew it was occupied. The natural and probable consequence of this act was that anyone occupying the cab would be injured. The shooting of Harris was not an accident under the Farm Bureau policy." 254 Kan. at 553, 867 P.2d 325.

The Supreme Court used a similar analysis in concluding the shooting also fell within the "intentional injury" exclusion of the policy: " '[W]e do not cover ... [b]odily injury or property damage expected or intended by an insured.' " 254 Kan. at 554, 867 P.2d 325. The court rejected Harris' contention that insurance coverage was available because Douglas shot him by mistake. Because Harris' injuries were a natural and probable consequence of Douglas' act, the court concluded they were injuries intended by Douglas. 254 Kan. at 556, 867 P.2d 325.

Although Harris examined the provisions of a homeowners policy rather than an automobile liability policy, the analysis is equally applicable to this case. First, both policies provide coverage for bodily injury caused by accident. In Harris, the Supreme Court relied on the same definition of "accident" that has been used in cases concerning a variety of insurance policies. See Spence v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 146 Kan. 216, 224, 69 P.2d 713 (1937) (life insurance policy with double indemnity provision for accidental death); Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Patrick, 16 Kan.App.2d 26, 28, 819 P.2d 1233 (1991) (automobile liability insurance); Whitaker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 13 Kan.App.2d 279, 282, 768 P.2d 320 (1989) (personal injury protection benefits provided under automobile liability insurance policy). All of these cases rely on a definition of "accident" which was first propounded in a workers compensation case. See Gilliland v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771, 773, 180 Pac. 793 (1919). Second, Harris relied on a series of cases that had developed the "natural and probable consequences" test for intentional injury exclusions, including a decision which construed an automobile liability insurance policy. 254 Kan. at 554-55, 867 P.2d 325; see Rankin v. Farmers Elevator Mutual Insurance Company, 393 F.2d 718 (10th Cir.1968).

Legleiter argues the natural and probable consequences approach requires an additional showing that the insured acted with the belief that there was a substantial certainty his acts would result in injury. This argument is not persuasive.

Legleiter cites Bell v. Tilton, 234 Kan. 461, 674 P.2d 468 (1983), a case in which the Supreme Court did use "substantial certainty" language. There, three boys were playing a game involving shooting BB guns at each other when one was shot in the eye and suffered severe injury.

The plaintiff argued that because Rusty Tilton testified he did not have the specific intent to injure plaintiff's eye when he fired the BB gun at plaintiff's face, the injury was not, as a matter of law, "intentional" within the meaning of the policy exclusion for expected or intended injury. The Supreme Court rejected plainti...