State Farm Fire Ins. Co v. Rakes
| Decision Date | 08 September 1948 |
| Citation | 49 S.E.2d 265,188 Va. 239 |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE FARM FIRE INS. CO. v. RAKES. |
Error to Circuit Court, Giles County; Vincent L. Sexton, Jr., Judge.
Action by Cecil Rakes against State Farm Fire Insurance Company on a fire policy. To review a judgment for plaintiff, the defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
Before HUDGINS, C. J., and EGGLES-TON, SPRATLEY, BUCHANAN, STAPLES and MILLER, JJ.
Woods, Rogers, Muse & Walker and Andrew S. Coxe, all of Roanoke, for plaintiff in error.
James L. Warren, of Narrows, for defendant in error.
The State Farm Fire Insurance Company, plaintiff in error (defendant below) complains of a judgment rendered against it in favor of the plaintiff below, Cecil Rakes, the insured in a fire insurance policy issued to him by the defendant.
The question presented is a narrow one. The policy insured plaintiff's personal property and household goods while located in a certain building but not elsewhere. They were destroyed by fire while in plaintiff's home in another county to which they had been removed; therefore, the loss is clearly not within the protection afforded by the language of the policy. But the plaintiff claims that the defendant is estopped by the conduct of its agent to deny liability.
In view of the verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff, the following facts must be taken as established:
E. E. Woodson was the general agent for three affiliated companies--The State Farm Life, State Farm Fire and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companies. His office was located in the town of Narrows, Virginia, and his insurance business was restricted to the representation of these affiliated companies and no others.
On November 5, 1945, the plaintiff was the owner of the personal property here involved which was then stored in a dwelling house on North View Street, in the town of Narrows. On that day he went to the office of defendant's said agent, Woodson, and made application for a fire insurance policy in the sum of $2,500 to cover the personal property so stored. At the time of making the application, he informed the agent that the property was stored at the time in Narrows, but that he intended to move it to Dickenson County as soon as he could get possession of a home which he had purchased there. For that reason he desired a policy in which the coverage would be transferable to the changed location. The company's standard form of policy was issued covering the property while located in said building "but not elsewhere."
The plaintiff also had purchased an automobile liability policy from one of the affiliated companies through the same agent. The vehicle originally covered by the policy having been sold and a new one acquired, he had had the coverage transferred to his new car by verbally requesting the agent to make the transfer.
On February 25, 1946, the plaintiff loaded the insured property in a truck for the purpose of moving it to his home in Dickenson County. As he was leaving Narrows, he stopped by the office of the agent, Woodson, and informed him of the fact that he was moving the property covered by the policy to his new home and requested the agent to transfer the coverage to that location. The agent made a memorandum of the change in location, and the plaintiff understood that the transfer was thus made, or would be made, by the agent.
About two months later, on April 24, 1946, the plaintiff's home was destroyed by fire, along with all of the personal property covered by the policy. On the day following the fire, the plaintiff went to the office of the agent, Woodson, at Narrows, and notified him of the destruction of the property, whereupon the agent informed him that he had never notified the company of the removal to the new location. The agent also told the plaintiff that he knew he had moved, but that he had neglected to have the insurance transferred and said "it is just negligence on my part that it was not transferred." This was the first intimation that the plaintiff had had that the coverage of the policy had not been transferred to the new location.
Woodson, being a general agent for Giles County, customarily exercised the authority to insure property on behalf of his principal and made the same binding from the time of the application. It was his custom, also, to make transfers of coverage on furniture and personal property in case of a change of residence, without any lapse in the protection during the time the transfer was being approved by the company. In such transfers, it was customary for the agent to have a rider issued from the home office indicating the permission of the company for the change of location.
In order to bring the position of defendant's counsel with respect to the proposition of law they contend for into clear focus, the following is quoted from their opening brief:
The question thus posed by counsel for the defendant was appropriately raised by exceptions to instructions granted for the plaintiff and those refused on behalf of the defendant.
In support of this position, the defendant relies strongly upon Summers v. Oakfield Town Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 245 Wis. 40, 13 N.W.2d 518. In that case the policy of a town mutual company which was issued to the assured covered the property while located and contained in the town of Byron, Wis., in the building as described therein, but not elsewhere. The charter of the company limited the territory within which it was authorized to do business to one county and certain towns in another county. The insured moved the property from its location at the time it was insured in the town of Byron to a town in Racine County, which was outside of the territory within which the mutual company was authorized by its charter to engage in business. The insured claimed, and the trial court held, that the mutual company had knowledge of the fact that the property in question had been removed to its new location where it was destroyed, and that with such knowledge it had continued to collect assessments from the insured. This knowledge of removal coupled with the continued collection of assessments, the trial court had held, estopped the company to deny the policy was continued in force. Upon appeal it was held that, under the facts in the case, there was no question of waiver or estoppel, but that the liability of the insured was to be determined by an interpretation of the policy itself. It was, therefore, concluded that, since the terms of the policy restricted the coverage to the designated location, the loss was not within the risk contracted...
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