State Farm Fire v. Prinz

• Decision Date: 21 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–1265.,11–1265.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Petitioner v. Robin Skinner PRINZ, the Personal Representative of the Estate Of Kyle Hoffman, Jr., Respondent.

231 W.Va. 96

743 S.E.2d 907

STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Petitioner

v.Robin Skinner PRINZ, the Personal Representative of the Estate Of Kyle Hoffman, Jr., Respondent.

No. 11–1265.

Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia.

Submitted Jan. 15, 2013.

Decided May 21, 2013.

Held Invalid

West's Ann.W.Va.Code, 57–3–1

Recognized as Unconstitutional

West's Ann.W.Va.Code § 55–7B–6d

Syllabus by the Court

1. “W.Va.Code § 57–3–1 (1937) does not bar any party in a wrongful death, medical malpractice action from testifying about conversations with the deceased patient.” Syllabus Point 8, Hicks v. Ghaphery, 212 W.Va. 327, 571 S.E.2d 317 (2002).

2. “Under article eight, section three of our Constitution, the Supreme Court of Appeals shall have the power to promulgate rules for all of the courts of the State related to process, practice, and procedure, which shall have the force and effect of law.” Syllabus Point 1, Bennett v. Warner, 179 W.Va. 742, 372 S.E.2d 920 (1988).

3. “The West Virginia Rules of Evidence remain the paramount authority in determining the admissibility of evidence in circuit courts.” Syllabus Point 7, in part, State v. Derr, 192 W.Va. 165, 451 S.E.2d 731 (1994).

4. “Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence is the paramount authority for determining whether or not an expert is qualified to give an opinion. Therefore, to the extent that Gilman v. Choi, 185 W.Va. 177, 406 S.E.2d 200 (1990) indicates that the legislature may by statute determine when an expert is qualified to state an opinion, it is overruled.” Syllabus Point 6, Mayhorn v. Logan Med. Found., 193 W.Va. 42, 454 S.E.2d 87 (1994).

5. “The provisions contained in W. Va.Code § 55–7B–6d (2001) (Supp.2004) were enacted in violation of the Separation of Powers Clause, Article V, § 1 of the West Virginia Constitution, insofar as the statute addresses procedural litigation matters that are regulated exclusively by this Court pursuant to the Rule–Making Clause, Article VIII, § 3 of the West Virginia Constitution. Consequently, W. Va.Code § 55–7B–6d, in its entirety, is unconstitutional and unenforceable.” Syllabus Point 3, Louk v. Cormier, 218 W.Va. 81, 622 S.E.2d 788 (2005).

6. Because it addresses evidentiary matters that are reserved to and regulated by this Court pursuant to the Rule–Making Clause, Article VIII, § 3 of the West Virginia Constitution, West Virginia Code § 57–3–1 (1937), commonly referred to as the Dead Man's Statute, is invalid, as it conflicts with the paramount authority of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence.

7. In actions, suits or proceedings by or against the representatives of deceased persons, witness testimony and documentary evidence pertaining to any statement of the deceased, whether written or oral, shall not be excluded solely on the basis of competency.E. Kay Fuller, Esq., Martin & Seibert, L.C., Martinsburg, WV, for the Petitioner.

Stephen G. Skinner, Esq., Skinner Law Firm, Charles Town, WV, Timothy P. Bosson, PHV, Simms Showers, LLP, Leesburg, VA, for the Respondent.

BENJAMIN, Chief Justice:

The instant case is before the Court upon the appeal of State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (“State Farm”), Petitioner, from a June 13, 2011, judgment order and an August 4, 2011, order denying its motion to alter or amend verdict or for a new trial. State Farm alleges that the Circuit Court of Jefferson County erred in (1) applying the Dead Man's Statute, W. Va.Code § 57–3–1 (1937), and prohibiting the jury from considering testimony from the decedent's family members regarding where the decedent was residing on the date of his death, (2) precluding the introduction of documentary evidence on the same grounds, and (3) failing to properly instruct the jury on the definition of the term “household” as utilized in the subject State Farm policy. Based upon the record before us, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable precedent, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 28, 2007, William Lee Piper, the driver, was killed in a motor vehicle accident in Jefferson County, West Virginia. His passenger, Kyle Hoffman, Jr., was also killed. Thereafter, the Estate of Kyle Hoffman, Jr. filed suit against the Estate of William Lee Piper. Count I of the complaint asserted a wrongful death claim against the Estate of William Lee Piper, and Count IV was an insurance coverage claim against State Farm. By agreement of the parties, the case was bifurcated into two parts for trial: a declaratory judgment action of insurance coverage involving State Farm and the tort action on the underlying wrongful death claim.

The declaratory judgment coverage action involved the question of whether William Lee Piper was a resident of the home of his grandparents in Berryville, Virginia, at the time of his death. If he was, there would be coverage under a State Farm personal liability umbrella policy issued to Mr. Piper's grandfather, Paul Massanopoli. State Farm asserted that William Piper lived with his parents, Julie and David Piper, in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, on the date of his death.

The jury considered the following evidence presented by the Respondent, Robin Skinner Prinz, as personal representative of the Estate of Kyle Hoffman, Jr., at trial: (1) that Piper's valid Virginia driver's license listed his grandparents' address in Virginia as his residence; (2) that three weeks before the accident, Piper titled and registered his vehicle that he was driving at the time of the crash using his grandparents' address in Virginia; (3) that he listed his grandparents' home in Virginia on his application for automobile insurance with Geico weeks before the accident and Geico issued an automobile insurance policy to Piper at the Virginia address; (4) that nine days before the accident, Piper listed his grandparents' Virginia address as his address on a federal W–4 form, a federal employment eligibility form, and a West Virginia Certificate of Non-residence; and (5) that an official high school transcript listed Piper as being enrolled in high school in Virginia from 2002 through 2006 and that his parents and grandparents had a joint custody agreement allowing Piper to live with his grandparents for the purpose of attending high school.

To counter this evidence, State Farm sought to introduce evidence that William Piper resided in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, including his parents' tax returns on which he was listed as a dependent; letters of administration creating his estate in West Virginia; and his obituary. Kyle Hoffman, Sr., the decedent plaintiff's father, executed an affidavit admitting that William Piper resided with his parents in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia. Julie and David Piper, William Piper's parents, Sara Piper, and William Massanopoli each testified in proffers that William Piper resided with his parents in Harpers Ferry on the date of his death. However, the circuit court, in granting Prinz's pre-trial motion in limine, excluded this evidence finding that it was barred by the Dead Man's Statute, W. Va.Code § 57–3–1, ¹ as irrelevant, or hearsay. In explaining its ruling, the circuit court held,

[I]n the instant case, any testimony regarding where William Lee Piper lived and his motivations or intent in signing these legal documents to the effect that he lived with his grandfather would necessarily involve testimony regarding personal transactions with the deceased. Such testimony by interested parties such as William Lee Piper's family members would relate to the course of conduct offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and would therefore be barred by the Dead Man's statute.

On June 2, 2011, the jury returned a verdict finding that Piper lived with his grandparents, thus finding in favor of Prinz on the coverage issue. State Farm filed a motion to alter or amend the jury verdict alleging that the circuit court erred in applying the Dead Man's Statute and prohibiting the jury from considering testimony from William Piper's family members regarding where he resided on the date of his death, in precluding the introduction of documentary evidence on the same grounds, and in failing to properly instruct the jury on the definition of the term “household” as utilized in the subject State Farm policy. The circuit court denied State Farm's post-trial motion, finding that

[t]he witnesses proffered by Defendant State Farm were interested parties whose testimony was intended to describe personal transactions or communications with the deceased Will Piper. Moreover, the Court did not err when it also excluded documents created after the death of Will Piper under the Dead Man's Statute. Finally, the Court did not err in disallowing the Defendant's jury instruction on the term “Household,” as the focus of the insurance policy at issue was the “primary residence” of the individual seeking coverage.

State Farm now appeals the circuit court's order denying its motion to alter or amend the verdict or for a new trial and the final judgment order.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

With respect to the standard of review regarding the application of the Dead Man's Statute, this Court has held,

[I]n reviewing a circuit court's application of the Dead Man's Statute, we utilize a bifurcated process. First, we review a circuit court's fact finding for clear error and give due deference to the circuit court's application of the statute to the facts applying an abuse of discretion standard. McDougal v. McCammon, 193 W.Va. 229, 235, 455 S.E.2d 788, 794 (1995); Michael v. Sabado, 192 W.Va. 585, 595, 453 S.E.2d 419, 429 (1994); Grillis v. Monongahela Power Co., 176 W.Va. 662, 666–67, 346 S.E.2d 812, 817 (1986). To the extent the exclusion of the evidence was based either upon a legal precept or an interpretation of a statute, our review is plenary. In other words, we review a circuit court's ruling on the admissibility...