State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lincow .
| Decision Date | 02 June 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 05-5368. |
| Citation | 715 F.Supp.2d 617 |
| Parties | STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Arnold LINCOW et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
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Cy Goldberg, Matthew A. Moroney, Richard Michael Castagna, Goldberg, Miller & Rubin, PC, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Jeffrey M. Lindy, Law Offices of Jeffrey M. Lindy, Joel W. Todd, Barry W. Krengel, Kenneth D. Albert, Michael D. Dolchin, Dolchin Slotkin & Todd PC, Philadelphia, PA, Julia Morrow, Friedman Schuman Applebaum Nemeroff & McCaffery, P.C., Elkins Park, PA, for Defendants.
I. BACKGROUND
In October 2005, Plaintiff insurance companies (“State Farm” or “Plaintiffs”) brought RICO and fraud actions against certain health-care providers (“Defendants”) who were allegedly involved in various schemes to defraud Plaintiffs by billing them for medical services that were either never provided or provided unnecessarily. Certain Defendants filed a counterclaim seeking unpaid benefits.
Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants were members of a conspiracy that sharply inflated the costs of medical care for car accident victims. State Farm alleged that Defendants schemed to drastically inflate the medical bills of car accident victims by systematically prescribing tests and treatments, as well as prescriptions and medical equipment-whether medically necessary or not-and then routinely billed State Farm for additional treatments that were never provided. At trial, Plaintiffs' proof of Defendants' fraud consisted of State Farm's claim files, testimony of patients, testimony of physicians working at Defendant medical facilities, testimony of Defendant physicians and expert testimony.
Defendants deny the charges and claim, instead, that all of the billing statements to State Farm reflected services which were medically necessary and consistent with the standard of care.
On March 26, 2009, after a four week jury trial, the jury awarded Plaintiffs $4,049,741.00 against all Defendants jointly and severally (doc. no. 593). 1 Additionally, individual Defendants were also found liable for punitive damages totaling $11.4 million. ( Id.) The jury also found in favor of Plaintiffs on Defendants' counterclaims.
Defendants and Plaintiffs have both filed post-trial motions with extensive briefing. On April 27, 2009, Defendants filed a motion for post-trial relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 (doc. no. 613). On May 11, 2009, Plaintiffs submitted their response to Defendants' motion for post-trial relief (doc. no. 661). Plaintiffs filed sealed motions to alter or amend the judgment (doc. no. 615) and for attorneys' fees and costs (doc. no. 616).
On August 21, 2009, Defendants filed their brief in support of the motion for post-trial relief (doc. no. 828). On November 5, 2009, Plaintiffs submitted their brief in opposition to Defendants' motion for post-trial relief (doc. no. 919). On November 30, 2009, Defendants filed their rebuttal brief in support of motion for post-trial relief (doc. no. 939). On December 15, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to reply to Defendants' rebuttal brief (doc. no. 955). 2 The Court heard oral argument on the motions on February 18, 2010.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEWA. Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law
Rule 50 provides that, in the aftermath of a jury trial, a court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law if it determines that there was “no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for a particular party on an issue,” and that, without a favorable finding on that issue, the party cannot maintain his claim under controlling law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). In determining whether to grant judgment as a matter of law, the court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and determine whether the record contains the ‘minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.’ ” Glenn Distribs. Corp. v. Carlisle Plastics, Inc., 297 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir.2002) (quoting Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir.1996)). Indeed, a court may grant judgment as a matter of law “only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability.”
LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 145-46 (3d Cir.2003) (quoting Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir.1993)).
In this endeavor, “[t]he court may not weigh evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses or substitute its version of the facts for that of the jury,” Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 691 (3d Cir.1993), but rather may grant a Rule 50 motion only “if upon review of the record it can be said as a matter of law that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence.” Id. at 691-92; see also LePage's, 324 F.3d at 145-46 (); Glenn Distribs., 297 F.3d at 299 () (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
Upon the renewed motion of a party, Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) allows the trial court to enter judgment as a matter of law at the conclusion of a jury trial notwithstanding a jury verdict for the opposing party. Such judgment may be entered under Rule 50(b) “only if, as a matter of law, the record is critically deficient of that minimum quantity of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.” Trabal v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 269 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir.2001). In deciding whether to grant this “sparingly invoked remedy,” the court must “refrain from weighing the evidence, determining the credibility of witnesses, or...
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