State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge

• Court: California Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: TOBRINER; WRIGHT; CLARK; McCOMB
• Citation: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal.3d 94, 109 Cal.Rptr. 811 (Cal. 1973)
• Decision Date: 25 September 1973
• Parties: , 514 P.2d 123 STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Wayne E. PARTRIDGE et al., Defendants and Respondents. Sac. 7973.

Page 811

109 Cal.Rptr. 811

10 Cal.3d 94, 514 P.2d 123

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Wayne E. PARTRIDGE et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Sac. 7973.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Sept. 25, 1973.

Rich, Fuidge, Dawson, Marsh, Morris, Sanbrook & Grove, and Chester Morris, Marysville, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Jones & Weldon, Charles R. Weldon, Norwalk, and Leonard Sacks, Pico-Rivera, for defendants and respondents.

TOBRINER, Justice.

The instant case presents a somewhat novel question of insurance coverage: when two negligent acts of an insured--one auto-related and the other non-auto-related--constitute concurrent causes of an accident, is the insured covered under both his homeowner's policy and his automobile liability policy, or is coverage limited to the automobile policy? State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm), the insurer which issued both policies at issue in this case, ¹ brought this declaratory judgment action requesting a determination as to which one, or both, of its policies afforded coverage for the accident in question.

In the trial court the insurer, relying on an exclusionary provision in the homeowner's policy which withheld coverage for injuries 'arising out of the use' of a motor vehicle, contended that coverage was only available under the automobile liability policy. Defendants, ² on the other hand, argued that since two independent negligent acts, one covered by the homeowner's policy and one by the automobile policy, jointly caused the accident, coverage should be afforded by both policies. After a non-jury trial, the court agreed with defendants and entered judgment holding the insurer liable under both policies. State Farm appeals from that judgment.

As discussed below, we have concluded that the trial court decision, finding liability under both insurance policies, should be affirmed. Initially, we shall point out that coverage is unquestionably available under the automobile liability policy since the instant accident bore some causal relationship to the use of the insured vehicle. Thereafter, we shall explain that although the homeowner's policy excluded injuries 'arising out of the use' of an automobile, such exclusion does not preclude coverage when an accident results from the concurrence of a non-auto-related cause and an auto-related cause. The comprehensive personal liability coverage of the homeowner's policy affords the insured protection for liability accruing generally from non-auto-related risks. Whenever such a non-auto risk is a proximate cause of an injury, liability attaches to the insured, and coverage for such liability should naturally follow. Coverage cannot be defeated simply because a separate excluded risk constitutes an additional cause of the injury. We therefore conclude that the trial court properly found that coverage is available under both of the policies in question.

We begin our analysis with a brief review of the facts of the case, which are not in dispute. The circumstances resulting in the accident at issue reveal an instance of what can only be described as blatant recklessness. Wayne Partridge, the named insured of the two insurance policies issued by State Farm, was a hunting enthusiast who owned a .357 Magnum pistol. Prior to the date of the accident, Partridge filed the trigger mechanism of his pistol to lighten the trigger pull so that the gun would have 'hair trigger action'; the trial court specifically found this modification of the gun to be a negligent act, creating an exceptionally dangerous weapon.

On the evening of July 26, 1969, Partridge and two friends, Vanida Neilson and Ray Albertson, were driving in the countryside in Partridge's four-wheel drive Ford Bronco. With Vanida sitting between them in the front seat, Partridge and Albertson hunted jackrabbits by shooting out of the windows of the moving vehicle; Partridge was using his modified .357 Magnum. On the occasion in question here, Partridge spotted a running jackrabbit crossing the road, and, in order to keep the rabbit within the car's headlights, Partridge drove his vehicle off the paved road onto the adjacent rough terrain. The vehicle hit a bump, the pistol discharged and a bullet entered Vanida's left arm and penetrated down to her spinal cord, resulting in paralysis. At the time of the accident, Partridge was either holding the gun in his lap or resting it on top of the steering wheel pointed at Vanida.

Thereafter, Vanida filed a personal injury action against Partridge seeking damages of $500,000. During settlement discussions between Vanida and State Farm, a controversy arose as to whether coverage was available under both Partridge's automobile liability policy and his homeowner's policy, or, if under just one policy, which one; the automobile policy contained a $15,000 limit, the homeowner's policy a $25,000 limit. Pursuant to these negotiations, State Farm agreed immediately to pay Vanida $15,000 and to institute the present declaratory judgment action to determine which of the policies provided coverage for the accident in question. Both parties agreed to be bound by the final determination (including appeal) in this action, and, as part of the settlement, Vanida agreed not to pursue further her action against Partridge; ³ the insurer, in turn, agreed to pay the full amount of all insurance policies found applicable, waiving any right to contest the monetary value of Vanida's damages.

State Farm then commenced the present action, setting out in its complaint the undisputed facts related above, and attaching the two relevant insurance policies issued to Partridge. The 'Automobile Policy' contains a typically broad coverage or insuring clause, affording coverage for bodily injuries 'caused by accident arising out of the . . . use . . . of the owned motor vehicle.' ⁴ The 'Homeowner's Policy,' in addition to affording the normal coverage against fire and theft, contains a common comprehensive 'personal liability' provision, which generally covers the named insured for All personal liability not falling within specific exclusionary provisions of the policy. ⁵ The broad coverage clause of this 'personal liability' section is followed by a lengthy list of 'exclusions'; the exclusionary clause relevant to this case excludes coverage for 'bodily injury . . . arising out of the . . . use of . . . any motor vehicle,' but excepts from this exclusion injuries arising from non-registered vehicles kept exclusively on the 'residence premises.' ⁶

As noted above, State Farm contended that because the use of the car played some causal role in the accident in question, the injuries 'arose out of the use of the car' within the meaning of the homeowner's exclusionary provision, and thus that only the automobile policy provided coverage for the injuries. Defendants claimed, in response, that both the filing of the trigger mechanism and the negligent driving were concurrent causes of the accident and argued that under such circumstances both policies were applicable.

The trial court first found that the insured, Partridge, had been negligent both in modifying the gun by filing its trigger mechanism and in driving his vehicle off the paved road onto the rough terrain, and that these two negligent acts were independent, concurrent proximate causes of Vanida's injuries. The court then concluded that both policies issued by State Farm to Partridge applied to the accident and that Vanida was entitled to recover under both.

The court's reasoning is clearly revealed in its memorandum opinion: 'In the Court's opinion each of the policies affords different coverage for distinct and different acts of negligence of the insured which resulted in injuries to a third person. ( ) It should make no difference that Partridge was the owner-driver and insured under the automobile liability policy and was also the insured under the homeowner's liability policy. There were two separate, distinct and different acts of negligence committed by Partridge, one of which was entirely disconnected with the use of a motor vehicle and the other while using a motor vehicle . . . (B)oth proximately and concurrently contributed to (Vanida's) injuries and therefore both policies should afford coverage.' State Farm now appears from this decision.

On this appeal we begin from the established rule that since the underlying facts are not in dispute "it is the duty of the appellate court . . . to make its own independent determination of the meaning of the language used in the instrument(s) under consideration.' (Citations.)' (Bareno v. Employers Life Ins. Co. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 875, 881, 103 Cal.Rptr. 865, 868, 500 P.2d 889, 892; see, e.g., Williams v. American Cas. Co. (1971) 6 Cal.3d 266, 271, 98 Cal.Rptr. 814, 491 P.2d 398; Faus v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 350, 360, 62 Cal.Rptr. 193, 431 P.2d 849.) We turn first to the automobile liability policy.

As noted above, the insuring clause of the automobile liability policy provided the typical coverage for bodily injuries 'arising out the . . . use . . . of the insured automobile.' Past California cases have established beyond contention that this language of 'arising out of the use,' When utilized in a coverage or insuring clause of an insurance policy, has broad and comprehensive application, and affords coverage for injuries bearing almost Any causal relation with the vehicle. As the Court of Appeal observed in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 826, 831, 53 Cal.Rptr. 650, 654: 'When employed in a public liability policy without restriction, words such as 'use' or 'using' have comprehensive scope. (Citations.)' (See also Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co. (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 144, 150, 57 Cal.Rptr. 240.) Although our cases have not yet defined with absolute precision the requisite causal connection...