State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schmitt

• Decision Date: 31 March 1981
• Docket Number: No. 79-2218,79-2218
• Citation: 419 N.E.2d 601,50 Ill.Dec. 493,94 Ill.App.3d 1062
• Parties: , 50 Ill.Dec. 493 STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff- Appellant, v. Wendy SCHMITT and Henry J. Kopeika, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 601

419 N.E.2d 601

94 Ill.App.3d 1062, 50 Ill.Dec. 493

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff- Appellant, v. Wendy SCHMITT and Henry J. Kopeika, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 79-2218.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

March 31, 1981.

Victor J. Piekarski of Querrey, Harrow, Gulanick & Kennedy, Ltd., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Joseph J. Butler, Chicago (Crane & Norcross, Chicago, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

RIZZI, Presiding Justice:

Plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, brought this declaratory judgment action to determine its obligation to defend and indemnify defendant Henry J. Kopeika, to whom plaintiff had issued a policy of automobile liability insurance. The court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted Schmitt's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

Defendant Wendy Schmitt is Kopeika's sister-in-law and was allegedly injured in a single car accident while riding in a car driven by Kopeika. Plaintiff sought a determination that it was not obligated to defend Kopeika in any suit arising out of this occurrence nor indemnify him for any judgment which might be obtained against him by Schmitt. Plaintiff claimed that there was no coverage because of an exclusion provision contained in its liability policy. This provision excludes coverage for bodily injury to any member of the family of the insured residing in the same household as the insured. Plaintiff alleged that at the time of the accident, Schmitt was a member of Kopeika's family and resided in Kopeika's household. The trial court found that the term family, as used in the exclusion clause, did not encompass a sister-in-law, and therefore, the policy did not exclude coverage to Kopeika for the claims of Schmitt arising from the occurrence.

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Libby-Broadway Drive-In, Inc. v. McDonald's System, Inc., 72 Ill.App.3d 806, 809, 28 Ill.Dec. 802, 391 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1979); Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 110, par. 57(3). Since construction of an insurance policy presents only a question of law (Voss v. Associated Life Insurance Co., 36 Ill.App.3d 105, 109, 343 N.E.2d 174, 176 (1976); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Case Foundation Co., 10 Ill.App.3d 115, 121, 294 N.E.2d 7, 11 (1973)), it is an appropriate issue for determination by means of summary judgment. Rivota v. Kaplan, 49 Ill.App.3d 910, 914, 7 Ill.Dec. 176, 364 N.E.2d 337, 341 (1977).

The primary concern of the court in interpreting an automobile liability insurance policy is to effectuate the intent of the parties as expressed by the contract. In so doing, the policy must be construed as a whole. Miller v. Madison County Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 46 Ill.App.2d 413, 417, 197 N.E.2d 153, 155-56 (1964). Ambiguous provisions in which an insurer seeks to limit its liability are to be construed most strongly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured. Mosby v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 405 Ill. 599, 607, 92 N.E.2d 103, 107 (1950); Dawes Laboratories, N.V. v. Commercial Insurance Co., 19 Ill.App.3d 1039, 1049, 313 N.E.2d 218, 225 (1974). The rationale underlying this rule of liberal construction in favor of the insured is the recognition that the provisions in an insurance policy do not result from negotiation but are written by the insurer and submitted to the prospective insured for acceptance without change. Miller, 46 Ill.App.2d at 418, 197 N.E.2d at 156; see Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. v. Indemnity Insurance Co., 411 Ill. 325, 332, 104 N.E.2d 250, 254 (1952). Therefore, exclusion provisions should only be applied where their terms are clear, definite and explicit. See Van Vactor v. Blue Cross Association, 50 Ill.App.3d 709, 717, 8 Ill.Dec. 400, 365 N.E.2d 638, 643 (1977); Wilson v. National Automobile & Casualty Insurance Co., 22 Ill.App.2d 34, 37, 159 N.E.2d 504, 505 (1959).

At issue here is whether a sister-in-law is a member of the family of the insured as that phrase is used in an exclusion provision in the automobile liability insurance policy issued by plaintiff. This provision reads:

THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY * * *: TO BODILY INJURY TO ANY MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OF THE INSURED RESIDING IN THE SAME HOUSEHOLD AS THE INSURED. The term "insured" as used in this exclusion means the person against whom claim is made or suit is brought. (Emphasis original.)

Although the policy defines several terms, no definition is provided for the phrase "member of the family." Plaintiff argues that this phrase is not ambiguous, and therefore, it should be taken in its plain ordinary and popular sense. Jenkins v. State Security Insurance Co., 56 Ill.App.3d 737, 742, 14 Ill.Dec. 150, 371 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 (1978). According to plaintiff, a sister-in-law is commonly understood to be a member of the family. Consequently Schmitt, who is the sister of Kopeika's wife, is a member of Kopeika's family pursuant to the clear language of the exclusion provision, and therefore, liability coverage should be denied to Kopeika for any claims made by Schmitt regarding the automobile accident. We do not agree with these arguments.

A provision in an insurance contract...