State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ranson, 1611

• Decision Date: 18 May 1960
• Docket Number: No. 1611,1611
• Citation: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ranson, 121 So.2d 175 (Fla. App. 1960)
• Parties: STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., a corporation, Appellant, v. Leonard B. RANSON, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 175

121 So.2d 175

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., a corporation, Appellant, v. Leonard B. RANSON, Appellee.

No. 1611.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 18, 1960.

Rehearing Denied June 8, 1960.

Wm. C. Kaleel and Luke R. Kaleel, St. Petersburg, for appellant.

Philip S. Ware, Herman Goldner, Goldner & Carney, St. Petersburg, for appellee.

ALLEN, Chief Judge.

The appellee, as plaintiff below, brought an action under the declaratory judgment act for an interpretation of plaintiff's rights under an automobile insurance policy.

The pertinent facts are as follows: Plaintiff, Ranson, while driving his automobile in downtown St. Petersburg on December 12, 1955, allegedly struck the hand of a police officer who was directing traffic. The plaintiff contends that the first knowledge he had of this accident was on February 6, 1956, when he was served with a summons charging him with 'failure to reduce speed to avoid a collision.' On this date the plaintiff met officer Corbin, the officer that plaintiff allegedly hit, at which time Corbin told plaintiff that he hit his hand on plaintiff's car as plaintiff drove through the intersection where Corbin was directing traffic. After plaintiff posted bond, he apparently did not consider the incident worthy of reporting to his insurer, the defendant in this case.

On March 25, 1957, plaintiff received a letter from Corbin's attorney demanding damages for injuries for Corbin's hand as a result of the incident on December 12, 1955. Plaintiff then notified the defendant of this letter and events leading up to the letter. An action was filed by Corbin for damages in the Civil and Criminal Court of Record on October 28, 1957.

The defendant insurance company disclaimed responsibility to defend this third party's suit against plaintiff because of the failure of plaintiff to comply with the provision of the insurance policy with regard to notice of the accident as soon as practicable.

Motions for summary judgment were filed by both the plaintiff and the defendant below.

The circuit judge entered an order on the 14th of September, 1959, in which he held with the plaintiff and decreed that the defendant-appellant insurance company was obligated to defend the plaintiff, Leonard B. Ranson, in the case of Richard E. Corbin, plaintiff, v. Leonard B. Ranson, defendant.

It was argued by the appellee before this court that the lower court determined as a matter of fact that the giving of the notice was within a reasonable time, and that the effect of the court's decree was that of a trial on the merits and not a summary judgment. We disagree with this theory of the appellee and hold that the court determined the question as a matter of law based upon the undisputed data before him.

The court, in its order, stated:

'This cause coming on this day to be heard upon the Bill of Complaint, Answer, Motions for Summary Final Decree of the plaintiff and the defendant, and the Stipulation of the parties of record herein dated September 9, 1959, the testimony of record herein, there being present before the Court counsel of record for the plaintiff and the defendant, and the Court being fully informed in the premises, Finds and Orders:

* * *

* * *

'2. That pursuant to the Stipulation of September 9, 1959, there is no genuine material issue of fact, and the Bill of Complaint and Affidavits of the plaintiff of record herein set forth the facts of this cause, and the same are by Stipulation treated as if the same were testimony received in evidence, and the matter before the Court on final hearing and for entry of final decree.

'3. The Court finds as a matter of law that the words 'as soon as practicable' as used in the defendant's contract of insurance with the plaintiff record herein requiring notice be given of an accident by the plaintiff-insured to the defendant-insurer, means that said notice should be given within a reasonable time under all of the circumstances and facts of each case, and that the duty to give notice does not arise until facts develop which would suggest to a person of ordinary and reasonable prudence that liability may have occurred. The duty to give notice at the time of the accident does not attach where the accident is trivial and there is no ground for reasonable belief that the accident involves any injury or possible claim against the insured.

'4. The Court further finds that the plaintiff, Leonard B. Ranson, under the facts and circumstances of this case gave notice of the alleged accident to the defendant within a reasonable time.'

The insurance policy involved was attached to the complaint. It provided in part as follows:

'Conditions 1 to 12 inclusive apply to the coverage or coverages noted thereunder.

'1. Notice of Accident-Coverages A, B and C. When an accident occurs written notice shall be given by or on behalf of the insured to the company or any of its authorized agents as soon as practicable. Such notice shall contain particulars sufficient to identify the insured and also reasonably obtainable information respecting the time, place and circumstances of the accident, the names and addresses of the injured and of available witnesses.

'2. Notice of Claim or Suit-Coverages A and B. If claim is made or suit is brought against the insured, the insured shall immediately forward to the company every demand, notice, summons or other process received by him or his representative.

'3. * * *

'4. Action Against Company-Coverages A and B. No action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all the terms of this policy, nor until the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally determined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the company.'

Coverage A related to liability for bodily injury and Coverage B related to liability for property damage.

The motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff was on the ground that the pleadings and affidavits marked 'Exhibits 1 and 2' show that there was no genuine issue of any material fact and that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment. One of the affidavits was by Richard E. Corbin, who was the officer directing traffic and he claimed to be injured, who stated that shortly after the accident he consulted a physician as to his injuries and that no treatment was considered necessary or was given to his right hand and wrist, and further that at the time of the meeting with Leonard B. Ranson in the St. Petersburg police station on February 6, 1956, he considered the injury to his right hand and wrist to be of little or no consequence, although it subsequently developed into a serious injury; that he did not inform Leonard B. Ranson that it was serious although he had had some minor discomform at the time of the accident and shortly thereafter; that at no time after the meeting of February 6, 1956, until his attorney notified Ranson of his claim did he contact him in any way regarding his injuries.

The affidavit of plaintiff Ranson was, in substance, that he was not aware on December 12, 1955, or any accident in which he was involved nor did he become aware of such until he was served with a summons on February 6, 1956, alleging his failure to reduce speed to avoid a collision. On February 6, 1956, he had a chance meeting with Corbin at the police station and at that time Corbin's wrist and arm were apparently normal and the said Corbin was not of abnormal appearance nor did he otherwise seem injured; that at the time of the meeting at the police court that a police Lieutenant there told him and Corbin to shake hands and forget the matter; that because of the circumstances he did not believe he had been involved in anything of a serious nature and that there was or could be anything against him; that he informed the insurance company on March 25, 1957, of the claim against him.

Several affidavits were filed by attorneys stating the sums of money which they deemed reasonable as attorney's fees for the plaintiff. The lower court allowed $1,500 as attorney's fees for the plaintiff, which has been alleged as excessive by the appellee since the total liability under the policy would not exceed $5,000. We shall not further allude to attorney's fees since we shall reverse the court on the judgment in this case which will carry out the reversal of award of attorney's fees also.

The defendant insurance company also filed a motion for summary judgment upon the pleadings, exhibits and depositions of the plaintiff.

A stipulation was filed by the parties on the hearing before the lower court, which is as follows:

'Mr. Goldner: It is stipulated and agreed by and between the Plaintiff and Defendant in open Court that the pleadings, affidavits, together with the deposition of the Plaintiff taken by the Defendant on August 7, 1959, shall be included as a matter of record in the file of this case and shall constitute the complete reflection of all of the facts applicable to this cause, and the motions of the Plaintiff and Defendant for Summary Judgment may be treated by the Court, together with the record in this cause, as all of the facts and evidence in said cause, and the same may be heard as if it were before the Court on final hearing, with the exception of the questions as to reasonable attorneys fees for the attorneys of the Plaintiff should the Court enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, which questions are reserved for further stipulation at that time, or evidence as to what constitutes reasonable attorneys' fees.

'The Court: I believe that the basic purpose of the stipulation has been overlooked in that it was my understanding between the counsel in this cause that the purpose of this stipulation was to clearly set up that there are no genuine material issues of fact existent in this cause and that the...