State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Christensen, 6577
| Decision Date | 13 March 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 6577,6577 |
| Citation | 494 P.2d 552,88 Nev. 160 |
| Parties | STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Ann Katherine CHRISTENSEN, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Vargas, Bartlett & Dixon and Jon J. Key, Reno, for appellant.
Hibbs & Bullis, Reno, for respondent.
The parties agree on the issues of this appeal and the facts that gave rise to them.
Ann Katherine Christensen, respondent, while communting from work on her motorcycle was involved in a collision with an automobile driven by Richard R. Stanton who was an uninsured motorist. Respondent was insured by five policies issued from State Farm under uninsured automobile coverage. She sued Stanton obtaining a default judgment in the amount of $96,302.95 on June 16, 1969. Although notified of this litigation State Farm chose not to participate.
Respondent then commenced an action against appellant seeking $50,000 which represented the combined policy limits of the five policies, plus interest. Her motion for summary judgment was granted on January 4, 1971 in the amount of $50,000, plus prejudgment interest at 7% from June 16, 1969 (the date of the Stanton judgment) until paid, plus costs of suit with interest thereon from January 4, 1971.
1. The first question for our determination is whether the insurance company was bound by the Christensen judgment against Stanton so that the date the interest commenced to run was properly June 16, 1969 as the trial court ruled.
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Pietrosh, 85 Nev. 310, 454 P.2d 106 (May 6, 1969), this court stated that when the company is given notice of the action, has the opportunity to intervene, and judgment is thereafter obtained against the uninsured motorist in an adversary proceeding, that the company should be bound thereby even despite contrary policy provisions. Prior to Pietrosh, the Nevada legislature on April 23, 1969 amended NRS 693.115 (1969 Nev.Stats. ch. 568), as follows: 'No judgment in any action between the named insured or any person claiming under him and the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle is binding upon the insurer with respect to the existence or amount of any liability under the coverage required by this section.' It is the insurance company's contention now that the new law, subsection 5 thereof, should be applied to the Stanton action which was commenced March 20, 1969 and concluded June 16, 1969.
Such legislative adjudication represented by the statute is a judicial function and is void. Cf. Volpert v. Papagna, 85 Nev. 437, 456 P.2d 848 (1969). The effect of Pietrosh, supra, procedurally is to impliedly pronounce the insurer as an indirect party which is a procedural consequence that is ours to decide. Pietrosh, supra, being the last pronouncement on the subject is controlling. The insurance company is bound by the judgment against Stanton.
2. We turn now to decide whether the award of prejudgment interest against the insurance company properly commenced from June 16, 1969, the date of the respondent's judgment against Stanton, or should have commenced as of January 4, 1971, the date of the summary judgment against the insurance company.
The main issue presented to the trial court was whether State Farm's liability was limited to the one policy limit of $10,000 or whether State Farm was under obligation to pay all five policies so that a total of $50,000 would be due. We decided in United Services Auto. Assoc. v. Dokter, 86 Nev. 917, 478 P.2d 583, rendered December 28, 1970, that policies issued by the same company could be stacked. The day after that decision the trial court in this case granted summary judgment which was entered on January 4, 1971.
The insurance company's liability became fixed the date of the Stanton judgment, June 16, 1969. On that date the appellant's obligation to compensate respondent in accord with its contractual obligations to her was established. Their contention that they had an unresolved bona fide issue of stacking and that therefore they should...
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