State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jakubowicz
| Decision Date | 29 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 45A05–1502–CT–78.,45A05–1502–CT–78. |
| Citation | 45 N.E.3d 500 |
| Parties | STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant–Defendant, v. Carol JAKUBOWICZ, Individually, and as Parent and Legal Guardian of Jacob Jakubowicz and Joseph Jakubowicz, Minors, Appellees–Plaintiffs. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Timothy M. Swan, Garan Lucow Miller, P.C., Merrillville, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
April L. Board, Boonville, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
[1] Appellant–Defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment in favor of Appellees–Plaintiffs, Carol Jakubowicz, Individually, and as Parent and Legal Guardian of Jacob and Joseph Jakubowicz, Minors (Collectively, Jakubowicz).
[2] We reverse and remand.
[3] State Farm raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial court properly denied summary judgment when it determined that Jakubowicz' underinsured motorist vehicle claim against State Farm is not barred even though it was filed outside the policy's three-year limitations period for claims arising under the underinsured motorist coverage.
[4] On August 2, 2007, Jakubowicz and Ronald Williams, Jr. (Williams) were involved in an automobile accident in Highland, Indiana, resulting in substantial injuries to Jakubowicz. At the time of the accident, Jakubowicz had an automobile insurance policy with State Farm, which included underinsured motorist coverage.
[5] On October 7, 2008, Jakubowicz filed her Complaint against Williams. On April 6, 2009, State Farm also filed a Complaint against Williams, seeking damages for payments under the medical payments provision and for property damages paid on behalf of Jakubowicz and arising from the automobile collision. On August 19, 2009, both causes were consolidated. On December 10, 2009, Jakubowicz notified State Farm's counsel that “please, consider this correspondence directed to your client, [State Farm] putting them on notice that it is likely that [Jakubowicz] will pursue underinsured motors claims [sic] in this case.” (Appellant's App. p. 108).
[6] On March 31, 2011, Jakubowicz filed her motion for leave to amend the Complaint to add State Farm as a defendant in order to institute a claim against the underinsured motorist provision of the insurance policy. The trial court granted the motion on July 27, 20111 . Jakubowicz filed her Amended Complaint that same day.
[7] On September 11, 2013, State Farm filed its motion for summary judgment, as well as its designated evidence in support thereof, contending that it was entitled to summary judgment because Jakubowicz' Amended Complaint was filed after the expiration of the three-year contractual limitation period. Jakubowicz opposed State Farm's motion by filing a brief in opposition with designation of evidence. On February 19, 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing on State Farm's motion, which was summarily denied on April 9, 2014.
[8] After an unsuccessful attempt at mediation, Jakubowicz and State Farm filed a joint belated motion to certify for interlocutory appeal, which was granted by the trial court on January 26, 2015. We accepted jurisdiction on March 27, 2015.
[9] In this interlocutory appeal, State Farm now challenges the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgement. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
[10] Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). “A fact is material if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is genuine if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties' differing accounts of the truth ..., or if the undisputed facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind.2009).
[11] In reviewing a trial court's ruling on summary judgment, this court stands in the shoes of the trial court, applying the same standards in deciding whether to affirm or reverse summary judgment. First Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Whorley, 891 N.E.2d 604, 607 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied. Thus, on appeal, we must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the trial court has correctly applied the law. Id. at 607–08. In doing so, we consider all of the designated evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 608. The party appealing the grant of summary judgment has the burden of persuading this court that the trial court's ruling was improper. Id. When the defendant is the moving party, the defendant must show that the undisputed facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff's cause of action or that the defendant has a factually unchallenged affirmative defense that bars the plaintiff's claim. Id. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment must be reversed if the record discloses an incorrect application of the law to the facts. Id.
[12] We observe that, in the present case, the trial court did not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its Judgment. Special findings are not required in summary judgment proceedings and are not binding on appeal. Id. However, such findings offer this court valuable insight into the trial court's rationale for its decision and facilitate appellate review. Id.
[13] State Farm contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment because Jakubowicz filed her claim for underinsured motor vehicle benefits outside the three-year contractual limitation of the policy. In general, “[i]nsurance policies are governed by the same rules of construction as other contracts ...” Peabody Energy Corp. v. Roark, 973 N.E.2d 636, 640 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), aff'd on reh'g, 978 N.E.2d 503 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), trans. denied. However, because of the disparity in bargaining power between insurance companies and insureds, courts have developed distinct rules for those contracts. Auto–Owners Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 842 N.E.2d 1279, 1283 (Ind.2006). When interpreting an insurance contract, “if an insurance contract is clear and unambiguous, the language therein must be given its plain and ordinary meaning.” Castillo v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 834 N.E.2d 204, 206 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). The mere fact that a controversy exists and the insured asserts an interpretation contrary to that asserted by the insurer is insufficient to establish an ambiguity. Shelter Ins. Co. v. Woolems, 759 N.E.2d 1151, 1155 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied.
[14] “If an ambiguity exists, ‘insurance policies are to be construed strictly against the insurer and the policy language is viewed from the standpoint of the insured.’ ” Wert v. Meridian Sec. Ins. Co., 997 N.E.2d 1167, 1170 (Ind.Ct.App.2013), reh'g denied, trans. denied (quoting Shelter Ins. Co., 759 N.E.2d at 1155 ). This is especially important “where the language in question purports to exclude coverage.” State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flexdar, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ind.2012), reh'g denied. We typically “accept an interpretation of the contract language that harmonizes the provisions rather than one which supports a conflicting version of the provisions.” Castillo, 834 N.E.2d at 206 (citing Burkett v. Am. Family Ins. Grp., 737 N.E.2d 447, 452 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) ). A court should construe the language of an insurance policy so as not to render any words, phrases, or terms ineffective or meaningless. FLM, LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 973 N.E.2d 1167, 1174 (Ind.Ct.App.2012), reh'g denied, trans. denied.
[15] Our supreme court has stated that contractual provisions that shorten the time to commence suit are enforceable “as long as a reasonable time is afforded, except where there is fraud, duress, and the like.” Bradshaw v. Chandler, 916 N.E.2d 163, 166 (Ind.2009). “[C]ontractual limitations shortening the time to commence suit are not favored” even though “they do ‘protect insurers from policy holders who voice no claim until the year has long since expired, promote early notification while evidence is available, and provide carriers with a basis for forming business judgments concerning claim reserves and premium rates.’ ” Id. at 167 (quoting Summers v. Auto–Owners Ins. Co., 719 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) ).
[16] Turning to State Farm's policy, the contested provisions read as follows:
GENERAL TERMS
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