State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Miranda
| Citation | 2019 S.D. 47 |
| Decision Date | 07 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | #28719,#28695 |
| Parties | STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GIYO BRYAN MIRANDA, Defendant, Third-Party Claimant and Appellee, v. JOHN DOE, Third-Party Defendant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of South Dakota |
#28695, #28719-a-MES
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT LAWRENCE COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
BENJAMIN L. KLEINJAN of
Helsper, McCarty & Rasmussen, P.C.
[¶1.] Giyo Miranda lost control of his vehicle, resulting in a head-on collision with another vehicle driven by Loyd Nielson. A third, unidentified vehicle was also allegedly involved in the incident. Nielson's insurer, State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company (State Farm), pursued subrogation recovery against Miranda. The case was tried to a jury which returned a general verdict in favor of Miranda. The circuit court subsequently denied State Farm's motion for a new trial. State Farm appeals. We affirm.
[¶2.] On November 20, 2013, 18-year-old Miranda and his older brother Kevin were traveling in a minivan back to Belle Fourche from Rapid City on I-90. Miranda was driving and exited at Whitewood before turning right and continuing west on Highway 34. Miranda explained he was traveling at approximately 30-35 mph in an area where the speed limit changes from 30 mph to 45 mph. The road conditions were icy due to freezing drizzle and snow accumulation on the road. As Miranda continued along an initial curve on Highway 34, he claimed that an unknown vehicle traveling eastbound entered his westbound lane and approached him head-on. Miranda said he swerved to the right shoulder of the road to avoid a collision. When he attempted to pull his minivan back onto the road, it began to slide. Miranda tried to correct the slide, but skidded into the eastbound lane instead and collided with a pickup driven by Nielson.
[¶3.] Nielson, who was insured by State Farm, was traveling home to Hot Springs after leaving an auction in the area. At the subsequent trial, Nielsoninitially testified that he did not recall seeing a third vehicle before the collision. However, he later acknowledged that there was an unidentified vehicle driving approximately 100 yards in front of him. Nielson also testified that he could see the vehicle apply its brakes in the area where the collision occurred a short while later.
[¶4.] After paying benefits under several separate coverages included in an automobile policy1 issued to Nielson, State Farm pursued a subrogated claim against Miranda, alleging negligence. The case was tried to a jury on April 26-27, 2018. Throughout the case, State Farm maintained the factual theory that the third-party vehicle Miranda described was either nonexistent or never came into his lane of travel.2 Miranda, however, persisted in his position that the vehicle had been present and had swerved into his lane, causing the sequence of events that led to the collision with Nielson.
[¶5.] At the completion of the trial, the circuit court instructed the jury on State Farm's theories of general negligence and negligence per se.3 The court further instructed the jury that if it found Miranda had acted negligently, it couldexcuse the negligence if it determined he had confronted a sudden emergency not of his own making.4
[¶6.] The circuit court also provided the jury with a detailed instruction describing the individual questions presented and how its determinations would impact the verdict. For example, the first two questions for the jury related to the issues of standard negligence and legal cause:
Only if the jury determined Miranda had acted negligently and had caused the collision did the court instruct the jury to move on and consider the questions related to the presence of a sudden emergency.
[¶7.] Notwithstanding this detailed instruction concerning the order and effect of the jury's individual factual determinations, the verdict form did not include corresponding special interrogatories. Following its deliberation, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Miranda that stated only, "[w]e, the jury, duly impaneled in the above-entitled action, and sworn to try the issues, find for the [d]efendant." State Farm moved for a new trial and later sought to supplement the record after realizing one of its proposed instructions was not contained in the clerk's record. Miranda opposed both motions. The circuit court denied State Farm's motion for a new trial, but granted its motion to supplement the record and an oral motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence.
[¶8.] State Farm appeals, raising the following issues for our review:
Miranda also raises the following issues by notice of review:
[¶9.] Both parties have submitted thorough briefs on the merits of the issues they believe are presented. However, neither party has addressed the significance of the jury's general verdict. We believe we must consider this issue on our own accord. Even if we were to accept State Farm's argument that the circuit court abused its discretion by instructing the jury as it did, our cases require us to assess the prejudicial impact of the court's instructions, and we would inevitably be forced to confront the issue.5
[¶10.] "A party challenging as erroneous a jury instruction must show not only that the instruction was in error, but also that it was prejudicial error to the effect that under the evidence, the jury . . . probably would have returned a different verdict." Veeder v. Kennedy, 1999 S.D. 23, ¶ 34, 589 N.W.2d 610, 618 (citations and quotations omitted). Where a jury returns a general verdict in a case tried upon multiple theories, though, establishing prejudice is difficult because the basis for the jury's verdict is likely uncertain. With a general verdict, "this Court cannot conclusively determine whether the jury based its verdict on any number of defenses . . ." or other theories offered by the parties to a case. Reede Constr., Inc. v. S.D. Dep't of Transp., 2017 S.D. 63, ¶ 14, 903 N.W.2d 740, 745. Indeed, "if a generalverdict is handed down and the jury could have decided the case on two theories, one proper and one improper, the reviewing court will assume that it was decided on the proper theory." Id. (quoting Lenards v. DeBoer, 2015 S.D. 49, ¶ 14, 865 N.W.2d 867, 871). "Only if there is 'an affirmative showing in the record to the contrary,' will we abandon this assumption." Thomas v. Sully Cty., 2001 S.D. 73, ¶ 7, 629 N.W.2d 590, 592 (quoting Limmer v. Westegaard, 251 N.W.2d 676, 679 (S.D. 1977)).
[¶11.] Special verdict forms, by contrast, can be useful for clarifying the basis of a jury's verdict and assisting a reviewing court in appropriate cases. For instance, a special verdict form may prove illuminating in a case involving complex issues or perhaps multiple or novel claims. See Miller v. Hernandez, 520 N.W.2d 266, 271 (S.D. 1994) ().
[¶12.] Here, though, neither party requested a special verdict form or objected to the circuit court's decision to utilize a general verdict form. They were successful in their efforts to have the court provide detailed instructions to assist the jury with the liability theories and defenses presented in the case. However, the general verdict form, by its nature, is imprecise and does not permit a safe inference about the specific basis for the jury's defense verdict.
[¶13.] It may well be that the jury's verdict had nothing to do with State Farm's principal claim that the court incorrectly allowed the jury to consider excusing negligence under Miranda's sudden emergency theory. Included among the first issues for the jury to consider were basic inquiries relating to the existenceof negligence and legal cause. The court's instruction advised the jury that it must return a verdict for the defendant if it found Miranda was not negligent or if it concluded his negligence was not the legal cause of the collision.
[¶14.] Based upon our review of the record, it is possible that the jury could have determined that State Farm simply did not prove the necessary elements of negligence. The jury could have, for example, concluded that Miranda did not act unreasonably in taking evasive action or perhaps it found that the unidentified vehicle was the sole cause of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Estate of Lynch v. Lynch
...decided the case on two theories, one proper and one improper, the reviewing court will assume that it was decided on the proper theory." 2019 S.D. 47, ¶ 10, 932 N.W.2d 570, 574 omitted). We only depart from this assumption "if there is 'an affirmative showing in the record to the contrary[......
-
Knecht v. Evridge
...to specifically note the theory of liability it accepted, which limits our ability to conduct further review. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Miranda , 2019 S.D. 47, ¶ 12, 932 N.W.2d 570, 574 (holding that the jury’s general verdict restricts further inquiry); Reede Constr., Inc. v. S......
-
Sedlacek v. Prussman Contracting, Inc.
...whether the jury based its verdict on any number of defenses’ or other theories offered by the parties to a case." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Miranda , 2019 S.D. 47, ¶ 10, 932 N.W.2d 570, 573-74 (quoting Reede Constr., Inc. v. S.D. Dep't of Transp. , 2017 S.D. 63, ¶ 14, 903 N.W.2d 74......
-
Frye-Byington v. Rapid City Med. Ctr., LLP
...leaving as our only course, recognition of the rule that the circuit court is presumed to have acted correctly. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Miranda, 2019 S.D. 47, ¶ 10, 932 N.W.2d 570, 574 (quoting Reed Constr., Inc. v. S.D. Dep't of Transp., 2017 S.D. 63, ¶ 14, 903 N.W.2d 740, 74......