State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ward
| Decision Date | 12 December 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 47838,47838,1 |
| Citation | 340 S.W.2d 635 |
| Parties | STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Margie WARD; Bonnie Ward, a/k/a Mrs. Joey Dodson; and Charles E. Woolf, Administrator of the Estate of Curtis E. Ward, a/k/a Curtis Ward, a/k/a C. E. Ward, Defendants-Appellants |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
James F. KOESTER, St. Louis, for appellants, Ward.
Carter, Fitzsimmons & Brinker, Clayton, for respondent.
HOLMAN, Commissioner.
In this declaratory judgment action plaintiff sought an adjudication concerning its obligation to defend a suit filed by defendants against the administrator of the estate of Curtis E. Ward, deceased, and its liability to pay any judgment that said claimants might obtain therein. All material facts were agreed upon. The trial court entered a judgment to the effect that plaintiff was not required to make any defense against, or payment of, the claims of defendants and that said claims were excluded from the coverage afforded by a policy of liability insurance theretofore issued by plaintiff to Curtis E. Ward. Defendants have appealed. This court has appellate jurisdiction because of the amount in dispute.
On October 13, 1957, Curtis E. Ward was driving his automobile northwardly on Highway 61. At a point approximately 80 miles south of St. Louis, Missouri, the Ward automobile collided with another automobile on said highway and Mr. Ward sustained injuries from which he died later that day. Passengers in Mr. Ward's car were his wife Margie, his daughter Bonnie, and Miss Joanne Curtis, all of whom are alleged to have sustained serious personal injuries. Those occupants filed a joint suit against the administrator of the estate of Curtis E. Ward. Therein Margie sought to recover $40,000, Bonnie $20,000, and Joanne $10,000.
Plaintiff disclaimed any liability in regard to the claims of Margie and Bonnie and refused to undertake any defense of their claims as alleged in Counts I and II of the petition in the aforementioned suit. Plaintiff's disclaimer was based upon a policy exclusion clause which provided that 'This policy does not apply under * * * (e) coverage A [bodily injury liability] * * * for bodily injury to the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing in the same household as the insured.' When the administrator, Charles E. Woolf, failed to make any defense to the claims of Margie and Bonnie, plaintiff instituted this suit against Margie, Bonnie, and Mr. Woolf as administrator, in order to obtain an adjudication as to its obligations under the policy. Mr. Woolf defaulted. Herein we will refer to Margie and Bonnie (appellants) as the defendants.
It is agreed that Margie Ward was the wife of Curtis E. Ward, and, on October 13, 1957, resided with him at 4101 Lafayette Avenue, St. Louis, Missouri; that Bonnie Ward is the daughter of Curtis E. and Margie Ward and had lived with her parents continuously since her birth and, on October 13, 1957, was living with them at the aforementioned address. It therefore appears to be undisputed that on October 13, 1957, defendants were members 'of the family of the insured residing in the same household as the insured.'
In an effort to avoid the application of the exclusionary provision of the policy invoked by plaintiff, defendants have briefed the contention that said provision is void because it is in conflict with provisions of 'The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law,' Section 303.010 et seq., Laws 1953, p. 569, P.P. Vol. 16 V.A.M.S. (unless otherwise indicated all statutory citations herein are to sections of that Act), and is against the public policy of the State of Missouri as evidenced by the provisions of said Act. These contentions are more specifically summarized in the brief as follows: 'The conclusion should then follow that either the exclusion is void as against public policy or amended to conform to our statutes and that in either event it must insure the person named therein against the liability alleged herein.'
In support of the foregoing contentions defendants point to Section 303.190 which states, in part, that They state that the claims for relief alleged in their petition are liabilities for damages 'imposed by law' against the estate of decedent because the fact that Curtis E. Ward was the husband of Margie and the father of Bonnie would not bar either of said defendants from maintaining the aforementioned suit for damages against his administrator. They cite Ennis v. Truhitte, Mo.Sup., 306 S.W.2d 549, and Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, Mo.Sup. 336 S.W.2d 68, which support the assertion that the relationship which had existed between defendants and decedent would not prohibit the maintenance of the suit they have heretofore filed. In that connection we note that Bonnie was 21 years of age and employed at the time of the casualty and hence could apparently maintain the action without being required to rely upon the rule stated in the Brennecke case.
Defendants also call attention to the following provision in the policy under consideration: As heretofore stated, defendants contend that said policy provision, when considered in connection with the quoted portion of Section 303.190, would constitute an amendment of the policy so as to provide coverage against 'liability imposed by law' which would include their claims.
The difficulty with the foregoing contention is that Section 303.190 () also provides that 'A 'motor vehicle liability policy' as said term is used in this chapter shall mean an owner's or an operator's policy of liability insurance, certified as provided in section 303.170 or section 303.180 as proof of financial responsibility * * *,' and the policy provision defendants rely upon applies only to policies 'certified' under a motor vehicle financial responsibility law. There is no contention that the policy involved herein had been 'certified' as proof of Mr. Ward's financial responsibility under the provisions of either Section 303.170 or Section 303.180. Contentions similar to the one under consideration were ruled upon by both the Kansas City and St. Louis Courts of Appeals in the cases of Perkins v. Perkins, Mo.App., 284 S.W.2d 603, and Gabler v. Continental Casualty Co., Mo.App., 295 S.W.2d 194. Each of those cases involved a policy provision very similar to the one we are here considering and in each case the court concluded that under the Missouri Financial Responsibility Act the policy provision did not become effective until the policy had actually been certified as proof of financial responsibility under the Act.
There are many cases in other jurisdictions that have construed similar policy provisions under comparable financial responsibility acts. The holdings in the Perkins and Gabler cases are supported by almost all of those decisions. Fifteen supporting decisions are cited in Perkins, and eight additional ones are cited in Gabler. It would serve no purpose to re-cite those cases herein. Defendants rely upon cases decided by the courts of California which support their contention. See Wildman v. Government Employees' Insurance Co., 48 Cal.2d 31, 307 P.2d 359, and Shapiro v. Republic Indemnity Company of America, Cal.App., 334 P.2d 594. We approve the majority rule. In our...
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