State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schwartz

• Decision Date: 13 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89-6290,89-6290
• Citation: 933 F.2d 848
• Parties: STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles SCHWARTZ; Glenda Schwartz, Individually and as Mother and Next Friend of Carla Schwartz, Mark Schwartz, and David Schwartz, Defendants-Appellees. Oklahoma Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company, Amicus Curiae.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 848

933 F.2d 848

STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois

corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles SCHWARTZ; Glenda Schwartz, Individually and as

Mother and Next Friend of Carla Schwartz, Mark

Schwartz, and David Schwartz,

Defendants-Appellees.

Oklahoma Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company, Amicus Curiae.

No. 89-6290.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

May 13, 1991.

Don Manners, Michael Mannes, William J. Molinsky, Jr., and Orlando M. Hernando, Oklahoma City, Okl., for plaintiff-appellant.

David A. Davis and John L. Collinsworth, Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendants-appellees.

Mort G. Welch of Abowitz & Welch, Oklahoma City, Okl., for amicus curiae.

Before MCKAY and MOORE, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge. ^*

JOHN P. MOORE, Circuit Judge.

State Farm filed this action in district court seeking a declaratory judgment that it is not obligated to defend or indemnify Glenda Schwartz in an Oklahoma state court action filed against her by her children. The children brought suit against their mother alleging that her negligent driving resulted in their injury. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Schwartz children, holding that the "household exclusion" in their parents' State Farm insurance policy, denying coverage for bodily injury to any insured or member of the insured's household, violated the public policy of Oklahoma under the state's compulsory automobile liability insurance law. The court held that State Farm is therefore liable to defend and indemnify Glenda Schwartz against her children's lawsuit. We affirm.

I. Background

The parties stipulated: 1) the insurance policy covering the automobile involved in the accident was in full force; 2) the policy excludes from coverage damages "[f]or any bodily injury to: ... c. any insured or any member of the insured's family residing in the insured's household" [the household exclusion at issue here]; 3) the policy defines "insured" as: "1. you [Charles Schwartz, in this case]; 2. your spouse; 3. the relatives of the first person named in the declarations [Charles Schwartz is the only named insured]; 4) the policy defines "relative" as: "a person related to you or your spouse by blood, marriage, or adoption who lives with you. It includes your unmarried and unemancipated child away at school;" and 5) the Schwartz children are relatives for the purposes of this policy. We review a summary judgment order de novo and apply the same legal standard used by the district court under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir.1988).

The issue in this case is straightforward: whether the district court erred in determining that the household exclusion in the Schwartz' insurance policy with State Farm contravenes the public policy established by Oklahoma's compulsory liability insurance law. In reviewing the district court's decision, we are faced with the difficult task of divining a coherent state policy from an ambiguous statute, directly conflicting positions announced in dicta in several state court opinions, and the persuasive authority of the public policies of other states with compulsory liability insurance laws.

II. Conceptual Analysis

Conceptually, there are two ways to analyze this issue: 1) whether the policy definition of the children as "insureds" precludes recovery, or 2) whether the household exclusion in the policy offends Oklahoma public policy. First, taking notice of the fact that the Schwartz children are defined as "insureds" in the policy, and the fact that according to the policy "insureds" may not recover for bodily injury under the liability provisions, one could argue that under Looney v. Farmers Ins. Group, 616 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Okla.1980), the children, as "insureds," are not covered by the insurance policy. This resolution would avoid reaching the difficult public policy question of the validity of the household exclusion.

However, there are flaws in this rationale. First, the claimant in Looney, as the spouse of the policyholder, was defined in the policy as a "named insured." In the present case the children are defined within the class of the "insured." Id. at 1139 n. 2. While the linguistic distinction between a "named insured" and an "insured" may not be significant, it does point to a more serious problem. The spouse of the policyholder is much more likely than the children of the policyholder to be a true, consenting party to the contract. It is highly unlikely that household members such as minor, unemancipated children will have consented, or are legally able to consent, to the terms of the insurance contract. ¹ In Young v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Okla.1987), the court distinguished parties to the contract from those "innocent victims" the Act intended to protect. Id. at 1087-88. The Young court noted that this conclusion was consistent with Looney because, in essence, a "named insured" is simply another name for a party to the contract.

In the present case, the district court properly pointed out that under Oklahoma law, Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 15, Sec. 11 (West 1983), children are incapable of contracting, and, in addition, simply because they are third party beneficiaries does not make them contracting parties. Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 15, Sec. 29 (West 1983). Logic supports this conclusion as well.

Adopting Young 's division of the world into two populations: innocent victims and parties to the contract, and remembering that parental immunity has been abrogated in automobile injury cases in Oklahoma, Unah By and Through Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla.1984), it would undermine Unah for parents and their insurance company to be able to prevent suits against the parents by their children by simply defining the children as "insureds."

Also, assuming for the moment that the household exclusion does contravene Oklahoma public policy, the contracting parties should not be able to accomplish the same results as would a household exclusion by simply defining all parties they would like to exclude from coverage as "insureds." For these reasons, we follow the second conceptual path. Our quest will therefore be to analyze whether the household exclusion violates Oklahoma public policy.

III. Public Policy

Oklahoma's compulsory liability insurance law states in relevant part:

On and after January 1, 1983, every owner of a motor vehicle registered in this state, other than a licensed used motor vehicle dealer, shall, at all times, maintain in force with respect to such vehicle security for the payment of loss resulting from the liability imposed by law for bodily injury, death and property damage sustained by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation or use of the vehicle.

Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 47, Sec. 7-601(B) (West 1988) (emphasis added). Also, as mentioned above, Oklahoma has abrogated parental immunity from suit to allow a child's action for negligence arising from an automobile accident to the extent of the parent's automobile insurance. Unah, 676 P.2d at 1369-70.

Since passage of the Compulsory Liability Insurance Act (the Act) in 1976, Oklahoma courts have invalidated several insurance policy exclusions as contrary to the public policy established by the Act. In Young, 743 P.2d at 1087-88, the Oklahoma supreme court held an age exclusion (no liability coverage if the operator was under age twenty-five and not a relative of the insured) violated the public policy. The Young court reached this result by concluding the legislative intent underlying the Act was to mandate that "any vehicle operated on the highways of Oklahoma be secured against liability to innocent victims of the negligent operation or use of the insured vehicle." Id. at 1088. Young also cited that portion of the Act requiring coverage for loss "sustained by any person" as further support for its conclusion. Id. at 1087, 1088.

In Equity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Spring Valley Wholesale Nursery, Inc., 747 P.2d 947, 952 (Okla.1987), the Oklahoma supreme court held that a geographical exclusion (policy did not cover travel outside a two hundred mile radius) also contravened the public policy of the Act, holding that "when liability insurance is issued in compliance with compulsory insurance laws, statutory policy at the very minimum requires coverage for all actionable claims which may arise within the state." Id. (emphasis in original). The Equity court noted in dictum, mischaracterizing the holding of Looney, that, unlike the geographical exclusion, the household exclusion would comply with Oklahoma public policy under the Act because "[t]he purpose of the law is to shield the public, not members of the named insured's household." Id. 747 P.2d at 953.

The Young and Equity discussions of the household exclusion are at best persuasive dicta because they dealt with other types of exclusions. Looney is closer to the facts of the present case because it indirectly involved a household exclusion as well as an exclusion prohibiting recovery by one of the insured parties. Id. at 1139 n. 2. ² The Equity court stated that Looney determined the household exclusion did not violate public policy in Oklahoma. This is a questionable characterization of Looney because the court there based its decision in favor of the insurance company upon the fact that the claimant was a named insured. The court simply did not base its decision on the validity of the household exclusion; indeed, the court stated, "[t]he appellant was more than a mere member of the family of the insured; she was the insured. Her relationship with the defendant Looney surpasses mere household member status." Id. at 1141 (emphasis in original). However, the Looney court unfortunately obscured the exact basis for its holding by expressing agreement with this court's treatment of household exclusions in Farmers Ins. Co. v. McClain, 603 F.2d 821 (10th Cir.1979).

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