State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Linton
| Decision Date | 18 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action CV-09-183 |
| Parties | STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff v. ROGER T. LINTON and the ESTATE OF JAMES CAREY, Defendants |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
In its amended complaint for a declaratory judgment, the plaintiff asks the court to determine the following: (1) whether its automobile policy with Jonathan Jennings provides liability coverage for a motor vehicle collision on October 7, 2008, in Chelsea, involving vehicles operated by defendant Roger Linton and James Carey; (2) whether the plaintiff has a duty to defend defendant Linton for any claims resulting from that collision; and (3) whether the plaintiff has a duty to indemnify defendant Linton for any claims resulting from that collision.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") contracted with Jonathan Jennings to provide insurance for the vehicle at issue.[1] Defendant Linton was employed by Jonathan Jennings, d/b/a Forgotten Stone Works during 2006-2007, after which he continued to work with Mr Jennings as an independent contractor. Defendant Linton is not related to Mr. Jennings and never spoke to Mrs. Jennings. As an employee, he used a Forgotten Stone Works vehicle to drive back and forth to work. Mr. Jennings did not discuss with defendant Linton any restrictions on the use of the vehicle. Mr. Jennings allowed Tina Savage, also an employee until June 2007 and defendant Linton's girlfriend, to use a Forgotten Stone Works vehicle during her employment when her vehicle broke down or when she did estimates and deliveries after work. Mr. Jennings did not discuss with Ms Savage or defendant Linton any restrictions on the use of the vehicle loaned to Ms. Savage. Eventually, Mr. Jennings told Ms. Savage that she had to get her own vehicle and she did.
Before the collision, defendant Linton had used a Forgotten Stone Works truck for personal use on his own job, getting groceries, fishing, and to haul hay. Mr. Jennings knew about the use of the vehicle for hauling hay because he asked that defendant Linton sweep out the truck. During 2008, defendant Linton worked as a subcontractor for Forgotten Stone Works. As a subcontractor, defendant Linton did not use Forgotten Stone Works vehicles after the regular workday, except possibly to haul hay, and no vehicles were provided to him. As an independent contractor, if defendant Linton required a vehicle, he specified what he would use the vehicle for. Jason Holland, another Forgotten Stone Works employee turned independent contractor, agreed that if he planned to use a vehicle for something other than grocery shopping, he would ask Mr. Jennings. Mr. Jennings stressed that use of Forgotten Stone Works vehicles by defendant Linton as an independent contractor was to be infrequent. Mr. Holland recalled using trucks a couple of times when he worked as an independent contractor with Forgotten Stone Works but never used the flatbed truck.
Defendant Linton did not use Forgotten Stone Works vehicles to take his girlfriend out, to do personal errands, or to visit friends. He had never used a Forgotten Stone Works vehicle while drinking so that was not an issue Mr. Jennings had to address. Defendant Linton agreed that October 7, 2008 was the first time he operated a Forgotten Stone Works vehicle while drinking, giving friends a ride, or visiting friends in a different town. Mr. Jennings trusted defendant Linton to use the vehicles "in his good judgment."
In October 2008, defendant Linton and Jason Holland worked as subcontractors on a job for Forgotten Stone Works at the Kents Hill School in Kents Hill. The project involved the installation of a stone entry in a sports field and required 10-15 tons of granite and various pieces of equipment. The materials and equipment were taken to the job site each morning and returned each evening; they could not be left at the school because the field was being used.
On October 7, 2008, defendant Linton and Jason Holland arrived at Forgotten Stone Works at 7:00 a.m. and drove to the job site in a 20-foot long by 8-foot wide flat bed truck with a carrying capacity of 8000 pounds and a gross weight of 14 000 pounds. (PL's Ex. 2.) This was the first time they had used this truck. The truck is cumbersome to operate and was used for work purposes only.
On the day of the accident, Mr. Jennings went to the job site. He did not discuss with defendant Linton any plans to use the truck after work and no permission to do so was requested by, or given to, defendant Linton. Between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. on October 7, Mr. Jennings received a voicemail message from defendant Linton, in which he asked if he could take the truck to his home in Readfield, located approximately eight miles from the job site. At the time of the call, defendant Linton intended to take the truck home, which was the regular practice. Defendant Linton had never borrowed the flatbed truck previously. Mr. Holland agreed that defendant Linton left that message on Mr. Jennings's phone. Mr. Holland recalled that the standard procedure was to tell Mr. Jennings what the truck would be used for. In the message, defendant Linton did not suggest he would visit his girlfriend in Winthrop, go to Sully's Tavern in Winslow, go to a friend's house in Farmingdale, go to Chelsea, or that he would be drinking while using the truck. Mr. Jennings would have denied permission if defendant Linton had mentioned any of those plans. Mr. Holland agreed that if defendant Linton had told Mr. Jennings that defendant Linton intended to drink while using the truck, Mr. Jennings would have said "no." Mr. Holland understood "there were limits" on what the truck could be used for.
Mr. Jennings returned the call and left a message on Mr. Holland's cell phone, which defendant Linton was using. Mr. Jennings said it made sense to drive the shorter distance, approximately eight miles, from the job site to defendant Linton's home than to drive past his home to Forgotten Stone Works and back to defendant Linton's home. Mr. Jennings stated that it was fine for defendant Linton to drive to his house and to the job site the next morning. Because of the way the truck handled and the cargo of materials and equipment, it was inappropriate to use the truck for personal use.
When defendant Linton left the Kents Hill School on October 7, 2008, he did not go to his home. He went first to his girlfriend's workplace in Winthrop. He then went to the Irving Station in Manchester and drank two sixteen-ounce beers. Next he traveled to Jimmie Pond in Hallowell and to the parking lot of Sully's Tavern in Winthrop. He then drove to his friend Rick Halley's home in Farmingdale and then headed to Chelsea to visit Mr. Halley's nephew. The collision between the vehicles operated by defendant Linton and James Carey occurred on Route 17, in Chelsea, on the way to the nephew's house, twenty miles from defendant Linton's home and twenty miles from the Kents Hill School. Defendant Linton's blood test revealed a blood alcohol content of .12%. Mr. Carey died as a result of the collision.
Although Mr. Jennings never specified, defendant Linton knew he would not be allowed to drive the vehicles if he had been drinking. Defendant Linton knew there were limits on the use of the vehicles that did not have to be stated. Defendant Linton knew that his conduct on October 7, 2008 would not have been allowed by Mr. Jennings.
The policy states that State Farm will "pay damages which an insured becomes legally liable to pay" due to bodily injury or property damage "caused by accident resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of your car, " and will "defend any suit against an insured for such damages." (PL's Ex. 1 at 7.) The policy's definition of "insured " includes Mr. Jennings, his wife, his relatives, and "any other person while using such a car if its use is within the scope of consent of [Mr. Jennings] or [Mr. Jennings's wife]." (Id.) Because defendant Linton is not related to Mr. Jennings, he is an "other person" for coverage purposes; his coverage status is therefore dependent upon a determination of whether his use of the truck was "within the scope of consent" from Mr. Jennings.
Maine law has established the order in which the court should address these three requests:
To secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of an action involving a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify and avoid a duplication of trials requires that courts proceed in the following order: the determination of a duty to defend, then the determination of liability in the underlying action, and finally the determination of the duty to indemnify.
Penney v. Capitol City Transfer, Inc., 1998 ME 44, ¶ 5, 707 A.2d 387, 389; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Koshy, 2010 ME 44, ¶ 62, 995 A.2d 651, 670.
The Law Court has "said that the duty to indemnify action should not be brought, or should be stayed, until the underlying action is completed in order to avoid duplicative litigation and to spare insureds the costs of declaratory judgment actions." Foremost Ins. Co. v. Levesque, 2007 ME 96, ¶ 2, n. 1, 926 A.2d 1185, 1186. Indeed the Law Court has "repeatedly cautioned against prematurely deciding the issue of indemnification." Am. Universal Ins. Co. v. Cummings, 475 A.2d 1136, 1137 n.l (Me. 1984) (citing Baybutt Construction Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 914, 924-25 (Me. 1983) [overruled by. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Brennon, 564 A.2d 383, 386 (Me. 1989)]; Union Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Inhabitants of Town of Topsham, 441 A.2d 1012, 1016 n.2 (Me. 1982); American Policy holdersIns. Co. v. Cumberland Cold Storage Co., 373 A.2d 247, 250 (Me. 1977)). When "the coverage dispute depends...
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