State Farm v. Dehaan

• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Cathell
• Citation: State Farm v. Dehaan, 900 A.2d 208, 393 Md. 163 (Md. App. 2006)
• Decision Date: 05 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 93, September Term, 2005.,93, September Term, 2005.
• Parties: STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Richard DeHAAN.

Page 208

900 A.2d 208

393 Md. 163

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Richard DeHAAN.

No. 93, September Term, 2005.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 5, 2006.

Michael J. Budow (Anne K. Howard of Budow and Noble, P.C., of Bethesda, MD), on brief, for petitioner.

Francis J. Ford (Francis J. Ford, P.A., of Bethesda, MD), on brief, for Respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.

CATHELL, J.

This case concerns the interpretation of Maryland Code (1997, 2006 Rep. Vol.), § 19-509 of the Insurance Article¹ (the State's uninsured motorist statute) and the coverage due to an insured under an automobile's uninsured motorist section of his insurance policy. Four questions are presented for our review:

1. "Did the courts below err in concluding that Richard DeHaan['s] injuries arose out of the use of an automobile?"

2. "Did the courts below err in concluding that Richard DeHaan was entitled to underinsured motorist benefits pursuant to the terms of the automobile insurance policy issued to him by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in light of the fact that the injuries and damages claimed by Mr. DeHaan arise solely from a gunshot wound?"

3. "Did the courts below err in concluding that simply by sitting in the driver's seat of a vehicle a person qualifies as an operator of the vehicle as that term is used in the Maryland Annotated Code, Insurance Article Section 19-509?"

4. "Did the courts below err in concluding that Mr. DeHaan's Blazer qualifies as an uninsured motor vehicle under the very same State Farm insurance policy that insures it and if not, did the courts below improperly find that the `owned but not insured' exclusion in the uninsured motorist portion of the policy violates Maryland law?"

We hold that the injuries to respondent did not arise out of the use of the vehicle as contemplated under the uninsured motorist statute and the insurance policy at issue in the case at bar. Because our holding on the first two questions is dispositive of the case, we shall not address the third and fourth questions.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On January 28, 2001, after attending a Super Bowl party, Richard DeHaan, respondent, stopped at the Westview Shell gas station in Baltimore County at approximately 11:15 p.m. He was driving his 1989 Chevrolet Blazer, which was insured under a State Farm Mutual Insurance Company's ("State Farm") policy. The policy provided for $10,000.00 coverage in Personal Injury Protection benefits (PIP) and $100,000.00 coverage in uninsured motorist benefits.

After arriving at the gas station, Mr. DeHaan turned off the vehicle, placed the keys on the driver's side floorboard and entered the convenience store portion of the Westview station to make a purchase. Upon returning to his vehicle, Mr. DeHaan noticed that there was an individual sitting in the driver's seat of the Blazer. Mr. DeHaan opened the driver's side door and asked the stranger "what are you doing?" His question was answered with gunfire from the intruder, who then started the vehicle and left the scene, stealing Mr. DeHaan's car and leaving him wounded at the gas station. After the shooting, Mr. DeHaan was taken to Maryland Shock Trauma Center. As a result of the incident, Mr. DeHaan suffered substantial injuries, incurred approximately $70,000.00 in medical expenses, and was unable to work for about six months. The assailant, Mr. Ronald Neely, was later identified, arrested, and convicted of attempted murder.² Mr. Neely was incarcerated at the time this case was brought before the Circuit Court for Howard County.

Mr. DeHaan submitted two claims to State Farm. The first claim sought recovery under the PIP portion of the insurance policy and the second claim was based upon the uninsured motorist section of the same policy. State Farm denied both claims, alleging that they were not covered by the relevant policy provisions. Mr. DeHaan then filed a complaint with the Circuit Court for Howard County.

The trial court granted Mr. DeHaan's motion for summary judgment. It determined that the facts, agreed upon by the parties, supported Mr. DeHaan's claims under both the PIP and the uninsured motorist provisions of the insurance policy. Petitioner then paid Mr. DeHaan the amount covered under the PIP provision, but timely appealed the trial court's decision regarding the uninsured motorist claim. The Court of Special Appeals in an unreported opinion agreed³ with the trial court and State Farm filed a petition for writ of certiorari on October 6, 2005. We granted certiorari on December 5, 2005. State Farm v. DeHaan, 390 Md. 90, 887 A.2d 655 (2005).

II. Standard of Review

Judge Greene, writing for the Court, recently described the standard of review in respect to the grant of a summary judgment motion by a trial court where, as in the case sub judice, the parties have agreed that there are no disputed issues of material fact:

"As stated in Md. Rule 2-501(f), `[t]he court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' Whether summary judgment was properly granted is a question of law, and we must determine whether the trial court was legally correct in doing so. Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, 343 Md. 185, 204, 680 A.2d 1067, 1076 (1996). In the present case, the parties agree that there are no factual disputes. Rather, the application of case law and the interpretation of a particular section of the Insurance Article were the only questions before the trial court, and they are the only questions now before us. As such, it is clear that our review is de novo. See Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609, 612 (2002) (noting that where the order of the trial court involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine whether the lower court's conclusions are `legally correct' under a de novo standard of review)."

Johnson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 388 Md. 82, 86-87, 878 A.2d 615, 617-18 (2005). Because the parties have agreed upon a stipulated statement of facts, we will review the circuit court's decision de novo to ascertain whether it was legally correct.

III. Discussion

In order to determine whether Mr. DeHaan is entitled to collect under the uninsured motorist provision of his policy we must interpret Maryland Code (1997, 2006 Rep. Vol.), § 19-509 of the Insurance Article. Our interpretation must conform to the well-settled principles of statutory construction:

"As we have so often stated, `the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.' Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). To begin with, we must consider the plain language of the statute. As noted in Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Director of Finance for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 683 A.2d 512 (1996), `we begin our inquiry with the words of the statute and, ordinarily, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their commonly understood meaning, we end our inquiry there also.' Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone, 343 Md. at 578, 683 A.2d at 517; see also Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (`If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.'). Moreover, `[w]here the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court may neither add nor delete language so as to `reflect an intent not evidenced in that language.'" Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone, 343 Md. at 579, 683 A.2d at 517 (quoting Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 755 (1993)).

Johnson, 388 Md. at 88-89, 878 A.2d at 618-19. Furthermore, Judge Greene stated for the Court:

"Our goal in interpreting statutes is to give them their `most reasonable interpretation, in accord with logic and common sense, and to avoid a construction not otherwise evident by the words actually used.' Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429, 701 A.2d 419, 422 (1997). We will avoid constructions that are `illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.' Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994). Moreover, we will not engage in a `forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute's meaning.' `Nesbit v. GEICO, 382 Md. 65, 76, 854 A.2d 879, 885 (2004) (quoting Taylor v. NationsBank, 365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001)).'"

Id. at 89, 878 A.2d at 619.

At the heart of this appeal lies our interpretation of two specific subsections of § 19-509. Subsection (a)(1) defines `uninsured motor vehicle' as a motor vehicle, `the ownership, maintenance, or use of which has resulted in the bodily injury or death of an insured ....' § 19-509(a)(1) (emphasis added). Subsection (c)(1) provides that the insured is entitled to recover "because of bodily injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motor vehicle." § 19-509(c)(1) (emphasis added). The statute does not define the word `use.' The fact that word is not defined subjects it to the possibility of different interpretations. We, therefore, look beyond the different meanings of the words in order to determine the intent of the legislature in enacting this section. We will first analyze the history of the uninsured motorists statute, then evaluate the context of the words as interpreted within the entire section and, finally, we will focus primarily on our interpretation of this language.

A. Maryland's Uninsured Motorist Statute

The Legislature first enacted the uninsured motorist statute as Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972...