State Finance Co. v. Bowdle
| Decision Date | 04 May 1907 |
| Citation | 112 N.W. 76,16 N.D. 193 |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court, Stutsman County; Glaspell, J.
Action by the State Finance Company against Valeria R. Myers and others. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff certain defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Judgment confirmed.
Marion Conklin, for appellants.
Wicks Paige & Lamb, for respondent.
This is an action to determine adverse claims to 80 acres of land in Stutsman county. Plaintiff alleges its absolute ownership of the land, and the defendant claims some interest or estate therein adversely to plaintiff. The relief demanded is in the statutory form prescribed by chapter 5, Laws 1901. The defendant Bowdle did not answer. The defendants Beck and Myers answered separately. The defendant Beck claims title as follows: (1) Under a sheriff's certificate of sale issued under the "Woods Law," dated November 21, 1898, for the taxes for the years 1892 and 1893. (2) Under a tax deed dated December 17, 1898, under a sale in 1895 for the tax of 1894. (3) Under a tax deed dated January 11, 1901, under the tax sale of 1897 for the taxes of 1896. (4) Under a tax deed dated January 11, 1901, under the sale of 1897, for the taxes of 1896. The defendant Myers in his answer claims title to the land under a tax deed dated June 25, 1903 under the sale of 1898, for the taxes of 1897. The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and that the defendants had no right, title or interest thereto. Judgment was entered on the findings, and the defendants Beck and Myers have appealed therefrom and demanded a review of the evidence under section 7229, Rev. Codes 1905.
The plaintiff claims title to the land in controversy under two quitclaim deeds--one from Daniel H. Beck, dated October 21, 1903, and the other from Willis H. Ludlow, dated September 30, 1903. The said grantors were the joint owners of said tract prior thereto. It is undisputed that these grantors were the owners of this land at the time of giving these deeds, unless their titles had been divested by prior tax proceedings. It is claimed that these deeds to the plaintiff were void under the rule laid down in Galbraith v. Paine, 12 N.D. 164, 96 N.W. 258. The contention is that the grantors had taken no rents for more than one year prior to the giving of these deeds and that the land was in the adverse possession of the defendant. No one was occupying the land adversely to the grantors at the time the deeds were delivered. It follows that the facts of this case as to adverse possession at the time of giving the deeds are not so favorable to defendants as were the facts in State Finance Co. v. Beck et al., 15 N.D. 374, 109 N.W. 357. In that case it was held that the deed was not void for champerty as defined in section 8733, Rev. Codes 1905. We adhere to that decision, and it is decisive of this case on this point.
The further contention is advanced in this connection that the plaintiff cannot maintain the action, for the reason that one of the plaintiff's attorneys, and an officer of the plaintiff corporation, examined the county records and therefore had notice of the defendants' deeds before it purchased the land, and the deeds procured after such examination are in consequence in violation of said section 8733, Rev. Codes 1905. We fail to see any persuasive force in the contention. The invalidity of deeds of land while adversely held by another exists only between the adverse possessors and the grantor. If the title never passed to the defendants under the tax proceedings, the mere fact that the plaintiff examined the records and purchased the land thereafter does not make such section applicable, nor bar plaintiff from bringing an equitable action to determine its rights to the land. It was an unconditional purchase of land of which no one had actual possession, and it had none of the elements of a champertous contract.
It is further claimed the grant in the Ludlow deed contained a disclaimer of any interest in the property, and that plaintiff is therefore now estopped from claiming any interest in the land as against the tax claimants. The deed contained the following clause: "And it is expressly understood and agreed that, in executing and delivering these presents to the said party of the second part, the said party of the first part makes no representation as to his title to the premises therein described." The granting clause of the deed was as follows: "Does hereby grant, bargain, sell, remise, release, quitclaim and convey." The special clause in the deed was undoubtedly inserted therein to negative any possible claim of liability in case the grantor had no title to the land. It cannot reasonably be construed as showing that the grantor did not then have title to or had abandoned the land.
It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the taxes on which the defendants base their title to the land are void for the reason that there was no legal assessment of the land during any of the years that the land was assessed. The land was owned by Daniel H. Beck and Willis H. Ludlow jointly, and it is described as the S1/2 of SW1/4 of section 14, township 139, range 65. The N1/2 of said SW1/4 was owned by Willis H Ludlow in his own right. The assessment was made in the name of "D. H. Buck." The land was assessed in one parcel or tract, and was described in the assessment roll as the SW1/4 of section 14, township 139, range 65. The contention is that there was no assessment at all of the S1/2 of the SW1/4. This was the description of the land as assessed during each of the years for the taxes on which the defendants' titles or liens are based. The interest of Ludlow in the land is not described or mentioned in the tax proceedings or in the deed. If an assessment by such a description is void, then all the proceedings on which the defendants based their titles are void. The assessments were made under the revenue law of 1890 until 1897, and during the latter year and thereafter were made under the revenue law of 1897. So far as the question under consideration is concerned, the two laws are identical. They provide as follows: "He (the assessor) shall...
To continue reading
Request your trial