State Highway Com'r v. Frazier

• Decision Date: 04 March 1974
• Citation: 214 Va. 556,203 S.E.2d 350
• Parties: STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSIONER of Virginia v. Lyle E. FRAZIER et al.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 350

203 S.E.2d 350

214 Va. 556

STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSIONER of Virginia v. Lyle E. FRAZIER et al.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

March 4, 1974.

Andrew P. Miller, Atty. Gen., Walter A. McFarlane, David T. Walker, Asst. Attys. Gen., on brief, for appellant.

No brief filed on behalf of appellees.

Before SNEAD, C.J., and I'ANSON, CARRICO, HARRISON, COCHRAN, HARMAN and POFF, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The sole assignment of error on this appeal granted the appellant, State Highway Commissioner of Virginia, in an eminent domain proceeding, is that the trial court erred in setting aside, on the ground of gross inadequacy, the award of the commissioners and ordering a rehearing of the case before a new panel of commissioners.

On August 12, 1971, appellant filed a petition under Title 33.1, Chapter 1, Article 7, ¹ of the Code of Virginia, to condemn a .77-acre parcel of land owned by the defendants, Lyle E. Frazier and Iva V. Frazier, for use in a highway construction project on Route 15 in Culpeper County. The regularly appointed commissioners, after viewing the property and hearing evidence, filed their report awarding $6,350 for the land taken and $500 for damages to the residue, or a total of $6,850.

The trial judge, in expressing his displeasure with the report of the commissioners, stated:

'. . . Members of the commission, your award is grossly inadequate.

Totally and completely inadequate. Now we're either going to get some commissioners here in Culpeper that award people what they're entitled to or I'm going to exhaust all the citizens in Culpeper County. Having said that you're disqualified in the next case, the other case, the Ashby case. The court declares a mistrial in that case. We'll summons a new commission to hear that case. You're excused.'

Counsel for the landowners then moved the court to set aside the award on the ground of inadequacy and filed his exceptions to the report. On a later date, the trial judge set aside the award on the ground that it shocked his conscience, and, over the objections of the appellant, ordered another hearing before new commissioners.

At the hearing before the first commissioners, an expert witness for the appellant testified that the best use of the property taken was for residential purposes. He valued the land taken at $5,766 and damages to the residue in the amount of $235, or a total value of $6,001. The landowners' two witnesses estimated the value of the land for commercial use. One valued the take at $11,792 and damages at $5,575, and the other fixed the value of the land at $12,192 and damages at $6,690. The landowners placed the value of the take at $10,000 and damages at an equal amount.

At a rehearing before the new commissioners, the testimony was the same as that at the first hearing. The commissioners returned an award for $12,500, without allowing any damages to the residue. At a subsequent date, the trial court entered its order awarding $6,250 for the take and an equal amount for damages to the residue. Appellant noted his exception to the award and the action of the trial court.

We have many times held that in the trial of a civil action the trial judge may not set aside a jury verdict simply because he disagrees with the amount of the verdict. If a fair and impartial jury has reached a verdict which is supported by sufficient evidence, it cannot be disturbed. Edmiston v. Kupsenel, 205 Va. 198, 202, 135 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1964), and cases there cited. The same principles apply with respect to the power of a trial judge over the awards of commissioners in eminent domain proceedings. See Hannah v. City of Roanoke, 148 Va. 554, 556--557, 139 S.E. 303, 307 (1927).

We have repeatedly said that in an eminent domain proceeding...