State Highway Dept. v. Ford

• Decision Date: 16 September 1965
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 41544,41544,2
• Citation: 144 S.E.2d 924,112 Ga.App. 270
• Parties: STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT v. Jack FORD et al
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 924

144 S.E.2d 924

112 Ga.App. 270

STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT v. Jack FORD et al.

No. 41544.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

Sept. 16, 1965.

Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Richard L. Chambers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Horace E. Campbell, Jr., Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, William L. Preston, Monroe, for plaintiff in error.

D. M. Pollock, Monroe, for defendants in error.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

PANNELL, Judge.

1. In a condemnation case, wherein the State Highway Department was condemning a tract of land for use as a highway, the court gave the following charge: 'I charge you, gentlemen, that there has been submitted to you evidence as to the present plans of the State of Georgia, as to the use to be made of the property condemned. I charge you in this connection that the State is bound by the boundaries of the land acquired by it and by the location of the limit of access lines as those that are disclosed in the pleadings. But I charge you further that the State is not bound now, or in the future, to follow the plans presently in existence as to the use to be made of the property condemned, but that these plans may be changed at any time so long as the land condemned is used for public road purposes and the construction of the road or roads for which it is used is done in a prudent and proper manner.' This charge was not subject to the exception that it was confusing and misleading to the jury, in that from said charge, the jury could reach a conclusion that the condemnor could, by changing its plans, acquire additional property from the condemnee without having to pay just and adequate compensation therefor; nor was said charge unsound as an abstract principle of law.

2. Where land is condemned for use as a new limited access highway the condemnee is not entitled to damages, actual or consequential, for lack of access to said new highway by reason of any rights of easement for ingress and egress to and from said highway. See § 2, Act of 1955, pp. 559, 560 (Code Ann. § 95-1701a) which provides that there shall be no right of ingress and egress to and from a limited access highway 'by reason of the fact that their property abuts upon such limited-access highway or for any other reason.' See also, 3 Nichols, Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed., § 10.2211(2); Schnider v. State, 38 Cal.2d 439, 241 P.2d 1, 43 A.L.R.2d 1068; People v. Thomas, 108 Cal.App.2d 832, 239 P.2d 914; State, By and Through State Highway Commission v. Burk, 200 Or. 211, 265 P.2d 783; State ex rel. Ashworth v. State Road Commission, 147 W.Va. 430, 128 S.E.2d 471; Riddle v. State Highway Commission, 184 Kan. 603, 339 P.2d 301. The lack of access, where there was no previous right of...