State In Interest of Cox

• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana
• Writing for the Court: LANIER
• Citation: State In Interest of Cox, 461 So.2d 658 (La. App. 1984)
• Decision Date: 28 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. KJ,KJ
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of Shawanda Lynette COX. 84 0695.

Page 658

461 So.2d 658

STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of Shawanda Lynette COX.

No. KJ 84 0695.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana First Circuit.

Dec. 28, 1984.

V. Patrick Bella, Asst. Dist. Atty., Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellee State of La.

Michael Mitchell, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant Shawanda Lynette Cox.

Before COLE, CARTER and LANIER, JJ.

LANIER, Judge.

On January 16, 1984, Shawanda Lynette Cox, a juvenile, was taken into custody for being a delinquent child in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. A detention hearing was held in the juvenile court for East Baton Rouge Parish on January 18, 1984, at which time the court appointed defense counsel and ordered Cox to be held in pre-adjudication detention unless she posted a $50,000 bond. On January 27, 1984, the State filed a petition charging Cox with being a delinquent child, a child in need of supervision and a child in need of care by committing aggravated assault and attempted felony theft in violation of La.R.S. 14:37 and 14:27 and 67, respectively. Cox, through her counsel, denied the allegations of the petition. On April 2, 1984, an adjudicatory hearing was held on the charges. Cox was adjudicated a delinquent child on the aggravated assault charge. The court found her not guilty of attempted theft and dismissed that charge. On April 16, 1984, a dispositional hearing was held. The court ordered Cox committed to the custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections for a period not to exceed six months, with credit for time served commencing April 16, 1984. ¹ Counsel for Cox made a motion for a suspensive appeal. The court granted a devolutive appeal which was lodged in this court on June 4, 1984.

FACTS

On January 16, 1984, Chandler Willis was the owner and operator of the Willis-Liggett Drugstore located at 409 Riverside Mall in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. At approximately 5:00 p.m., Willis was "checking out" the cash register when he heard the distinctive sound of the door of his safe hitting the safe casing in the back office of the store. Willis looked toward the back office and observed a black male and a black female leaving the office and walking toward the front of the store. Willis confronted the pair and attempted to block their passage out of the store. After the male unsuccessfully tried to get by Willis, the female pulled a pistol out of her jacket. Willis stepped back and the male passed by him. As the male was leaving the store, the female moved in front of Willis and he grabbed the pistol and took it away from the female. The female ran out of the store and Willis pursued her. Willis caught the female at the street, brought her back inside the store and held her until the police arrived.

STANDARD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF FACTS IN JUVENILE MATTERS

The courts of appeal of Louisiana have appellate jurisdiction of all matters appealed from juvenile courts. La. Const. of 1974, art. V, Sec. 10(A)(2); La.C.J.P. art. 97 et seq. The scope of appellate review by the courts of appeal in juvenile matters extends to both the law and the facts. La. Const. of 1974, art. V, Sec. 10(B).

In civil matters the scope of appellate review by the courts of appeal of Louisiana extends to the law and the facts, just as in juvenile matters. La. Const. of 1974, art. V, Sec. 10(B). The standard for appellate review of facts in civil matters is set forth in Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978) and Canter v. Koehring Company, 283 So.2d 716 (La.1973). When reviewing the facts in a civil matter, an appellate court may not disturb reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact of a district court. However, even though an appellate court determines there is a reasonable factual basis for the findings of the district court, the appellate court has latitude to evaluate the overall weight of the evidence to determine if the factual conclusions of the district court are clearly wrong.

The scope of appellate review of the courts of appeal of Louisiana in criminal cases extends only to questions of law. La. Const. of 1974, art. V, Sec. 10(B). However, in State v. Mathews, 375 So.2d 1165 (La.1979), a majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that the United States Supreme Court case of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), required that the standard of review when considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the Jackson standard, all evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution and all reasonable findings of the trier of fact involving conflicts in the testimony (credibility), the weight of the evidence and the inferences drawn from the basic facts must be accepted by an appellate court. However, determinations of the credibility of witnesses is a matter of the weight of the evidence and not its sufficiency. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). A determination of the weight of the evidence is a question of fact. State v. Korman, 439 So.2d 1099 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983). Since the weight of the evidence is a question of fact, this court has no appellate jurisdiction to review it in appeals in criminal cases. State v. Williams, 452 So.2d 234 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984), writ not considered, 456 So.2d 161 (La.1984),reconsideration not considered, 458 So.2d 471 (La.1984).

The evidentiary elements considered in making a Jackson review are the same as an Arceneaux review: weight, credibility (an element of weight) and inferences. Under the Jackson standard, these elements must be considered in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the prosecution. Under the Arceneaux standard, the appellate court is not required to consider the three elements in the light most favorable to the prevailing party but must accept reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences and may determine if the overall weight of the evidence is clearly wrong. A review under the Arceneaux standard is broader in scope than a review under the Jackson standard. State in Interest of Cason, 438 So.2d 1130 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1983).

A review of the jurisprudence shows that some appellate courts have reviewed juvenile delinquency adjudications under the Arceneaux standard, some have reviewed them under the Jackson standard ² and some have reviewed them under both. State in Interest of Racine, 433 So.2d 243 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), writ denied, 440 So.2d 151 (La.1983). See also State v. Redd, 445 So.2d 126 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1984) and Cason, 438 So.2d at 1131-1132. The Arceneaux review is clearly a review of facts because it involves determinations of reasonable inferences, reasonable credibility findings and overall weight evaluation.

Is a Jackson review one of fact or one of law? ³ At least two legal authorities and the Louisiana Supreme Court in dictum have indicated that a Jackson review of the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. Baker, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983: Criminal Law, 44 La.L.Rev. 279 (1983); Joseph, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983: Postconviction Procedure, 44 La.L.Rev. 477 (1983); State v. Cheatwood, 458 So.2d 907 (La.1984); State v. Moran, 400 So.2d 1359, 1363 at fn. 4 (La.1981). If a Jackson review is a question of law, and if we only conducted that review in a juvenile delinquency matter, would we be abdicating our constitutional jurisdiction and duty to review questions of fact in such cases? Or, should we review the sufficiency of the evidence as a question of law under the Jackson standard and the weight of the evidence as a question of fact under the Arceneaux standard? Since the Arceneaux standard is broader in scope than the Jackson standard, would an Arceneaux review necessarily include a Jackson review? Since the evidentiary elements of each standard are the same (weight, credibility and inferences), how can one be a question of law and the other a question of fact?

La. Const. of 1921, art. VII, Sec. 10 established the appellate jurisdiction of the Louisiana Supreme Court, in part, as follows: "In criminal matters, its appellate jurisdiction extends to questions of law only." To determine jurisdiction under this provision, the Louisiana Supreme Court defined a question of law as "where there is no evidence at all upon some essential element of the crime". A question of fact was defined as "the sufficiency of the evidence". State v. Vines, 245 La. 977, 162 So.2d 332 (1964) and the cases cited therein.

La. Const. of 1974, art. V, Sec. 5(C) established the appellate jurisdiction of the Louisiana Supreme Court, in part, as follows: "In criminal matters, its appellate jurisdiction extends only to questions of law." In explaining this constitutional prohibition against appellate review of facts in criminal cases at the Constitutional Convention of 1973, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee observed that "[i]n criminal matters however the appellate jurisdiction is restricted to questions of law. This is also the present law in our Constitution and is continued without substance." 6 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts, page 721 on August 15, 1973. The Constitutional Convention of 1973 kept a verbatim record of its proceedings, in part, to aid the courts in interpreting constitutional provisions. 5 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts, pages 67-73 on January 13, 1973. On numerous occasions, the courts have referred to convention records to determine the meaning of constitutional provisions. State v. Ruple, 426 So.2d 249, 254 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983). To determine jurisdiction under this constitutional provision, the Louisiana Supreme Court defined a question of...