State in Interest of L.M.

• Decision Date: 01 December 1988
• Citation: 550 A.2d 1252,229 N.J.Super. 88
• Parties: The STATE of New Jersey in the Interest of L.M., Juvenile-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 88

229 N.J.Super. 88

550 A.2d 1252

The STATE of New Jersey in the Interest of L.M., Juvenile-Appellant.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued Nov. 1, 1988.

Decided Dec. 1, 1988.

Bernadette DeCastro, Asst. Deputy Public Defender, for appellant (Alfred A. Slocum, Public Defender, attorney, Bernadette DeCastro, on the letter brief).

Steven E. Lessick, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent State of N.J. (W. Cary Edwards, Atty. Gen., attorney, Steven E. Lessick, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges PRESSLER, SCALERA and STERN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SCALERA, J.A.D.

L.M., a juvenile, pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled dangerous substance, cocaine, within 1000 feet of a school, a third-degree crime contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, adopted as part of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1986, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1¹ et seq. He was consequently adjudicated to be a juvenile delinquent and was sentenced to a two-year custodial sentence which was stayed and was placed on probation conditioned upon completion of a drug rehabilitation program. He also was required to pay the "$25 lab analysis fee" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-20b, the mandatory Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction (DEDR) fine of $1000 for third degree drug offenses pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15(a)(3), and deprived of his privilege to secure a driver's license for six months after he reached the age of 17 years pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-16. He appeals from the imposition of that sentence, based solely on the assertion that the mandatory nature of the penalty required by the DEDR statute is constitutionally infirm for several reasons.

The facts are not in dispute. On Wednesday, September 2, 1987, L.M. then 14 years old, was standing with two others, Kenneth Nero, an adult, and R.G., another juvenile, within 1000 feet of Paterson School Number 6. Paterson police officers on surveillance observed an unidentified black male approach Nero and R.G. and after a brief conversation, hand Nero some money. Nero then directed the black male to L.M., who handed him a small object which he placed in his pants pocket and walked away. Upon observing a second similar transaction, the police moved in to arrest L.M. and his associates. L.M. was observed to place several vials into his mouth but the officers forced him to spit out the vials which were found to contain "crack" cocaine.

L.M. argues that the mandatory DEDR penalties unconstitutionally discriminate between those juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent for committing drug offenses and those whose adjudications are based on any other offense because the latter are not subject to mandatory fines even if they have committed "more serious offenses." Further, he claims that the penalty provisions are fundamentally unfair and violate constitutional principles of due process by placing an unjustifiably heavy burden on a juvenile's liberty and property interests and amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, he contends that both N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15 and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-16 are violative of the prohibition against statutory amendment and incorporation by reference contained in Art. IV, § VII, par. 5 of the 1947 New Jersey Constitution.

The State answers that the mandatory penalties required by N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15 are rationally related to the State's legitimate interest in deterring the possession, use and distribution of controlled dangerous substances by juveniles as well as adults; that L.M.'s arguments concern "only an administrative problem for the State" in collecting the DEDR penalties and not a constitutional infirmity in the imposition of these penalties; that the mandatory penalty scheme is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory; and that the penalties are not excessive simply because of L.M.'s particular inability to pay them, especially in light of the alternative methods of payment or punishment which are available, nor are they "shocking" or "disproportionate" to the offenses committed. Finally, the State contends that the statutory provisions in question are not the type of fraudulent or deceptive legislation that would offend the prohibition on amendment or incorporation by reference contained in Art. IV, § VII, par. 5 of the New Jersey Constitution. We agree with the State and reject L.M.'s arguments.

First, the mandatory DEDR penalties of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15 do not discriminate against juveniles in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as Art. I, par. 1, of the New Jersey Constitution. Equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment are subject to a three-tier analysis, depending upon the type of right affected. Governmental action which purports to regulate a "fundamental right" or disparately treats a "suspect class" is subject to strict scrutiny--i.e., the action must further a compelling state interest and must be the least restrictive available means of accomplishing that objective. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1287, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, reh'g den, 411 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1919, 36 L.Ed.2d 418 (1973); Barone v. Dept. of Human Services, 107 N.J. 355, 364-65, 526 A.2d 1055 (1987). "Intermediate scrutiny" is applied in analyzing such actions which regulate a "semi-suspect class" or affect a fundamental right in an indirect manner--i.e., the action complained of must serve an "important" governmental objective and be "substantially related" to the achievement of that objective. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 97 S.Ct. 451, 456, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) reh'g den. 429 U.S. 1124, 97 S.Ct. 1161, 51 L.Ed.2d 574 (1977); Barone, 107 N.J. at 365, 526 A.2d 1055. If neither "suspect" or "semi-suspect" classifications nor fundamental rights are involved the governmental action complained of is subjected only to a "rational basis" analysis--i.e., the action must be rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate state interest. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976); Barone, 107 N.J. at 365, 526 A.2d 1055; Rubin v. Glaser, 83 N.J. 299, 309, 416 A.2d 382 (1980), app. dism'd. 449 U.S. 977, 101 S.Ct. 389, 66 L.Ed.2d 239 (1980).

Where the Legislature has created non-suspect classifications of offenders for purposes of fixing penalties, New Jersey courts apply the traditional rational basis test. ² State v. Corbitt, 74 N.J. 379, 401, 378 A.2d 235 (1977), aff'd 439 U.S. 212, 99 S.Ct. 492, 58 L.Ed.2d 466 (1980). "[I]n the area of classification of criminal or penal offenders for purposes of penalty or punishment the Legislature may provide for differences of treatment so long as there is some rational connection between the classification and a proper legislative purpose." 74 N.J. at 401, 378 A.2d 235.

The statement of policy accompanying the enactment of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1986 declares in pertinent part that,

It is the intention of the Legislature to provide for the strict punishment, deterrence and incapacitation of the most culpable and dangerous drug offenders, and to facilitate where feasible the rehabilitation of drug dependent persons so as ultimately to reduce the demand for illegal control of dangerous substances and the incidence of drug related crime. It is also the policy of this state to afford special protection to children from the perils of drug trafficking, to insure that all schools and areas adjacent to schools are kept free from drug distribution activities, and to provide a especially stern punishment for those drug offenders who operate on or near schools and school buses, who distribute to juveniles, or who employ juveniles in a drug distribution scheme. [ N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1.1(c) ].

As was noted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 58 N.J. 202, 276 A.2d 369 (1971) The Legislature has wide discretion in the creation or recognition of different classes of offenders for separate treatment. In pursuing a legitimate objective it may recognize degrees of harm or possible harm and strike at what it feels more urgently needs repression. If there is some reasonable basis for the recognition of separate classes, and if the disparate treatment of the classes has a rational relation to the objective sought to be achieved by the lawmakers, the Constitution is not offended. The transgression arises only when the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to achievement of the State's objectives; the separate treatment must admit of but one conclusion beyond a rational doubt, i.e., that the basis therefore is arbitrary and unreasonable and without relevance to the legislative goal. [58 N.J. at 207, 276 A.2d 369].

Viewing the basic scheme of the mandatory DEDR penalties there can be no cognizable argument that the Legislature's decision to deal harshly with drug law offenders as a class is constitutionally defective.

However, regarding L.M.'s complaints directed solely to the penalty provisions, we start with the observation that juveniles, like adults, cannot be incarcerated for involuntary failure to pay the mandatory penalties provided for in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-15, Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983); State in Interest of D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 505 n. 4, 361 A.2d 513 (1976); State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A.2d 137 (1971). We need not address what recourse may be available to the State in the event a juvenile is unable to pay the fine. ³

States are not required to convince the courts of the correctness of their legislative judgments. Rather, those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decision maker. [Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464, 101 S.Ct. 715, 724, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) ].

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