State In Interest of A.H. v. Mr. and Mrs. H.

• Decision Date: 01 April 1976
• Citation: 716 P.2d 284
• Parties: STATE of Utah, In the Interest of A.H.,
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 284

716 P.2d 284

STATE of Utah, In the Interest of A.H., 4-1-76, Division of Family Services, Department of Social Services Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MR. AND MRS. H., Defendants and Respondents.

No. 19454.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Jan. 10, 1986.

Rehearing Denied March 21, 1986.

David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Linda Luinstra, Carlie Christensen, Salt Lake City, Michael Harrison, Provo, for plaintiff and appellant.

D. Gilbert Athay, Salt Lake City, Bruce Holliday, Monticello, for defendants and respondents.

DURHAM, Justice:

This is an appeal from a juvenile court order restoring custody of A.H., a minor, to defendants Mr. and Mrs. H., under the continued protective supervision of the Utah State Department of Social Services, Division of Family Services ("DFS"). A prior order had taken custody of A.H. away from Mr. and Mrs. H., her prospective adoptive parents, and placed custody with DFS pending a hearing on a petition alleging mistreatment and neglect by Mrs. H.

Appellant DFS argues that the juvenile court incorrectly applied the statutory standard applicable to the termination of parental rights when it ordered that A.H. be returned to the custody of the prospective adoptive parents. DFS further argues that restoring custody of the child to the H.s was not in the best interests of the child. We agree.

A.H. was born in El Salvador in April of 1976. She came to the United States for adoptive placement when she was five years two months old. A.H. joined the H.s' two natural children and two adopted children in their southern Utah home in June 1981. After approximately six months of temporary custody, the H.s filed a petition for adoption of A.H. on January 5, 1982.

A.H. suffered from a variety of maladies when she arrived in the H.s' home, including intestinal parasites, scarring of the retinas caused by infection, alleged difficulty in swallowing and digesting foods, impaired motor coordination, and a congenital chest deformity.

On April 16, 1982, A.H. was hospitalized, comatose, for a subdural hematoma (severe brain concussion) that threatened her life. Immediate surgery was required and performed. The admitting pediatrician, Dr. Piper, noted that in addition to the brain concussion, A.H. had multiple small bruises on the scalp in varied stages of healing, large bruises on her lower back and buttocks, a large bruise in her groin area, multiple bruises over her extremities, and severe lacerations on the tops of both feet. Dr. Piper suspected child abuse from the numerous bruises on her body. The surgeon agreed and reported that "whenever an acute subdural hematoma occurs in a child without adequate explanation it is almost always related to non-accidental trauma or abusive conduct." On May 17, 1982, A.H. was transferred to Primary Children's Medical Center in Salt Lake City for further testing and treatment. The evidence also indicates that since A.H. left the H.s' home she has improved, without incident or further injury, and has bonded well with her foster parents. Despite this progress, Dr. Nilsson, a clinical psychologist, doubted that she will ever function above a " 'mentally deficient' level" as a result of her injuries.

The H.s offered explanations to DFS for almost all of A.H.'s injuries. They said that A.H. fell while bathing and struck her head two weeks before the hospitalization, but that she had exhibited no signs of serious injury at the time. Two weeks later, Mrs. H. heard a thump, went into A.H.'s room, and found A.H. unconscious and not breathing. Mrs. H. began mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and called for an ambulance. The bruise to the groin was explained as resulting from a mishap on a swing glider that caused A.H. to straddle a bar incorrectly. The bruises to the back were explained as having occurred when A.H. tipped off of a tricycle backwards. The lacerations on the feet were said to have occurred when cement blocks supporting a teeter-totter fell on A.H.'s feet while she was playing with other children. The H.s also stated that A.H. had poor coordination, that she fell often, and that she bruised easily because of her prior medical history.

Despite these explanations, DFS filed a petition for protective custody on May 28, 1982, alleging that A.H. was a neglected child as defined in U.C.A., 1953, § 78-3a-2(17). The court awarded custody to DFS pending the determination of jurisdiction and ordered the H.s to pay for A.H.'s support during foster care. The court found jurisdiction based upon an admission of neglect by Mrs. H. At first, the court informed the parties that it would not accept an admission of neglect without the factual basis to support it. However, neither the State nor Mrs. H. offered any evidence in addition to the medical reports and other materials already before the court. The court then reluctantly accepted the admission.

The court found that the causes of A.H.'s injuries were inaction on the part of Mrs. H., her failure to seek medical attention generally and particularly for the head injury sustained April 4, 1982, as well as failure to protect the child following the injury "with knowledge of the child's propensities to accidental [sic] and self-injury as a result of which the child sustained further injury to her head on April 16th resulting in subdural hematoma." The court concluded that the best interests of the child warranted continued temporary custody by DFS.

On June 8, 1983, DFS filed a petition alleging that further mistreatment and abuse had occurred during a visit with A.H. After a hearing, the court ordered that petition dismissed. On July 5, 1983, the H.s filed a petition for return of custody. Prior to a hearing on the petition, the court ordered psychological profiles of the H.s. The juvenile court held a hearing on the H.s' petition, and on August 23, 1983, the court issued its decision. The judge found that the psychological profile of the H.s "indicates that they have personality characteristics well within normal limits with no pathological characteristics present which would make them unfit parents to care for and raise ... [A.H.]." The court also found that A.H.'s special education needs could be met in San Juan County, and the court ordered the return of custody to the H.s. The State appealed that decision, and this Court granted a temporary stay pending the appeal.

Juvenile court determinations regarding the custody of children are equitable in nature, and this Court is charged with the responsibility of reviewing the evidence. See Wilson v. Family Services Division, Utah, 554 P.2d 227, 230 (1976). Ordinarily, we will not overturn the findings and decisions of the juvenile court "unless they are clearly against the weight of the evidence, or it is plainly manifest that the court has abused its discretion." State ex rel. F.D.P. v. Dade, 14 Utah 47, 51-52, 376 P.2d 948, 951 (1962). However, this Court has recognized that in equitable proceedings we must do our own weighing and make our own decision based on the facts in the record. D.P. v. Social Service & Child Welfare Department, 19 Utah 2d 311, 321, 431 P.2d 547, 553 (1967).

DFS argues on appeal that the H.s have no standing to petition the juvenile court for restoration of custody under U.C.A., 1953, § 78-3a-47. We disagree. That statute, formerly codified as U.C.A., 1953, § 55-10-108, "does not apply until there has been a final determination and decree of custody." State ex rel. Tom v. Tom, Utah, 556 P.2d 213, 215 (1976) (emphasis added). Prior to the H.s' petition for restoration of custody, the juvenile court in this case had not made a final determination and decree of custody. The court had merely placed temporary custody with DFS subject to further court order pending further development of the facts.

Traditional standing criteria require that the interests of the parties be adverse and that the party "seeking relief have a legally protectible interest in the controversy." Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, Utah, 702 P.2d 451, 454 (1985) (citation omitted). Although parents are the only persons with a legally vested interest in the custody of a child, Wilson v. Family Services Division, 554 P.2d at 229, a child's prospective adoptive parents do have a legally protectible interest. Although the H.s may not be legally entitled to permanent custody prior to finalization of an adoption petition, the actions of the juvenile court could effectively foreclose the possibility of adoption for them. Therefore, having filed a petition for the adoption of A.H. and having been ordered by the court to pay for her expenses, the H.s have a legal interest sufficient to confer standing to petition for restoration of custody. Accord In re Joseph, R.I., 420 A.2d 85, 89 (1980) (prospective adoptive parents have standing since removal of child could result in "injury in fact").

The next issue is whether the juvenile court erred in determining the issue of A.H.'s custody utilizing the standards for termination of parental rights. The termination of parental rights is a drastic measure that should be resorted to only in extreme cases, when it is clear that the home is unable or unwilling to correct the evils that exist. State ex rel. Pilling v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 407, 409, 464 P.2d 395, 397 (1970). "There is a presumption that it is generally for the best interest and welfare of children to be reared under the care of their natural parents." Id. at 410, 464 P.2d at 397. The termination of parental rights is not permitted solely upon a finding of the best interests of the child without a finding of parental unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect. In re J.P., Utah, 648 P.2d 1364, 1374-77 (1982). Section 78-3a-48 of the Utah Code requires compliance with those standards in order to protect parents' constitutional rights to raise their own children. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1377-78. In addition, due process concerns require the state to prove allegations by clear and...