State in Interest of J.W.F.

• Decision Date: 19 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. 890001,890001
• Citation: 799 P.2d 710
• Parties: STATE of Utah in the Interest of J.W.F., a person under eighteen years of age. Petition of Winfield D. SCHOOLCRAFT.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 710

799 P.2d 710

STATE of Utah in the Interest of J.W.F., a person under

eighteen years of age.

Petition of Winfield D. SCHOOLCRAFT.

No. 890001.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Oct. 19, 1990.

Richard W. Jones, Ogden, for petitioner.

Martin W. Custen, Jane A. Marquardt, Ogden, for J.W.F.

R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra Sjogren, Paul M. Tinker, Diane Wilkins, Salt Lake City, for State of Utah.

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:

Winfield Schoolcraft seeks review of a decision of the court of appeals which held that the juvenile court acted correctly when it (i) determined that he has no parental rights in a child born to his wife during their marriage because he is not the biological father of the child and (ii) declined to hold a hearing to determine whether it would be in the best interests of the child, J.W.F., to place him in Schoolcraft's custody. We reverse the court of appeals' decision insofar as it indicates that Schoolcraft has no standing to petition for custody of J.W.F. and remand to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether it would be in the best interests of J.W.F. for Schoolcraft to have custody.

Winfield and Linda Schoolcraft were married on October 6, 1984. They lived together for approximately eight months after their marriage. The record is unclear as to the exact date on which Linda left Winfield, but it was seven months to one year prior to her giving birth to a son, J.W.F., in Utah on November 5, 1985. Linda abandoned J.W.F. on or about December 5, 1985.

A petition was filed by the State in the juvenile court on December 13, 1985, alleging neglect and abandonment by Michael Ford, the alleged natural father, and Linda Schoolcraft, the mother. The court appointed a lawyer, Jane Marquardt, as guardian ad litem on December 24, 1985. On February 19, 1986, the court found J.W.F. to be neglected and abandoned and placed him in the custody of the State Division of Family Services, where he has been ever since.

Winfield, who is still technically married to Linda, was living in California and was unaware of the pregnancy. He found out about J.W.F.'s birth in August of 1986, when he learned of the neglect and abandonment petition that had been filed by that state in juvenile court in 1985. J.W.F. was about nine months old at the time. Winfield then promptly filed a petition for custody in juvenile court on August 28, 1986, alleging that he was the presumed father because he was married to Linda and was living with her at the time of conception.

A petition for permanent termination of the parental rights of Michael Ford and Linda Schoolcraft was filed on September 5, 1986, and on December 16, 1986, the guardian ad litem filed another petition, alleging that Winfield Schoolcraft had no legal rights to J.W.F. This petition, seeking a determination that Winfield Schoolcraft had no rights in J.W.F., was based on an allegation by the guardian ad litem that Winfield was not the biological father of J.W.F. or, alternatively, that he was an unfit parent or had abandoned the child. After a hearing held on the two petitions, the court entered an order permanently depriving Michael Ford and Linda Schoolcraft of their parental rights. Both Winfield Schoolcraft's petition for custody and the guardian ad litem's petition to terminate Winfield's legal rights were continued to February 10, 1987.

On February 10th, the trial court entered a memorandum decision finding that Winfield Schoolcraft was not the biological father of J.W.F. and concluding that he had no right to custody. In essence, because Schoolcraft was not the child's natural father, the trial court denied Schoolcraft standing to assert a claim that it was in the child's best interests that he have custody. The court continued J.W.F.'s placement in the Utah State Division of Family Services for the purpose of finding suitable adoptive parents. Nothing in the record indicates that anyone is waiting to adopt J.W.F. at this time. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision.

The central question before us is what rights, including custodial rights, a husband has in a child born into his marriage who is not his biological offspring. Before addressing this question, several preliminary issues must be dealt with.

First, the court of appeals held that the trial court properly permitted the guardian ad litem to challenge the presumption that a child born during a marriage is the husband's natural child, relying on our decision in Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106, 107 (Utah 1986), and Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d 163, 164-66, 340 P.2d 761, 762-63 (1959). The court of appeals reasoned that the guardian is the representative of the child and the child is an indispensible party to the proceeding with independent interests to assert. In re J.W.F., 763 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Utah Ct.App.1988). Schoolcraft attacks this ruling. He argues that in order to preserve the sanctity of the marriage relationship, only the wife and the husband should be permitted to challenge the legitimacy of a child born into their marriage. If Schoolcraft is correct, then the trial court erred in permitting the guardian ad litem to challenge Schoolcraft's paternity and Schoolcraft is entitled to a legal presumption that he is J.W.F.'s father.

We find the court of appeals' analysis on this point to be too mechanistic and, consequently, is insufficiently sensitive to the legitimate policy considerations Schoolcraft raises. However, we find Schoolcraft's approach similarly flawed. We agree that, as a general matter, the class of persons permitted to challenge the presumption of paternity should be limited, as he argues, but we reject the notion that the legal status of the prospective challenger is the only relevant factor, as the court of appeals held. In determining who can challenge the presumption of legitimacy, a paramount consideration should be preserving the stability of the marriage and protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon their paternity. See Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 395, 518 P.2d 687, 689 (1974); Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d at 165, 340 P.2d at 763. This leads us to conclude that whether individuals can challenge the presumption of legitimacy should depend not on their legal status alone, but on a case-by-case determination of whether the above-stated policies would be undermined by permitting the challenge. ¹

Applying these criteria to the present case, we reach the same result as the court of appeals, albeit for different reasons. The guardian ad litem was representing the child, one not disinterested in the issue, because his custody, rather than his mere technical legitimacy, is at issue. Moreover, allowing the State or J.W.F. to challenge the presumption of legitimacy is not inconsistent with the relevant policy considerations. The stability of the marriage between Winfield and Linda Schoolcraft was shaken long ago, and their marriage is one in name only. Similarly, J.W.F.'s expectations as to who his father is cannot be shaken by permitting a challenge to the presumption of legitimacy. The child has never had a relationship with Schoolcraft, Michael Ford, or even his mother, so he has no expectations as to who his father is. Having considered the legal status of the challenger and the relevant policies that bear on the question, we conclude that the guardian ad litem was properly granted standing to challenge the presumption of legitimacy in this case.

A second claim Schoolcraft raises is that the court of appeals improperly found the presumption of legitimacy to have been rebutted in this case. In Utah, "the presumption of legitimacy will prevail unless the contrary is proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Holder, 9 Utah 2d at 166, 340 P.2d at 763. And, consistent with the historically strong policies that underlie that presumption, the form of proof admissible to rebut the presumption is limited. One of these limits that is part of our common law is "Lord Mansfield's rule." ² As stated by this court, the rule is that "spouses themselves may not give testimony which would tend to illegitimatize the child." Lopes, 30 Utah 2d at 395, 518 P.2d at 689. "[T]he proof of such facts where necessary [must] come from other sources." Id. at 396, 518 P.2d at 689.

In Utah, the legislature has not abrogated Lord Mansfield's rule, but has specified that certain nontraditional evidence is capable of conclusively rebutting the presumption of legitimacy. In Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106, 107 (Utah 1986), the court observed that Lord Mansfield's rule has been substantially eroded by the enactment of section 78-25-18 of the code, which expressly mandates that courts utilize blood tests to assist in making a determination of paternity. Section 78-25-18 provides: "In any civil action or in bastardy proceedings in which the parentage of a person is a relevant fact, the court shall order the child and alleged parents to submit to blood tests." Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-18 (1987). Section 78-25-21 states: "The results of the [blood] tests shall be received in evidence where the conclusion of all examiners, as disclosed by the tests, is that the alleged father is not the actual father of the child, and the question of paternity shall be so resolved." Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-21 (1987 & Supp.1990).

The trial court found that it was scientifically impossible for Schoolcraft to be J.W.F.'s father based on blood tests and testimony by Dr. Charles DeWitt regarding the results of the blood tests. This is consistent with sections 78-25-18 and 78-25-21. The court also relied on the fact that J.W.F. is partly of African ancestry while Winfield and Linda Schoolcraft are both of Anglo-Saxon ancestry.

The court of appeals, however, affirmed the trial court's paternity finding on alternate grounds, i.e., Schoolcraft's concession on appeal that he is not the biological father of J.W.F. This was error because in relying...