State in Interest of R. R.
| Decision Date | 31 January 1979 |
| Citation | 79 N.J. 97,398 A.2d 76 |
| Parties | , 6 A.L.R.4th 140 STATE of New Jersey, In the Interest of R. R., Jr., a Juvenile. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Andrea R. Grundfest, Asst. Essex County Prosecutor, for appellant State of N. J. (John J. Degnan, Atty. Gen., attorney; Donald S. Coburn, Essex County Prosecutor, of counsel).
Stanford M. Singer, Asst. Deputy Public Defender, for respondent (Stanley C. Van Ness, Public Defender, attorney).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This case presents for review numerous issues concerning the circumstances under which the testimony of an infant witness will be deemed properly admissible in the course of a court proceeding. First, we must decide whether an infant must be given, and hence understand the significance of, the "traditional" oath administered to adults in order that his testimony be taken. Second, a determination must be made as to whether the particular infant here involved satisfied the competency requirements of Evid.R. 17. Finally, we must address the propriety of the trial court's appointment of the infant's mother to act as his interpreter.
On January 19, 1976, R. R., Jr., a 15-year-old male, was charged with an act of delinquency under N.J.S.A. 2A:4-44. Specifically, the State alleged that R. R. had sodomized a 4-year-old child an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:143-2. A hearing on this charge was held on March 3, 4, and 5, 1976. Three witnesses appeared on behalf of the State: S. M. (Sean), the alleged victim of the offense; L. W., Sean's stepfather; and J. W., the child's mother. The defense presented no witnesses.
Mr. and Mrs. W. both testified that on the evening of January 11, 1976 they had gone to the movies leaving Sean at home in the care of R. R., a cousin of Mr. W., who had in the past frequently babysat for the child. The following day, the W.'s, noticing that Sean was acting "jittery," asked the child if anything was wrong. Sean replied that he and R. R. had "play(ed) medicine" the previous evening, and then attempted to convey through gestures what had occurred. Sean walked into the bathroom with his stepfather, urinated, and then pointing to his rectum stated that R. R. had "mess(ed) with him back there." Sean also stated that R. R.'s actions had "hurted" him. The child's parents understood Sean's actions and words as meaning that R. R. had placed his penis in the child's rectum.
Enraged by what his stepson had told him, Mr. W. decided to arrange a confrontation between R. R. and Sean. At approximately 6:30 that evening, R. R. was summoned to the W. home, ostensibly to watch Sean while the W.'s went shopping. After R. R. had arrived, the couple left the house only to return 10 to 15 minutes later. Sean, in the presence of R. R., then informed Mr. W. that he (Sean) had told R. R. that Mr. W. knew what had occurred the previous evening. R. R. insisted that "it wasn't like that." The juvenile explained that he had been urinating when he heard Sean coughing or crying out and, in his haste to tender to the child's needs, had inadvertently walked into Sean's bedroom with his penis exposed.
Not believing R. R.'s story, Mr. W. told the juvenile that he was either going to summon the police, call R. R.'s mother, or give R. R. a beating. R. R. pleaded with Mr. W. not to notify his mother because she had already beaten him once for "messing" with Sean in the past. Mr. W. then told R. R. to "stand up like a man and fight." A fight thereupon ensued in which Mr. W. definitely had the upper hand.
The only other witness to testify was Sean, the 4-year-old alleged victim of the sodomy. Aside from R. R., Sean was the only person present when the alleged offense occurred, and hence the only witness to render a first-hand account of the events that transpired on January 11.
As soon as the prosecutor informed the court of her intention to call Sean as a witness, counsel for R. R. moved to hold Sean incompetent Per se because of his age. That motion was denied. Counsel for R. R. then requested that Sean be sworn. Sean placed one hand on a Bible and the following ceremony ensued:
The Clerk: Will you tell the truth to this Court?
The Witness: Yes.
The Clerk: Do you believe in God?
The Witness: Yes.
The Clerk: If you lie do you believe that God will punish you?
The Witness: No.
The Clerk: God will not punish you if you tell a lie? Or will he punish you?
The Witness: He will.
The Clerk: He will. The boy is sworn, Judge.
Counsel for R. R. objected on the ground that the above ceremony did not constitute the oath required of all witnesses by Evid.R. 18. He maintained that the child must be administered, and hence must understand the significance of, the "traditional" oath given adult witnesses in order for his testimony to be taken. The court disagreed, stating that the above ceremony did indeed constitute an oath inasmuch as the child promised to tell the truth on pain of future punishment. In its view, the traditional oath was not appropriate for "one so young."
The judge did rule, however, that further interrogation of the child was necessary in order to determine his "understanding (and) his ability to express himself" and thus his competency as a witness under Evid.R. 17. Upon questioning by the court and both counsel, Sean indicated that he attended school every day; that he always obeyed his teacher; that his teacher would scold him if he did things "wrong"; and that he never did things "wrong" when at home. The child was then asked if he knew what it meant to be truthful and what it meant to tell a lie. Sean responded that truthfulness "means to be good" and that if he told a lie, "I be bad." Sean also stated that if he were bad he would "get a beating," and therefore he tried to be good all the time. Finally, Sean indicated that he would not be "bad" when answering questions in court but would instead relate what had happened "the way it (was)."
Following this Voir dire the judge ruled that Sean was not disqualified as a witness under Evid.R. 17. In his view, by equating truthfulness with good and lying with bad and by acknowledging that he would receive a beating if he were bad, Sean understood that it was his duty to tell the truth. The judge also concluded that Sean could adequately express his thoughts so as to be understood by the court.
The State then moved to have Sean's mother sworn to act as an interpreter for her son. The Prosecutor reasoned that in the course of his testimony the child might communicate through idiosyncratic speech patterns and gestures which would be understandable only to his mother. Over the objections of counsel for R.R., the judge granted the motion. He cautioned Mrs. W., however, that her function was merely to convey to the court the messages which her son might communicate, and that she could not prompt or aid Sean in any way. He further informed her that she was to interpret a particular response given by Sean only when requested to do so by the court.
The prosecutor then began questioning Sean as to the events surrounding the alleged sodomy. Sean testified that he remembered the night when his parents had gone to the movies, and that he and R. R. had been alone in the W. home. He indicated that R. R. had awakened him by pushing on his legs and told Sean to "(t)ake it easy." The following colloquy then ensued:
Mrs. W.: He put his penis back here.
Sean then went on to explain that R. R. had removed his pajama bottoms and "touched" him on the rear end, and that this touching "hurt" him. Moreover, this touching had occurred more than once.
Sean had no conception of days of the week or dates of the month and, as such, could not testify as to when the alleged sodomy transpired. The child was, however, able to distinguish morning from nighttime, and did state that R. R.'s actions had occurred at night and that R. R. had gotten beaten the following night.
Given the age of the witness, the judge allowed counsel to use leading questions throughout his testimony. It should also be noted that the child's responses to the same questions were at times inconsistent. Finally, the record demonstrates that Sean was confused as to the precise nature of the proceedings being conducted.
At the close of the State's case, counsel for R. R. moved for an acquittal or, in the alternative, for a reduction of the sodomy charge to the lesser included offense of assault and battery. He also moved that Sean now be declared incompetent on the basis of the testimony the boy had in fact given.
R. R.'s motion to strike Sean's testimony was denied. The judge reiterated his earlier conclusion that Sean by equating truthfulness with good and lying with bad understood that he had a duty to tell the truth. Although acknowledging that much of the child's testimony had been the product of leading questions, the judge felt that Sean "was not fabricating or fantasizing but that he relayed actually what happened as best he could remember it." Further, despite the child's lack of time perception, the judge concluded that the testimony given by Mr. and Mrs. W. sufficiently established the chronology of events.
Finding that no evidence relating to actual penetration had been adduced, the judge dismissed the sodomy charge. However, he found that sufficient evidence existed to support the lesser included offense of private lewdness (N.J.S.A. 2A:115-1). The defense then indicated that it would produce no witnesses and moved for an acquittal on the lewdness count.
This motion was denied. The judge, as trier of fact, concluded that R. R. had exposed himself to Sean an...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Van Tran
... ... However, the better practice is to avoid appointing a friend or relative of a party or witness as an interpreter. The court should attempt to appoint a neutral, unbiased interpreter, one who has no interest in the outcome of the trial. Almon v. State, 21 Ala.App. 466, 109 So. 371, 372 (1926) (Disinterested interpreter should be used when possible); Western & A.R. Co. v. Deitch, 136 Ga. 46, 70 S.E. 798 (1911) (Where possible, a disinterested interpreter should be used); Kley v. Abell, supra at 628 ... ...
-
Kentucky v. Stincer
... ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." This right is secured for defendants in state as well as in federal criminal proceedings. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). The Court has emphasized that "a primary interest secured by [the Confrontation Clause] is the right of cross-examination." Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076, 13 L.Ed.2d ... ...
-
State v. Savage
... ... He also ... Page 612 ... stated that he "probably" explained his strategy to defendant, but could not recall how he did it. He stated that his defense centered on impeaching Cheryl Hubbard's testimony by pointing out her self-interest and the inconsistencies between her three statements. He never showed defendant Cheryl Hubbard's August 23, 1984, statement implicating him in the crime. When asked whether he had considered that Cheryl Hubbard's statement implicated defendant in Jackie Cobb's murder, he explained that Savage was ... ...
-
State v. Freeman
... ... Thus, the procedure established under R. 1:4-4(b) stands as an alternative to the general requirement that "all prospective witnesses ... must be sworn or affirmed prior to the giving of ... Page 113 ... testimony." State in Interest of R.R., 79 N.J. 97, 108, 398 A.2d 76 (1979) (Emphasis added); State v. Gambutti, 36 N.J.Super. 219, 223-234, 115 A.2d 136 (App.Div.1955); State v. Walton, 72 N.J.Super. 527, 535, 179 A.2d 78 (Law Div.1962) ... The use of certification in lieu of oath was directly addressed ... ...
-
Table of cases
...§21:04 State ex rel. Papin Builders, Inc. v. Litz , 734 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. App. 1987), transfer denied, §14:03 State ex rel. R.R., Jr., 398 A.2d 76, 86 (N.J. 1979), §23:11 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Perrigan , 102 F.R.D. 235 (W.D. Va. 1984), §5:22 State v. Abdelnabi , 2018 WL 3148003 (Tenn.......
-
Objections at depositions of non-english speaking witnesses
...the courts have made clear that potentially biased translators should be avoided whenever possible. See, e.g., State ex rel. R.R., Jr., 398 A.2d 76, 86 (N.J. 1979) (stating that “interested” interpreters should be used only when no competent disinterested interpreter is NON-ENGLISH SPEAKING......