State in Interest of L. C.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1982
• Citation: 446 A.2d 1233,184 N.J.Super. 569
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, In the Interest of L. C., Juvenile-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 569

184 N.J.Super. 569

446 A.2d 1233

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent,

In the Interest of L. C., Juvenile-Appellant.

Superior Court of New Jersey,

Appellate Division.

Argued May 18, 1982.

Decided June 3, 1982.

John M. Apicella, Asst. Deputy Public Defender, for juvenile-appellant (Stanley C. Van Ness, Public Defender, attorney).

Debra L. Stone, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-respondent (Irwin I. Kimmelman, Atty. Gen.).

Before Judges FRITZ, ARD and TRAUTWEIN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FRITZ, P. J. A. D.

This is an appeal by a juvenile from the discretionary determination by a judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court granting the motion of the State to transfer jurisdiction to the Superior Court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4-48. It would appear from the comments of the trial judge that he misconceived the applicable law and so we vacate the order of transfer and remand for further proceedings.

This heinous murder for profit, committed by this juvenile in an "aggressive, a violent, willful manner" when he was 16 1/2 years of age, was described in articulated findings. The trial judge also pointed out that while the Patient Director of Youth Services in Atlantic County, produced for testimony by the juvenile, said "he [the juvenile] could benefit from the short PIE [Program of Intensive Education] Program," "he never said that this juvenile could be rehabilitated." As a consequence of these and other findings, the judge concluded, "I find that there has been nothing shown to me which would indicate that L. C. could be rehabilitated within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Justice System."

Passing for the moment the question of which party has the burden of proof in a waiver hearing such as this--a matter noted by counsel for the juvenile below and argued before us--we first deal with the rehabilitation question among the several standards whereby the judge of the Juvenile Court is guided in the exercise of his discretion. While "the judicial decision for waiver is largely discretionary [and] is motivated basically by the seriousness of the offense," State v. Lueder, 74 N.J. 62, 78, 376 A.2d 1169 (1977), the question is not one of the presence of affirmative proof that the juvenile can be rehabilitated within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. Rather, the question is resolved by an ascertainment that "there are no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation of the juvenile prior to his attaining the age of majority." N.J.S.A. 2A:4-48c. In other words, the absence of persuasive proof in either direction on the bare and isolated rehabilitation question ¹ supports no valid conclusion with respect to the statute. It is only the presence of satisfactory proof that there are no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation before majority which will justify a waiver, assuming the other statutory criteria are met. While this is somewhat related to the matter of burden of proof, about which more is said below, and it is this relationship which disturbs the juvenile in this case, the fact that apparently the trial judge did not understand this proposition by itself justifies a reversal and remand in this matter.

Since the matter must be returned, we add the following respecting the burden of proof. Inasmuch as the ordinarily anticipated situation is one of nonwaiver and waiver and transfer may be ordered only under a determination of certain fixed standards, N.J.S.A. 2A:4-48, we are satisfied that the State must bear the burden of proof respecting the propriety of transfer under the statute. This holding may be easily derived from the contrary situation in State in Interest of B. C. L., 82 N.J. 362, 413 A.2d 335 (1980). There the court, at 377, held that in the matter of disclosure of the name of a juvenile, "[s]ince the Legislature intended disclosure to be the rule and not the exception, the juvenile must demonstrate a substantial likelihood of specific harm to constitute a showing of 'good cause.' " In a like manner, we say here that since the Legislature intended nonwaiver to be the rule and not the exception, the State must demonstrate the elements necessary to undergird a proper waiver.

Such a rule finds considerable support in other jurisdictions which have reached the same result. In the Matter of F. S., 586 P.2d 607 (Alaska Sup.Ct.1978), overruled in part on other grounds State v. F. L. A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska Sup.Ct.1980); People v. Taylor, 76 Ill.2d 289, 29 Ill.Dec. 103, 391 N.E.2d 366 (Sup.Ct.1979); Imel v. State, 168 Ind.App. 384, 342 N.E.2d 897 (Ct.App.1976); In the Matter of G. D. C., 581 P.2d 908 (Okla.Cr.App.1978); In the Matter of Lerma, 29 Or.App. 713, 564 P.2d 1100 (Ct.App.1977), reconsideration denied 30 Or.App. 127, 566 P.2d 207 (Ct.App.1977).

With respect to that which must be done by the State in order to sustain this burden of proof, we are of the opinion that the traditional statements of the burden, such as substantial evidence, preponderance of the proof, clear and convincing evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, are inappropriate in the context of a juvenile transfer hearing...