State Indiana Anderson v. Brand

Decision Date31 January 1938
Docket NumberNo. 256,256
Citation303 U.S. 95,58 S.Ct. 443,82 L.Ed. 685,113 A.L.R. 1482
PartiesSTATE of INDIANA ex rel. ANDERSON v. BRAND. *
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Messrs. Paul R. Shafer and Thomas F. O'Mara, both of Terre Haute, Ind., for petitioner.

Messrs. Raymond Brooks, of North Manchester, Ind., and Asa J. Smith, of Indianapolis, Ind., for respondent.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner sought a writ of mandate to compel the respondent1 to continue her in employment as a public school teacher. Her complaint alleged that as a duly licensed teacher she entered into a contract in September, 1924, to teach in the township schools and, pursuant to successive contracts, taught continuously to and including the school year 19321933; that her contracts for the school years 19311932 and 19321933 contained this clause: 'It is further agreed by the contracting parties that all of the provisions of the Teachers' Tenure Law, approved March 8, 1927, shall be in full force and effect in this contract'; and that by force of that act she had a contract, indefinite in duration, which could be canceled by the respondent only in the manner and for the causes specified in the act. She charged that in July, 1933, the respondent notified her he proposed to cancel her contract for cause; that, after a hearing, he adhered to his decision and the county superintendent affirmed his action; that, despite what occurred in July, 1933, the petitioner was permitted to teach during the school year 19331934 and the respondent was presently threatening to terminate her employment at the end of that year. The complaint alleged the termination of her employment would be a breach of her contract with the school corporation. The respondent demurred on the grounds that (1) the complaint disclosed the matters pleaded had been submitted to the respondent and the county superintendent who were authorized to try the issues and had lawfully determined them in favor of the respondent; and (2) the Teachers' Tenure Law, Acts Ind. 1927, c. 97, had been repealed in respect of teachers in township schools. The demurrer was sustained and the petitioner appealed to the state Supreme Court which affirmed the judgment.2 The Court did not discuss the first ground of demurrer relating to the action taken in the school year 19321933, but rested its decision upon the second, that, by an act of 1933, Acts Ind.1933, c. 116, the Teachers' Tenure Law had been repealed as respects teachers in township schools; and held that the repeal did not deprive the petitioner of a vested property right and did not impair her contract within the meaning of the Constitution. In its original opinion the court said: 'The relatrix contends * * * that, having become a permanent teacher under the Teachers' Tenure Law before the amendment, she had a vested property right in her indefinite contract, which may not be impaired under the Constitution. The question is whether there is a vested right in a permanent teacher's contract; whether, under the tenure law, there is a grant which cannot lawfully be impaired by a repeal of the statute.' Where the state court does not decide against a petitioner or appellant upon an independent state ground, but deeming the federal question to be before it, actually entertains and decides that question adversely to the federal right asserted, this Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment if, as here, it is a final judgment. 3 We cannot refuse jurisdiction because the state court might have based its decision, consistently with the record, upon an independent and adequate nonfederal ground. And since the amendment of the judiciary act of 17894 by the act of February 5, 18675 it has always been held this Court may examine the opinion of the state court to ascertain whether a fed- eral question was raised and decided, and whether the court rested its judgment on an adequate nonfederal ground.6 Any ambiguity arising from the generality of the court's reference to the Constitution is resolved by a certificate signed by all the Justices of the court, made a part of the record, to the effect that the reference to the Constitution in the opinion was to article 1, section 10, of the Constitution of the United States.7 It thus appearing that the constitutional validity of the repealing act was drawn in question and the statute sustained, we issued the writ of certiorari. 302 U.S. 678, 58 S.Ct. 262, 82 L.Ed. —-.

The court below holds that in Indiana teachers' contracts are made for but 1 year; that there is no contractual right to be continued as a teacher from year to year; that the law grants a privilege to one who has taught 5 years and signed a new contract to continue in employment under given conditions; that the statute is directed merely to the exercise of their powers by the school authorities and the policy therein expressed may be altered at the will of the Legislature; that in enacting laws for the government of public schools, the Legislature exercises a function of sovereignty and the power to control public policy in respect of their management and operation cannot be contracted away by one Legislature so as to create a permanent public policy unchangeable by succeeding Legislatures. In the alternative the court declares that if the relationship be considered as controlled by the rules of private contract the provision for re-em- ployment from year to year is unenforceable for want of mutuality.

As in most cases brought to this court under the contract clause of the Constitution, the question is as to the existence and nature of the contract and not as to the construction of the law which is supposed to impair it. The principal function of a legislative body is not to make contracts but to make laws which declare the policy of the state and are subject to repeal when a subsequent Legislature shall determine to alter that policy. Nevertheless, it is established that a legislative enactment may contain provisions which, when accepted as the basis of action by individuals, become contracts between them and the State or its subdivisions within the protection of article 1, § 10. 8 If the people's representatives deem it in the public interest they may adopt a policy of contracting in respect of public business for a term longer than the life of the current session of the Legislature. This the petitioner claims has been done with respect to permanent teachers. The Supreme Court has decided, however, that it is the state's policy not to bind school corporations by contract for more than 1 year.

On such a question, one primarily of state law, we accord respectful consideration and great weight to the views of the state's highest court but, in order that the constitutional mandate may not become a dead letter, we are bound to decide for ourselves whether a contract was made, what are its terms and conditions, and whether the State has, by later legislation, impaired its obligation.9 This involves an appraisal of the statutes of the State and the decisions of its courts.

The courts of Indiana have long recognized that the employment of school teachers was contractual and have afforded relief in actions upon teachers' contracts.10 An act adopted in 189911 required all contracts between teachers and school corporations to be in writing, signed by the parties to be charged, and to be made a matter of public record. A statute of 192112 enacted that every such contract should be in writing and should state the date of the beginning of the school term, the number of months therein, the amount of the salary for the term, and the number of payments to be made during the school year.

In 1927 the State adopted the Teachers' Tenure Act13 under which the present controversy arises. The pertinent portions are copied in the margin. 14 By this act it was provided that a teacher who has served under con- tract for 5 or more successive years, and thereafter enters into a contract for further service with the school corporation, shall become a permanent teacher and the contract, upon the expiration of its stated term, shall be deemed to continue in effect for an indefinite period, shall be known as an indefinite contract, and shall remain in force unless succeeded by a new contract or canceled as provided in the act. The corporation may cancel the contract, after notice and hearing, for incompetency, insubordination, neglect of duty, immorality, justifiable decrease in the number of teaching positions, or other good or just cause, but not for political or personal reasons. The teacher may not cancel the contract during the school term nor for a period 30 days previous to the beginning of any term (unless by mutual agreement) and may cancel only upon 5 days' notice.

By an amendatory act of 193315 township school corporations were omitted from the provisions of the act of 1927. The court below construed this act as repealing the act of 1927 so far as township schools and teachers are concerned and as leaving the respondent free to terminate the petitioner's employment. But we are of opinion that the petitioner had a valid contract with the respondent, the obligation of which would be impaired by the termination of her employment.

Where the claim is that the state's policy embodied in a statute is to bind its instrumentalities by contract, the cardinal inquiry is as to the terms of the statute supposed to create such a contract. The State long prior to the adoption of the act of 1927 required the execution of written contracts between teachers and school corporations, specified certain subjects with which such contracts must deal, and required that they be made a matter of public record. These were annual contracts, covering a single school term. The act of 1927 announced a new policy that a teacher who had served for 5 years under successive contracts, upon the execution of another was to become a permanent teacher and the last contract was...

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    ...a legislature is not to make contracts, but to make laws that establish the policy of the state. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 104-105, [58 S.Ct. 443, 82 L.Ed. 685] (1938). Policies, unlike contracts, are inherently subject to revision and repeal, and to construe laws as c......
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    ...contractual, as should state law confirming a “settlement of disputed rights” defining its terms). 47. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (noting also that “[i]f the people’s representatives deem it in the public interest they may adopt a policy of contracting in res......
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