State Ins. Co. v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1891
• Citation: 26 P. 838,20 Or. 563,20 Or. 579
• Parties: STATE INS. CO. v. OREGON RY. & NAV. CO.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

26 P. 838

20 Or. 563, 20 Or. 579

STATE INS. CO. v. OREGON RY. & NAV. CO.

Supreme Court of Oregon

April 30, 1891

Appeal from circuit court, Multnomah county; E.D. SHATTUCK, Judge.

R. Eakin & Bros. and Cox, Teal & Minor, for appellant.

W.W. Cotton and Zera Snow, for respondent.

LORD, J.

This is an action to recover the sum of $515, paid by the plaintiff as insurance money to R.J. Rodgers and S.B. Williamson on account of certain hay valued at $1,600 which had been destroyed by the negligence of the defendant. To the extent of the insurance money paid thereon Rodgers and Williamson duly assigned to the plaintiff their claim against the defendant. It thus appears that the total value of the property destroyed by the negligent act of the defendant was greatly in excess of the amount of insurance money paid by the plaintiff to Rodgers and Williamson for which the assignment was taken. As assignee of a portion of such claim or liability against the defendant as a wrong-doer the plaintiff has brought this action in its own name for its recovery. The question is, has the plaintiff a right to sue alone upon such a state of facts? As in this state it is the distinction between forms of action at law only that is abolished, and not the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, as in several of the Code states, it is contended that the assignment, being of a portion of a claim or liability in tort, is purely equitable, and can only be enforced in equity in a suit in which all the parties interested in the cause of action are made parties; that, by reason of this, when our Code provides that "every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest" in actions at law it applies only to those holding the legal right or title and not those holding an equitable right or title,--hence, as the assignment confers merely an equitable title upon the plaintiff, it can only be enforced by the plaintiff by a suit in equity in his own name, jointly with Rodgers and Williamson as plaintiffs, or as defendants, if they refuse to join, because the plaintiff has no right or interest which is recognized at law. But the subrogation of the insurer, upon payment of the insurance, to the rights and remedies of the insured--the party holding the legal title--to the extent of such payment is purely an equitable result and the creation of equity, which operating as an equitable assignment, authorizes the plaintiff to bring an action at law in the name of the insured for his benefit. Why, then, may not the plaintiff under the provision of the Code cited, whether he acquires his right or interest in the liability of the defendant for its wrongful act by an assignment purely equitable, or by subrogation which operates as an equitable assignment, pursue his remedy at law in his own name, joining Rodgers and Williamson as plaintiffs, upon the same principle that the plaintiff could, at common law, bring his action at law in the name of the insured? In either case the singleness of the action is preserved and the rights of the parties are the same, the remedy only being varied as it may be affected by the provision of the Code. However that may be, there is but one wrongful act complained of, causing one loss and creating but one liability. It is a single wrongful act giving rise to but one liability upon a claim which is admissible. It is immaterial whether the insurer acquires his right or interest by subrogation or assignment. When the property destroyed exceeds the value of the insurance money paid, he only acquires a joint right or interest with the owner of such property in a single cause of action or liability. Where there is but one liability or cause of action, those united in interest must adjust their loss in a single action. "The logic of the general requirement," says Mr Bliss, "that actions should be brought in the name of the real party in interest, and that all who are united in interest should unite as plaintiffs, clearly demands the union of the assignor with the assignee of a part." Bliss, Code Pl. § 65. Together they constitute the real parties in interest upon a claim which is indivisible. "To hold...