State Management Ass'n of Connecticut, Inc. v. O'Neill, No. 12978

• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Writing for the Court: CALLAHAN
• Citation: 204 Conn. 746,529 A.2d 1276
• Parties: STATE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF CONNECTICUT, INC., et al., v. William A. O'NEILL et al.
• Docket Number: No. 12978
• Decision Date: 11 August 1987

Page 1276

529 A.2d 1276 204 Conn. 746 STATE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF CONNECTICUT, INC., et al.,
v.
William A. O'NEILL et al. No. 12978. Supreme Court of Connecticut. Argued May 14, 1987.
Decided Aug. 11, 1987.

[204 Conn. 747] Eugene N. Sosnoff, New Haven, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Thadd A. Gnocchi, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on brief, were Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., and Bernard F. McGovern, Jr., Robert E. Walsh and Charles A. Overend, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellees (defendants).

Before ARTHUR H. [204 Conn. 746] HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN, HURLEY and LEWIS, JJ.

Page 1277

[204 Conn. 747] CALLAHAN, Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether General Statutes § 5-270(b) and (g) are unconstitutional because they deny to those state employees who are designated as "managerial employees" or "managers" the right to union representation and the right to bargain collectively with the state concerning the terms and conditions of their employment. The plaintiffs, state management association of Connecticut (SMAC), and four members of the association who work for the state, appeal from a decision of the trial court denying their request for a declaratory judgment that §§ 5-270(b) and (g) are unconstitutional and for related relief. We find no error.

A brief summary of the legislative action leading to the exclusion of these employees from the protections of General Statutes § 5-270 et seq. is necessary to our discussion of the plaintiffs' claims. In 1975, the General[204 Conn. 748] Assembly adopted the State Employees' Relations Act (SERA), which, for the first time, granted state employees the right to bargain collectively. Public Acts 1975, No. 75-566 (now codified in General Statutes § 5-270 et seq.). Thereafter, in 1979, SMAC petitioned the Connecticut state board of labor relations (SLRB) for a certification permitting it to represent a unit of state managerial employees. The state objected to this petition on the ground that SERA did not extend to managerial employees, but the board overruled the state's objection, ordered an election and, in 1981, certified SMAC as the representative for managerial employees. In that same year, however, the General Assembly passed Public Acts 1981, No. 81-457, § 12(b) and (g) (now codified in General Statutes § 5-270[b] and [g]), which explicitly excluded managerial employees from SERA's coverage. The plaintiffs then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to have the managerial exclusion declared unconstitutional. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendants, 40 Conn.Sup. 381, 512 A.2d 240, and the plaintiffs filed this appeal claiming that the trial court erred in finding General Statutes § 5-270(b) and (g) constitutional. Specifically, they argue that these provisions (1) deprive them of equal protection under the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 1 and 20, of the state constitution, and (2) are unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. ¹ We disagree with these contentions.

[204 Conn. 749] I

The plaintiffs' first claim that General Statutes § 5-270(b) and (g) ² deny them

Page 1278

equal protection under the law because these provisions deny "managers" or "managerial employees" the right to bargain collectively with the state while § 5-270(b) and (f) ³ grant such [204 Conn. 750] rights to those employees designated as "supervisors." They also claim that § 5-270(b) and (g) infringe upon their "fundamental right" to bargain collectively. We are unpersuaded.

It is established that the equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions have the same meaning and limitations. Gunther v. Dubno, 195 Conn. 284, 290 n. 6, 487 A.2d 1080 (1985); Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53, 66, 444 A.2d 225 (1982); United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 179 Conn. 627, 635, 427 A.2d 830, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 801, 101 S.Ct. 45, 66 L.Ed.2d 5 (1980); Miller v. Heffernan, 173 Conn. 506, 509, 378 A.2d 572 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 1057, 98 S.Ct. 1226, 55 L.Ed.2d 758 (1978). "When a statutory classification impinges upon an inherently suspect class or affects a fundamental personal right, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny and is justified only by a compelling state interest. E.g., Eielson v. Parker, [179 Conn. 552, 563, 427 A.2d 814 (1980) ]; Frazier v. Manson, 176 Conn. 638, 645, 410 A.2d 475 (1979). Otherwise, a statute will stand if the classification bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest. E.g., G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404, 408, 102 S.Ct. 1137, 1147, 71 L.Ed.2d 250 (1982); United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, [supra, 179 Conn. at 636, 427 A.2d 830]; Eielson v. Parker, supra, [179 Conn. at] 563 [427 A.2d 814]; Frazier v. Manson, supra, [176 Conn. at] 645 [410 A.2d 475]." Keogh v. Bridgeport, supra, 187 Conn. at 66-67, 444 A.2d 225.

In this case, the plaintiffs do not claim that the classification of "managerial employees" is a suspect classification; rather they contend that the right to bargain collectively is a fundamental constitutional right. They argue, therefore, that the disparity of treatment [204 Conn. 751] between managers and supervisors under § 5-270(g) and (f) should be subject to the "strict scrutiny" test and not the "rational basis" test, the latter of which the trial court applied in assessing the constitutionality of the statute. This argument is without merit.

"The key to discovering whether a right is fundamental is in assessing whether the right is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1297, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973)." Cardo v. Lakeland Central School District, 592 F.Supp. 765, 770 (S.D.N.Y.1984). Such rights include "first amendment rights, which are explicitly provided for by the Constitution, see e.g., Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-85, 97 S.Ct. 568, 574-575, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2698, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); the right to travel interstate, which has been found to be implicit in the Constitution, see, e.g., Martinez v.

Page 1279

Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 103 S.Ct. 1838, 1842-43, 75 L.Ed.2d 879 (1983); Shapiro [v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) ]; and the right to vote, which is the guardian of all other rights. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966)." Cardo v. Lakeland Central School District, supra.

The plaintiffs do not claim, nor could they, that the right to bargain collectively is explicitly guaranteed by the constitution. Rather, they argue that the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937), specifically held that the right of employees to form a union and engage in collective bargaining is a fundamental constitutional right. As the trial court indicated, however, the plaintiffs misinterpret the Supreme Court's reference in its opinion to a fundamental right. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel [204 Conn. 752] Corporation, the United States Supreme Court upheld the validity of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA). ⁴ The plaintiffs rely on that portion of the opinion where the court was discussing § 8(1) and (3) of the NLRA. ⁵ Id., 32. Section 8(1) refers to § 7 of the same act, which provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." The court, in discussing this subdivision, stated that "[t]hus, in its present application, the statute goes no further than to safeguard the right of employees to self-organization and to select representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining or other mutual protection without restraint or coercion by their employer.

"That is a fundamental right. Employees have as clear a right to organize and select their representatives for lawful purpose as the respondent has to organize its business and select its own officers and agents. [204 Conn. 753] Discrimination and coercion to prevent the free exercise of the right of employees to self-organization and representation is a proper subject for condemnation by competent legislative authority." Id., 33. It is clear from this portion of the court's opinion that the court's reference to a fundamental right is related to the NLRA's specific statutory grant of protection of the right to self-organization and to select one's own representative, not to a fundamental right in a constitutional sense. "At best, the right to collectively bargain and the right to receive the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement are statutorily created property rights." Cardo v. Lakeland Central School District, supra, at 770; see Hanover Township Federation of Teachers Local 1954 v. Hanover Community School Corporation, 457 F.2d 456, 461 n. 13 (7th Cir.1972); Atkins v. Charlotte, 296 F.Supp. 1068, 1077 (W.D.N.C.1969); see also NLRB v. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571, 577 (6th Cir.1948), cert. denied,

Page 1280

335 U.S. 908, 69 S.Ct. 411, 93 L.Ed. 441 (1949) ⁶; Shelofsky v. Helsby, 32 N.Y.2d 54, 295 N.E.2d 774, 343 N.Y.S.2d 98, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 804, 94 S.Ct. 60, 38 L.Ed.2d 41 (1973). We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err in finding that the right to bargain collectively is not a fundamental constitutional right.

Therefore, since the legislation involved in this case does not create a...