State of Alabama v. Sudie Schmidt

• Decision Date: 26 January 1914
• Docket Number: No. 595,595
• Citation: 34 S.Ct. 301,58 L.Ed. 555,232 U.S. 168
• Parties: STATE OF ALABAMA, Plff. in Err., v. SUDIE SCHMIDT
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

232 U.S. 168

34 S.Ct. 301

58 L.Ed. 555

STATE OF ALABAMA, Plff. in Err.,

v SUDIE SCHMIDT.

No. 595.

Argued January 12, 1914.

Decided January 26, 1914.

Mr. Robert C. Brickell, Attorney General of Alabama, and Mr. R. B. Evins for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 169 intentionally omitted] Messrs. J. K. Dixon and John P. Tillman for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 170-171 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit brought by the state of Alabama to recover possession of a specified part of section 16, township 17, range 5, Talladega county. It was agreed that the land was a part of the 16th section school lands given to the state by the act of March 2, 1819, chap. 47, § 6, 3 Stat. at L. 189, 491, and still belonged to the state if the defendant had not got a title by adverse possession, which it was agreed the defendant had if the statutes of Alabama, limiting suits like the present to twenty years, were valid. The trial court ruled that the statutes were falid, and ordered judgment for the defendant, and this judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the state. ——Ala. ——, 61 So. 293.

We are of opinion that the judgment must be affirmed. The above-mentioned act of Congress, under which Alabama became a state, provided that section 16 in every township 'shall be granted to the inhabitants of such township for the use of schools.' Of course the state must admit, as it expressly agreed, that these words vested the legal title in it, since it relies upon them for recovery in the present case. Any other interpretation hardly would be reasonable. In some cases the grant has been to the state in terms; but in whichever way expressed, probably it means the same thing, so far as the legal title is concerned. Certainly it has the same effect with regard to the scope of the state's legal control.

The argument for the plaintiff in error relies mainly upon Northern P. R. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267, 47 L. ed. 1044, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 671, which held that a right of way over public land granted by the United States for railway purposes could not be extinguished by adverse possession under the statute of limitations of the state in which the land lay. The ground of that decision was that the grant to the railroad was not a conveyance of the land in fee simple absolute, but a limited grant 'on an implied condition of reverter in the event that the company ceased to use or retain the land for the purpose for which it was granted.' This decision has been met for some similar cases elsewhere by the act of June 24, 1912, chap. 181, 37 Stat. at L. 138. Union P. R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co. 231 U. S. 190, 58 L. ed. ——, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 101; Union P. R. Co. v. Snow, 231 U. S. 204, 58 L. ed. ——, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 104. But it does not apply to a gift to a state for a public purpose of which that state is the sole guardian and minister. As long ago as 1856 it was decided 'the trusts created by these compacts relate to a subject certainly of universal interest, but of municipal concern, over which the power of the state is plenary and exclusive;' and it was held that the state of Michigan could sell its school lands without the consent of Congress. Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How. 173, 15 L. ed. 338. This decision adverted to the fact that it had been unual for Congress to authorize the sale of lands if the state should desire it, but suggested...