State of Alaska v. Lyng

• Decision Date: 20 August 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-3992,85-3992
• Citation: 797 F.2d 1479
• Parties: STATE OF ALASKA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard E. LYNG, * Secretary of Agriculture, R. Max Peterson, Chief, United States Forest Service, and Michael A. Barton, Alaska Regional Forester, and their respective successors in office, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1479

797 F.2d 1479

STATE OF ALASKA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard E. LYNG, ^* Secretary of Agriculture, R.

Max Peterson, Chief, United States Forest Service, and

Michael A. Barton, Alaska Regional Forester, and their

respective successors in office, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 85-3992.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 3, 1986.

Decided Aug. 20, 1986.

Michele Brown, Atty. General's Office, Anchorage, Alaska, for plaintiff-appellee.

William B. Lazarus, David C. Shilton, Land and Natural Resources Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Bruce M. Landon, Land and Natural Resources Div. Dept. of Justice, Anchorage, Alaska, for defendants-appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska.

Before WRIGHT, SNEED and SCHROEDER, Circuit Judges.

EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:

In this case we are asked to decide the reasonableness of the Forest Service's interpretation of the Alaska Statehood Act. The Service requires that land grant selections from national forests have a community nexus before they will be approved. The district court held that the Service's interpretation was unreasonable and granted summary judgment for Alaska. We reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Prior to statehood, the vast majority of land in Alaska was owned by the federal government. To facilitate economic development and community expansion, Congress In December 1977, Alaska filed selections totaling 247,597 acres in the Chugach and Tongass National Forests. In a series of decisions in 1979, the Regional Forester disapproved 51,050 acres of those selections after determining they did not qualify under the conditions of the statute.

made several land grants to the state in the Alaska Statehood Act. Under Section 6(a) of the Alaska Statehood Act, the state may select up to 400,000 acres of land from the national forests, "with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture." ¹

The decision of the Regional Forester was affirmed by the Chief of the Forest Service in October 1979. After the Secretary of Agriculture declined review, Alaska filed this action in federal district court. The court granted Alaska's motion for summary judgment, holding the Secretary's interpretation of the statute was contrary to law. The Secretary has appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Planet Insurance Co. v. Mead Reinsurance Corp., 789 F.2d 668 (9th Cir.1986). The construction of a statute is a question of law reviewable de novo. United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 754 F.2d 1445, 1447 (9th Cir.1985).

The APA requires that a reviewing court hold unlawful and set aside agency action found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2)(A), and actions in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right, id., Sec. 706(2)(C).

The interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration is granted substantial deference. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); Kidd v. United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management, 756 F.2d 1410, 1412 (9th Cir.1985). If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the court may not substitute its own construction for a reasonable interpretation made by the agency. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).

To affirm, we need not conclude that the agency's construction was the only one it could have adopted, or even the one the court would have reached. Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 606 (9th Cir.1984). Deference requires affirmance of any interpretation within the range of reasonable meanings the words permit, comporting with the statute's clear purpose. Id.

The courts, however, are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Commission, 390 U.S. 261, 262, 88 S.Ct. 929, 930, 19 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1968); Markair, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 744 F.2d 1383, 1385 (9th Cir.1984), especially where the construction requires consideration of broad concerns beyond the agency's expertise. Grunfeder v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 503, 505 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc).

A court must reject administrative constructions of a statute inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement. Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Alaska argues that no deference is due the Forest Service here because the Alaska Statehood Act is not an act that it administers. It contends that the Act is a contract between two sovereigns creating rights in the state, and the Forest Service's approval is only a procedural function. This argument is without merit.

Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 32, 102 S.Ct. 38, 42, 70 L.Ed.2d 23 (1981); United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 754 F.2d at 1447.

The Supreme Court has held that the "approval of the Secretary" power conferred under land grant statutes gives the Secretary the authority and the duty "to determine the lawfulness of the selections." Wyoming v. United States, 255 U.S. 489, 503-04, 41 S.Ct. 393, 397, 65 L.Ed. 742 (1920); Payne v. New Mexico, 255 U.S. 367, 371, 41 S.Ct. 333, 334, 65 L.Ed. 680 (1920). Accord Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 511, 100 S.Ct. 1803, 1809, 64 L.Ed.2d 458 (1980); Lewis v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 673, 676 (9th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992, 91 S.Ct. 456, 27 L.Ed.2d 440 (1971); Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706, 710, 713 (9th Cir.1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904, 85 S.Ct. 1449, 14 L.Ed.2d 286 (1965).

The "action of the Secretary [is] required, not merely as supervisory of the action of the agent of the state, but for the protection of the United States against an improper appropriation of their lands." Wisconsin Cent R. Co. v. Price County, 133 U.S. 496, 512, 10 S.Ct. 341, 347, 33 L.Ed. 687 (1890). Alaska's sovereignty did not prevent it from consenting to administration of the land grants by the Secretary as a condition of receiving the grants.

Alaska also argues that deference is improper here because the standards used by the Forest Service have not been promulgated as regulations. ² However, deference to an administrative interpretation of a statute is appropriate whether or not it has been embodied in a regulation. Western Pioneer, Inc. v. United States, 709 F.2d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir.1983). ³

ANALYSIS

I. Community Nexus

A. Introduction

The Forest Service refused to approve several Section 6(a) selections submitted by Alaska as suitable for prospective recreational areas. It required such areas to be near (generally within 25 nautical miles of) existing communities, proposed by existing community governments or planning boards as community areas, or at or near an area where there had been an expressed intention of establishing new communities.

B. Statutory Language

Section 6(a) requires that all selections of land under this subsection "shall be adjacent to established communities or suitable for prospective community centers and recreational areas." ⁴ The Forest Service has interpreted "prospective community" in this clause to modify both "centers" and "recreational areas." Alaska, on the other hand, would not read "prospective community" to modify "recreational areas."

In construing a statute, we look first to the language of the statute itself, and second to its legislative history and, as an aid in interpreting Congress' intent, the interpretation of its administering agency. Brock v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., 762 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir.1985). We look to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). However, even where the meaning of the words is plain, the circumstances of the enactment of legislation may persuade us that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect. Heppner v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 665 F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir.1981).

Here, the phrase in question is susceptible to either asserted interpretation and is ambiguous. We look to Congress' intent to shed light on its meaning.

Section 6(a) states its purpose. The land grants under this section are "[f]or the purpose of furthering the development of and expansion of communities." This purpose supports the Forest Service's "commuity nexus" interpretation.

The relationship between the land grants in Section 6(a) and Section 6(b) also supports the Forest Service's interpretation. Section 6(a) provides for two 400,000 acre grants, one from National Forests and one from other public lands. Section 6(b) provides for a grant of 102.5 million acres from public lands. ⁵ If no community nexus were required, Section 6(a) public land grants would be almost as unrestricted as Section 6(b) grants, since virtually any site may be classified as suitable for a prospective recreational area. The grant of public lands in Section 6(a) would in substance be rendered surplusage, as Congress could have simply provided for a larger Section 6(b) grant. We must read the statute as a whole to avoid such a result. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11, 82 S.Ct. 585, 591, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39, 75 S.Ct. 513, 519-20, 99 L.Ed. 615 (1955).

C. Legislative History

Purposes of the Alaska Statehood Act included developing Alaska's economy, H.R.Rep. No. 624, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 9, reprinted in U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2933, 2933, 2941 (1957) and resources, id. at 2936, and decreasing the amount of federally owned land in Alaska. Id. at 5, 7, U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 2937, 2939. See also S.Rep. No. 1163, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1957). However, these purposes are much more general than the specific...