State of California v. Superior Court

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Citation: 112 Cal.Rptr. 706,37 Cal.App.3d 1023
• Decision Date: 15 February 1974
• Parties: STATE of California, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, FOR the COUNTY OF ORANGE, Respondent; AMERICAN INDEMNITY COMPANY, a corporation, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 13352.

Page 706

112 Cal.Rptr. 706 37 Cal.App.3d 1023 STATE of California, Petitioner,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, FOR the COUNTY OF ORANGE, Respondent;
AMERICAN INDEMNITY COMPANY, a corporation, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 13352. Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California. Feb. 15, 1974.

Page 707

[37 Cal.App.3d 1024] Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jemas R. Schwartz and Joseph M. O'Heron, Deputy Attys. Gen., for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Shield & Smith and Peter Berwick, Los Angeles, for real party in interest.

OPINION

GABBERT, Associate Justice.

The State of California, as petitioner, seeks a writ of prohibition to restrain and enjoin respondent court from continuing to hear a negligence action brought by the real party in interest, American Indemnity Company ('American'). In support of its petition, the State notes that, under section 845.8, subdivision (a) of the Government Code, ¹ its entities and employees are immune from liability for injuries which are inflicted upon the general public by released prisoners.

The instant petition for writ of prohibition is before us for a second time. When petitioner first sought this writ, we denied the petition. Thereafter, the California Supreme Court granted a hearing and issued an order transferring the proceeding to this court with instructions to issue an alternative writ of prohibition. We have done so, and we now reexamine the instant petition, as directed by the Supreme Court, in light of the recently decided case of County of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.3d 479, 105 Cal.Rptr. 374, 503 P.2d 1382.

[37 Cal.App.3d 1025] On February 13, 1973, American, the plaintiff below, filed a first amended complaint against the State and various of its agencies and employees. American alleged five separate causes of action for damages, all arising out of the arson of a building for which it (American) provided fire insurance. The arson assertedly was committed by prisoners released into the general population by the State of California's Don Lugo Community Center.

On March 2, 1973, the defendant State of California demurred to American's complaint and specifically raised the defense of sovereign immunity. The State particularly relied upon section 845.8, subdivision (a), which reads:

'Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for: (a) Any injury resulting from determining whether to . . . release a prisoner or from determining the terms and conditions of his . . . release or from determining whether to revoke his . . . release.'

Page 708

The superior court, despite the above statute, overruled the State's demurrer as to four of the five causes of action.

Of the causes of action surviving the demurrer, all essentially allege 'ministerial' negligence by the State in the implementation of its rehabilitative programs. The first cause of action, for instance, urges that the State was negligent in the Application of rules and regulations of the Don Lugo facility, thus improperly permitting the two inmates (who committed the arson) to be released. ² The second cause of action alleges that unnamed guards permitted the here relevant inmates to be released despite the fact these inmates were not eligible for release. ³ The remaining viable causes of action, which are worded similarly, charge that the State was negligent in enforcing prison regulations requiring, in certain circumstances, revocation[37 Cal.App.3d 1026] of the privilege (of inmates) to occasionally leave the Don Lugo facility. ⁴

The principal argument of petitioner State of California is that the decision of the respondent superior court contravenes the legislative intent behind section 845.8, in that the decision will have a severe chilling effect on existing rehabilitative programs. Petitioner, in this regard, refers us to the Law...