State of Conn. Office v. Hartford Bd. of Educ.

Citation355 F.Supp.2d 649
Decision Date07 February 2005
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A.3-04-CV-1338 (JCH).,CIV.A.3-04-CV-1338 (JCH).
CourtUnited States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Connecticut)
PartiesThe STATE OF CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES and James McGaughey, Executive Director of The State of Connecticut Office Of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities, Plaintiffs v. HARTFORD BOARD OF EDUCATION, Hartford Public Schools, and Robert Henry, in his official capacity as the Superintendent of Schools, Defendants

Nancy B. Alisberg, Paulette G. Annon, State of Connecticut Office of Protection & Advocacy for Persons With Disabilities, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiffs.

Ann F. Bird, John Rose, Jr., Corporation Counsel's Office, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A PERMANENT INJUNCTION [DKT. NO. 3]

HALL, District Judge.

Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the plaintiffs, the State of Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities ("OPA") and its Executive Director, James McCaughey, initiated this action against the defendants, Hartford Board of Education, Hartford Public Schools, and Robert Henry, on August 11, 2004. On that same date, they filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction requesting access to the Hartford Transitional Learning Academy ("HTLA") and directory information for students and their parents or guardians for the purposes of conducting an investigation into allegations of abuse and neglect at HTLA. [Dkt. No. 3]. The plaintiffs claim that, pursuant to certain federal statutes, they are entitled to access facilities treating persons with certain disabilities and mental illnesses for the purposes of investigating allegations of mistreatment or abuse. 29 U.S.C. § 794e; 42 U.S.C. § 15001 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10827. On August 31, 2004, the parties agreed to merge the request for a preliminary injunction with the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction. See F ed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). The parties also agreed to stipulate to certain facts for the purposes of the Motion for a Permanent Injunction. Stipulations of Fact [Dkt. No. 13]. The court heard oral argument on January 21, 2005. On that date, the defendants withdrew its then-pending Motion to Strike [Dkt. No. 16].

I. FACTS

The parties have stipulated certain facts. The Hartford Transitional Learning Academy is operated by the Hartford Board of Education for the purpose of providing a therapeutic educational program for students who require special education and related services and who are considered "seriously emotionally disturbed." Stipulations of Fact [Dkt. No. 13] at ¶¶ 6-7. The plaintiffs allege that they have received complaints that students at HTLA have been subjected to inappropriate restraint and seclusion and that in certain instances, students have suffered injury as a result. Id. at ¶ 12. The defendants concede that Hartford Public Schools policy allows teachers and administrators at HTLA to "use reasonable physical force when he/she believes it is necessary to (a) protect himself/herself or others from immediate physical injury; (b) obtain possession of a dangerous instrument or controlled substance upon or within the control of such student; or (c) protect property from physical damages." Usage of Therapeutic Physical Restraint to Maintain Safety [Dkt. No. 13, Ex. B]. As a result of complaints and other evidence, OPA has determined that probable cause exists to suspect that HTLA students are subjected to abuse and neglect. Stipulations of Fact [Dkt. No. 13] at ¶ 14.

Upon making this determination, OPA and the Office of the Child Advocate initiated an investigation of HTLA. Id. at ¶ 15. On February 3, 2004, McGaughey and Joanne Milstein of the Office of the Child Advocate wrote to Defendant Henry to notify him that they would be investigating complaints received "regarding the provision of educational and related services to Hartford students" at HTLA. Letter, February 3, 2004 [Dkt. No. 13, Ex. D]. On February 10, representatives of OPA and the Office of the Child Advocate went to HTLA. Stipulations of Fact [Dkt. No. 13] at ¶ 17. They were denied access to students and to records. Id. Representatives of OPA and the Hartford Board of Education and Hartford Public Schools attempted to negotiate a resolution. Disputes regarding the applicability of OPA's authorizing statutes to HTLA, as well as HTLA's ability to provide the information requested by OPA in the face of federal law protecting students' privacy and confidentiality, prevented such resolution. See Stipulations of Fact [Dkt. No. 13], ¶¶ 18-22.

II. ANALYSIS
A. The Standards for a Permanent Injunction and Declaratory Relief

The plaintiffs seek declaratory relief pursuant to section 2201 of Title 28 of the United States Code. That section provides that "any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 2201. "[A] court must entertain a declaratory judgment action: (1) when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue, or (2) when it will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding." Continental Cas. Co. v. Coastal Sav. Bank, 977 F.2d 734 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Broadview Chem. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 417 F.2d 998, 1001 (2d Cir.1969)).

The plaintiffs also seek a permanent injunction. "Generally, to obtain a permanent injunction a party must show the absence of an adequate remedy at law and irreparable harm if the relief is not granted." New York State Nat. Organization for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1362 (2d Cir.1989). In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate actual success on the merits rather than a likelihood of success, as is required when a preliminary injunction is requested. Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n. 12, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987).

Courts have concluded that a protection and advocacy system's inability to meet its federal statutory mandate to protect and advocate the rights of disabled people, see discussion, infra, section II.B., constitutes irreparable harm. See Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v. Armstrong, 266 F.Supp.2d 303, 310 (D.Conn.2003) (citing cases). Should OPA demonstrate success on the merits, it is clear that there is no adequate remedy at law. Id. The only adequate relief would be to require the defendants to allow OPA access to HTLA and relevant records pursuant to the relevant statutes.

B. OPA's Authority Under Federal Statute

The OPA is established pursuant to Connecticut statute "for the protection and advocacy of the rights of persons with disabilities and developmentally disabled persons." Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-10. It serves as the protection and advocacy system for the purposes of three federal statutes described below, the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act, and the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally III Individuals Act. The OPA is bound by state and federal law regarding confidentiality. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-11h; 42 U.S.C. § 10806.

1. The Development Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act

The Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act ("DD Act") provides for federal funding of state systems "to protect the legal and human rights of individuals with developmental disabilities....." 42 U.S.C. § 15041; 42 U.S.C. § 15042. In order to qualify for such funds, a state must have in place a system that is authorized to provide effective advocacy for and protection of the rights of developmentally disabled persons. 42 U.S.C. § 15043(a)(2)(A). Further, such systems must "have access at reasonable times to any individual with a developmental disability in a location in which services, supports, and other assistance are provided to such an individual" as well as access to records of developmentally disabled individuals when certain factors arise. 42 U.S.C. § 15043(a)(2)(H)(I). Where a system is entitled to access to records, such records must be provided to the system "not later than 3 business days after the system makes a written request for the records involved." 42 U.S.C. § 15043(J)(I). To the extent that developmentally disabled students attend HTLA, see discussion, infra, section II.C., the school is undoubtedly a "location in which services, supports, and other assistance are provided." 42 U.S.C. § 15043(a)(2)(H)(I).

2. The Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act

The Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act ("PAIR") creates an identical framework with respect to the rights of individuals with disabilities. 29 U.S.C. § 794e. PAIR applies to individuals with disabilities who are not entitled to protection or services under either the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally III Individuals Act or the DD Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794e(a)(1)(B). In order to receive federal funds under PAIR, a state must "have in effect a system to protect and advocate the rights of individuals with disabilities" and such system must "have the same general authorities, including access to records and program income, as are set forth" in the DD Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794e(f)(1)-(2). Thus, while PAIR applies to a broader segment of the population of individuals with disabilities, it allows protection and advocacy systems the same breadth of investigative and advocacy authority allowed under the DD Act. Again, to the extent that students protected by PAIR attend HTLA, see discussion, infra, section II.C, the school must provide OPA with access to such students.

3. The Protection and Advocacy for Mentally III Individuals Act

The Protection and Advocacy for Mentally III...

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