State Of Conn. v. Davis

• Decision Date: 27 July 2010
• Docket Number: No. 31003.,31003.
• Citation: 998 A.2d 1250,122 Conn.App. 664
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticutv.Jeffrey DAVIS.

122 Conn.App. 664

998 A.2d 1250

STATE of Connecticutv.Jeffrey DAVIS.

No. 31003.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 11, 2010.

Decided July 27, 2010.

Victoria Pells, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Harry Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John A. Connelly, state's attorney, Jayne F. Kennedy, deputy assistant state's attorney, and James Dever, certified legal intern, for the appellee (state).

HARPER, ROBINSON and DUPONT, Js.

ROBINSON, J.

The defendant, Jeffrey Davis, appeals from the trial court's order, following a pretrial hearing, that he be involuntarily medicated to render him competent to stand trial. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly found that his alleged violation of General Statutes § 54-252 was serious enough to give the government an important interest in requiring that he be medicated so that he would be competent to stand trial. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the order of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the issue this case presents. On April 30, 2008, the defendant appeared in court on a violation of § 54-252 ¹ charge for failure to register as a sex offender.² On that date the court ordered a competency examination pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56d. On May 29, 2008, after the competency hearing was completed, the court Norko, J., found the defendant incompetent but capable of being restored to competency within sixty days. On July 24, 2008, the court Markle, J., found the defendant incompetent but restorable. On September 24, 2008, the court Fasano, J., heard the testimony of Mark S. Cotterell, a psychiatrist at Connecticut Valley Hospital, that the defendant was cooperating with his medication regimen, had shown improvement and was capable of understanding the proceedings and assisting his legal counsel.³ The court subsequently found that the defendant had been restored to competency.

On November 4, 2008, the defendant, through counsel, requested another competency examination pursuant to § 54-56d. On December 10, 2008, the court Crawford, J., once again found the defendant to be incompetent but restorable. The treatment plan that the court ordered included the administration of antipsychotic drugs. The court also appointed a health care guardian because the defendant expressed his unwillingness to take antipsychotic drugs. After the defendant was transferred back to the department of correction, he refused to take antipsychotic medication and his mental condition deteriorated.

The defendant has a history of five inpatient psychiatric hospitalizations. He has been diagnosed with delusional disorder, persecutory type; polysubstance dependence; antisocial personality disorder; and narcissistic personality disorder. Presently, the defendant is diagnosed with delusional disorder, which can be treated with antipsychotic medication. The defendant previously has been treated successfully with the anti-psychotic drug Risperdal, with minimum side effects. His treatment plan for restoration to competency includes treatment with Risperdal. If, however, the defendant continues to refuse to take the medication orally, the plan includes administering the antipsychotic drug Haldol intramuscularly.

On March 19, 2009, the court, Crawford, J., found that involuntary medication of the defendant would render him competent to stand trial. The court ordered that the defendant be involuntarily medicated over a period of sixty days and set a hearing date for May 21, 2009, to reconsider his competency. This interlocutory appeal followed.⁴

The defendant claims that the court, Crawford, J., improperly found that he should be involuntarily administered antipsychotic medication to render him competent to stand trial. Specifically, the defendant challenges the court's application of the first factor set forth in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003), to the facts of his case, and argues that his failure to register as a sex offender in violation of § 54-252 is not a serious enough crime to give the government an important interest that outweighed his liberty interest. We disagree.

To evaluate the defendant's claim, we first set forth the applicable standard of review. “Whether the Government's asserted interest is important is a legal question that is subject to de novo review.” (Emphasis in original.) United States v. Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1128, 125 S.Ct. 1094, 160 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2005).

“[T]he Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests.” Sell v. United States, supra, 539 U.S. at 179, 123 S.Ct. 2174. The defendant challenges only the state's failure to meet the standard that he committed a serious crime that gives the government an important interest in bringing him to trial.

“[A]n individual has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs-an interest that only an essential or overriding state interest might overcome.... This is because [t]he forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body represents a substantial interference with that person's liberty.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 813 (4th Cir.2009). “[A] court must find that important governmental interests are at stake. The Government's interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime is important. That is so whether the offense is a serious crime against the person or a serious crime against property. In both instances the Government seeks to protect through application of the criminal law the basic human need for security.” (Emphasis in original.) Sell v. United States, supra, 539 U.S. at 180, 123 S.Ct. 2174.

This is the standard adopted through Connecticut jurisprudence. See State v. Jacobs, 265 Conn. 396, 399-400, 828 A.2d 587 (2003) (concluding that standard articulated in Sell governs issue of involuntarily medicating defendant so that defendant may be competent to stand trial in Connecticut). Although our precedent reflects an adaptation of the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court, the issue has not been explored through Connecticut law since Sell v. United States, supra, 539 U.S. at 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, and so we turn to federal interpretations for guidance.

With respect to the seriousness of the crime, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that although Sell qualifies serious crimes as being against “the person or ... property”; id., at 180, 123 S.Ct. 2174; a crime does not have to be violent to be considered serious. United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538, 548 (6th Cir.2008), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 2735, 174 L.Ed.2d 250 (2009). Further, the court determined that the lack of an identifiable victim does not mean that a crime is victimless because, with such crimes as drug trafficking, society as a whole is the victim. Id., at 549. The court reasoned that when “a criminal defendant possesses an illegal substance with the intent to distribute that substance to others, unquestionably there are victims.” Id. We find this reasoning persuasive and applicable to the present case.

The defendant is accused of violating the requirement set forth in § 54-252 that he register as a sex offender. Citing Sell, the defendant argues that while the failure to register as a sex offender is a serious crime, it is not a serious crime against the person or a serious crime against property. We refuse to take such a narrow view of the Sell criteria. First, we note that the defendant's reliance on Sell is misplaced. What the United States Supreme Court actually said is that “[t]he Government's interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime is important. That is so whether the offense is a serious crime against the person or a serious crime against property. In both instances the Government seeks to protect through application of the criminal law the basic human need for security.” Sell v. United States, supra, 539 U.S. at 180, 123 S.Ct. 2174.

The fact that the crime of not registering as a sex offender is not a crime of violence does not negate the seriousness of undetected sex offenders existing within communities. “The current law, [General Statutes] § 54-250 et seq. of chapter 969 of the General Statutes, is commonly referred to as Megan's Law.... The intent behind this legislation was to alert the public by identifying potential sexual offender recidivists when necessary for public safety.... The law was broadened in 1997 to include all convicted sex offenders.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Boysaw, 99 Conn.App. 358, 363, 913 A.2d 1112 (2007). “The legislature enacted the law to protect the public from sex offenders.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arthur H., 288 Conn. 582, 590, 953 A.2d 630 (2008).

Section 54-252 was enacted to protect the general public in the same way that statutes prohibiting the sale of illegal narcotics are created to protect the general public. Taking the legislative intent of this specific statute into consideration, we conclude that, irrespective of whether the potential victim of an unidentified sex offender is known, the threat to the public in general satisfies the requirement that the state have an important interest at stake. See Sell v....