State Of Conn. v. Leak

Decision Date27 July 2010
Docket NumberNo. 18509.,18509.
Citation998 A.2d 1182,297 Conn. 524
PartiesSTATE of Connecticutv.Benjamin LEAK.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court

297 Conn. 524
998 A.2d 1182

STATE of Connecticut
v.
Benjamin LEAK.

No. 18509.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 20, 2010.
Decided July 27, 2010.


998 A.2d 1183

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

998 A.2d 1184
Richard E. Condon, Jr., assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

James M. Ralls, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Michael Dearington, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and McLACHLAN, Js.*

NORCOTT, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 53a-47(b) 1 authorized the trial court to order maximum terms of commitment consecutively in imposing a total period of confinement following insanity acquittals for multiple offenses. The defendant, Benjamin Leak, appeals 2 from the judgments of the trial court determining that the maximum terms of commitment for the two criminal cases in which he was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect for assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree and possession of a dangerous instrument in a correctional institution, were to be served consecutively, for a total period of confinement of forty-five years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the committing court had the authority to impose multiple maximum insanity commitments consecutively under § 53a-47(b). We disagree with the defendant and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history. On September 14,1979, the defendant committed an assault using a knife and subsequently was charged with assault in the first degree

998 A.2d 1185
in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1979) § 53a-59. On October 21, 1979, while incarcerated at the New Haven correctional center pending disposition of that charge, the defendant assaulted a correctional officer there with a razor knife and, thereafter, was charged with assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1979) § 53a-60(a)(2) and possession of a dangerous instrument in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1979) § 53a-174a(a). On May 8, 1981, the defendant was found not guilty in both criminal cases by reason of mental disease or defect, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 53a-13,3 and was committed by the trial court Fishman, J., for a sixty day evaluation of dangerousness, to the Connecticut Valley Hospital, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 53a-47(a).4 Subsequent to this evaluation, and after a hearing conducted on January 25, 1982, the trial court Fishman, J., committed the defendant to the custody of the department of mental health (department), pursuant to § 53a-47a. In the two mittimuses prepared by the trial court clerk's office on that date, the defendant's term of commitment was twenty years for the first assault and twenty-five years for the second assault. The two mittimuses were silent, however, as to whether these two terms of commitment were to be served consecutively or concurrently.

Since 1985, when the legislature created the psychiatric security review board (board), which took jurisdiction from the department over the defendant's commitment; see footnote 1 of this opinion; both the state and the defendant acknowledge that they have assumed that the defendant's maximum term of commitment was forty-five years, consisting of the twenty year maximum commitment for the first assault and the twenty-five year maximum commitment for the second assault, to be served consecutively. At the March 16, 2007, mandatory review hearing before the board, however, board chairperson Robert

998 A.2d 1186
Berger inquired regarding the nature of the defendant's two terms of commitment, querying whether they were to run consecutively or concurrently. Subsequent inquiry and investigation revealed that the oral pronouncement of judgment was not recorded anywhere in the court file, and a transcript of the commitment proceedings on January 25, 1982, or a copy thereof, no longer could be obtained. Furthermore, as stated previously, the two mittimuses prepared by the trial court clerk's office provided no direction as to whether the terms of commitment were to be served consecutively or concurrently. Thus, the record was ambiguous regarding the nature of the trial court's January 25, 1982 commitment order.

Thereafter, on April 20, 2007,5 the state filed a petition for an order of continued commitment pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-593(c) 6 and, on May 15, 2007, it filed a request for clarification, asking that the mittimus for each file be amended to show that the terms of commitment are to run consecutively, for a total period of confinement of forty-five years. In support of its request, the state first noted that the entry in each of the state's attorney's files made in the normal course of business at the time of commitment showed that such commitments were ordered by the court to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty-five years. Further, all of the records created after the defendant's commitment at the Whiting Forensic Division of Connecticut Valley Hospital and its successor administrator, the board, showed a total period of confinement of forty-five years. Moreover, the state expressed its understanding that the notes in the public defender's trial file reflected a commitment of forty-five years. In response, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and an application for discharge from the jurisdiction of the board.

The trial court, Damiani, J., held evidentiary hearings on July 3, July 6 and August 9, 2007, to attempt to reconstruct the record of the trial court's oral pronouncement of judgment on January 25, 1982. At the conclusion of these reconstruction hearings, the court concluded: “[I]t was the [committing court's] intention at the time of [commitment] that the mittimus for each file be amended to show that the commitments in each file are to run consecutively to each other for a [ total

998 A.2d 1187
effective sentence ] of [forty-five] years commitment, which is the total effective sentence [the defendant] could have received for conviction.” (Emphasis in original.) Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal disposition pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22,7 along with a memorandum of law, specifically contending that consecutive insanity commitments were not authorized under § 53a-47(b).

The trial court denied both of the defendant's motions, as well as the application for discharge, issuing a memorandum of decision on October 22, 2007, concluding that consecutive commitments, or situations involving a stay of one commitment until the prior one expires by lapse of time, were permitted under § 53a-47(b), which, in providing for a “total period of confinement,” evinced a legislative intent to permit consecutive maximum terms of commitment. Accordingly, the court determined that, on the basis of the charges of which the defendant had been acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect, he could have been criminally sentenced to a total effective term of forty-five years imprisonment based upon consecutive sentencing principles. Thus, the maximum “total period of confinement” under § 53a-47(b) in this case was forty-five years. The trial court also determined that, because under § 53a-47(b), an acquittee can be discharged before or after the maximum term of commitment, depending upon whether he remains both mentally ill and dangerous, the “total period of confinement” is irrelevant for purposes of the statute.

Thereafter, on November 20, 2007, the court granted the defendant's motion to reargue the matter, specifically to address the meaning of “total period of confinement” as used in § 53a-47(b), which the court had emphasized in its October 22, 2007 memorandum of decision, and which was a focal point of the court's oral remarks during the October 24, 2007 oral argument.8 The court adhered, however, to its ruling denying the defendant's motion to correct and related motions and concluded that the committing court had the authority, under § 53a-47(b), to impose consecutive terms of commitment. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the committing court had the authority under § 53a-47(b) to impose multiple maximum insanity commitments consecutively. First, the defendant emphasizes the fundamental distinction between incarceration pursuant to a criminal sentence and commitment following an insanity acquittal, and claims that the logical corollary of such a distinction “render[s] inapplicable the traditional sentencing policies of consecutive and concurrent sentencing” in the commitment context. The defendant also notes that, in placing an outer limit on the maximum term of commitment, that is, the maximum sentence that could have been imposed if the person had been convicted of the offense, the legislature

998 A.2d 1188
used singular phrasing regarding both the maximum “ ‘sentence’ ” and “ ‘offense,’ ” thus suggesting that it did not intend to authorize a court to impose multiple maximum terms of confinement consecutively for multiple offenses. In response, the state contends otherwise, and also claims that, because courts have the inherent common-law authority to stay their judgments, they may impose “consecutive” terms of imprisonment, commitment or other confinement.9 We agree with the state.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. The resolution of this appeal requires us to interpret § 53a-47(b). “Well settled principles of statutory interpretation govern our review.... Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Woodrow Wilson of Middletown,...

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23 cases
  • State v. Hearl, AC 39463
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 29 May 2018
    ...of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leak , 297 Conn. 524, 532–33, 998 A.2d 1182 (2010). "Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review." (Internal quotation ma......
  • State v. Griffin
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 11 September 2018
    ...of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leak , 297 Conn. 524, 532–33, 998 A.2d 1182 (2010). "Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review." (Internal quotation ma......
  • State v. McCoy
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 7 May 2019
    ...(permitting court to stay execution of sentence until after defendant finished psychiatric treatment); see also State v. Leak , 297 Conn. 524, 537, 998 A.2d 1182 (2010) (trial court had inherent common-law power to impose on defendant consecutive terms of commitment following insanity acqui......
  • State v. Quested, 106,805.
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 26 June 2015
    ...where there is not a legislative directive otherwise. Several state courts have reached the same conclusion. E.g., State v. Leak, 297 Conn. 524, 537–39, 998 A.2d 1182 (2010) (courts have “inherent common-law power to stay the execution of their own judgments and thereby order that confineme......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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