State Of Conn. v. Leak
Decision Date | 27 July 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 18509.,18509. |
Citation | 998 A.2d 1182,297 Conn. 524 |
Parties | STATE of Connecticutv.Benjamin LEAK. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
297 Conn. 524
998 A.2d 1182
STATE of Connecticut
v.
Benjamin LEAK.
No. 18509.
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Argued April 20, 2010.
Decided July 27, 2010.
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
James M. Ralls, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Michael Dearington, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and McLACHLAN, Js.*
NORCOTT, J.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 53a-47(b) 1 authorized the trial court to order maximum terms of commitment consecutively in imposing a total period of confinement following insanity acquittals for multiple offenses. The defendant, Benjamin Leak, appeals 2 from the judgments of the trial court determining that the maximum terms of commitment for the two criminal cases in which he was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect for assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree and possession of a dangerous instrument in a correctional institution, were to be served consecutively, for a total period of confinement of forty-five years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the committing court had the authority to impose multiple maximum insanity commitments consecutively under § 53a-47(b). We disagree with the defendant and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history. On September 14,1979, the defendant committed an assault using a knife and subsequently was charged with assault in the first degree
Since 1985, when the legislature created the psychiatric security review board (board), which took jurisdiction from the department over the defendant's commitment; see footnote 1 of this opinion; both the state and the defendant acknowledge that they have assumed that the defendant's maximum term of commitment was forty-five years, consisting of the twenty year maximum commitment for the first assault and the twenty-five year maximum commitment for the second assault, to be served consecutively. At the March 16, 2007, mandatory review hearing before the board, however, board chairperson Robert
Thereafter, on April 20, 2007,5 the state filed a petition for an order of continued commitment pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-593(c) 6 and, on May 15, 2007, it filed a request for clarification, asking that the mittimus for each file be amended to show that the terms of commitment are to run consecutively, for a total period of confinement of forty-five years. In support of its request, the state first noted that the entry in each of the state's attorney's files made in the normal course of business at the time of commitment showed that such commitments were ordered by the court to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty-five years. Further, all of the records created after the defendant's commitment at the Whiting Forensic Division of Connecticut Valley Hospital and its successor administrator, the board, showed a total period of confinement of forty-five years. Moreover, the state expressed its understanding that the notes in the public defender's trial file reflected a commitment of forty-five years. In response, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and an application for discharge from the jurisdiction of the board.
The trial court, Damiani, J., held evidentiary hearings on July 3, July 6 and August 9, 2007, to attempt to reconstruct the record of the trial court's oral pronouncement of judgment on January 25, 1982. At the conclusion of these reconstruction hearings, the court concluded: “[I]t was the [committing court's] intention at the time of [commitment] that the mittimus for each file be amended to show that the commitments in each file are to run consecutively to each other for a [ total
The trial court denied both of the defendant's motions, as well as the application for discharge, issuing a memorandum of decision on October 22, 2007, concluding that consecutive commitments, or situations involving a stay of one commitment until the prior one expires by lapse of time, were permitted under § 53a-47(b), which, in providing for a “total period of confinement,” evinced a legislative intent to permit consecutive maximum terms of commitment. Accordingly, the court determined that, on the basis of the charges of which the defendant had been acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect, he could have been criminally sentenced to a total effective term of forty-five years imprisonment based upon consecutive sentencing principles. Thus, the maximum “total period of confinement” under § 53a-47(b) in this case was forty-five years. The trial court also determined that, because under § 53a-47(b), an acquittee can be discharged before or after the maximum term of commitment, depending upon whether he remains both mentally ill and dangerous, the “total period of confinement” is irrelevant for purposes of the statute.
Thereafter, on November 20, 2007, the court granted the defendant's motion to reargue the matter, specifically to address the meaning of “total period of confinement” as used in § 53a-47(b), which the court had emphasized in its October 22, 2007 memorandum of decision, and which was a focal point of the court's oral remarks during the October 24, 2007 oral argument.8 The court adhered, however, to its ruling denying the defendant's motion to correct and related motions and concluded that the committing court had the authority, under § 53a-47(b), to impose consecutive terms of commitment. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the committing court had the authority under § 53a-47(b) to impose multiple maximum insanity commitments consecutively. First, the defendant emphasizes the fundamental distinction between incarceration pursuant to a criminal sentence and commitment following an insanity acquittal, and claims that the logical corollary of such a distinction “render[s] inapplicable the traditional sentencing policies of consecutive and concurrent sentencing” in the commitment context. The defendant also notes that, in placing an outer limit on the maximum term of commitment, that is, the maximum sentence that could have been imposed if the person had been convicted of the offense, the legislature
As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. The resolution of this appeal requires us to interpret § 53a-47(b). “Well settled principles of statutory interpretation govern our review.... Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Woodrow Wilson of Middletown,...
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State v. Hearl, AC 39463
...of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leak , 297 Conn. 524, 532–33, 998 A.2d 1182 (2010). "Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review." (Internal quotation ma......
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State v. Griffin
...of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leak , 297 Conn. 524, 532–33, 998 A.2d 1182 (2010). "Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review." (Internal quotation ma......
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State v. McCoy
...(permitting court to stay execution of sentence until after defendant finished psychiatric treatment); see also State v. Leak , 297 Conn. 524, 537, 998 A.2d 1182 (2010) (trial court had inherent common-law power to impose on defendant consecutive terms of commitment following insanity acqui......
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State v. Quested, 106,805.
...where there is not a legislative directive otherwise. Several state courts have reached the same conclusion. E.g., State v. Leak, 297 Conn. 524, 537–39, 998 A.2d 1182 (2010) (courts have “inherent common-law power to stay the execution of their own judgments and thereby order that confineme......