State Of Conn. v. Bernacki
Decision Date | 06 July 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 30176.,30176. |
Citation | 122 Conn.App. 399,998 A.2d 262 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of Connecticutv.Gary C. BERNACKI, Sr. |
Glenn W. Falk, special public defender, with whom, on the brief, was Elliot Morrison, law student intern, for the appellant (defendant).
Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Kevin D. Lawlor, state's attorney, and Kimberley N. Perrelli, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
FLYNN, C.J., and BEACH and WEST, Js.*
The defendant, Gary C. Bernacki, Sr., appeals from the judgment of the trial court, following a jury trial, convicting him of, and sentencing him for, criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217(a)(3)(A) 1 and criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes § 53a-223(a).2 On appeal, the defendant claims that his conviction of, and his punishment for, both of these crimes violates the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 9, of the Connecticut constitution 3 because as charged, they constitute the same offense. Although we agree that the crimes as charged constitute the same offense, we conclude that the legislature intended to permit multiple punishments for the crimes of criminal violation of a protective order and criminal possession of a firearm. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In this case, the charging document provides in relevant part:
The basis of the charge of criminal violation of a protective order was the defendant's possession of a firearm, which specifically is prohibited by anyone against whom a protective order has been issued.
The jury found the defendant guilty of these two charges,4 and the court sentenced him on count two to a four year term of imprisonment, execution suspended after two years, with four years of probation. On count three, the court sentenced the defendant to a four year term of imprisonment, execution suspended after one year, with four years of probation. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently, for a total effective sentence of four years imprisonment, execution suspended after two years, with four years of probation. This appeal followed.
The defendant claims that his conviction of, and his punishment for, both of these crimes violates double jeopardy because the crimes, as charged, constitute the same offense. He requests review of this unpreserved claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). The record on appeal is adequate for review, and a claim of double jeopardy is of constitutional magnitude. See State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 704-705, 584 A.2d 425 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254, 111 S.Ct. 2898, 115 L.Ed.2d 1062 (1991). Accordingly, we will review the defendant's claim.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bozelko, 119 Conn.App. 483, 507, 987 A.2d 1102, cert. denied, 295 Conn. 916, 990 A.2d 867 (2010). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kurzatkowski, 119 Conn.App. 556, 569, 988 A.2d 393, cert. denied, 296 Conn. 902, 991 A.2d 1104 (2010); see Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) ( ).
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Greco, 216 Conn. 282, 292-93, 579 A.2d 84 (1990).
The defendant argues that his conviction and sentence violate his constitutional right not to be placed in double jeopardy because criminal violation of a protective order by the act of possessing a firearm and criminal possession of a firearm, while there is a protective order, punish him for the same acts. The state argues that the two offenses are not the same for double jeopardy purposes because criminal possession of a firearm has possession of a firearm as an element and criminal violation of a protective order does not. In the alternative, the state argues that there was no intent by the legislature to prohibit multiple punishments for the same conduct under these circumstances and that each of these statutes aims to promote different interests. Although we agree with the defendant that the crimes as charged constituted the same offense because he could not have committed one of the crimes without having committed the other, we further conclude that the legislature intended to provide multiple punishments for the defendant's conduct in possessing a firearm while being subject to a protective order.
In reaching our conclusion, we look to the reasoning of this court's decision in State v. Quint, 97 Conn.App. 72, 77-83, 904 A.2d 216, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 924, 908 A.2d 1089 (2006), which we find persuasive. In Quint, the defendant had been charged with criminal violation of a protective order pursuant to § 53a-223(a) and with criminal trespass in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-107(a)(2). As explained in Quint, “§ 53a-107(a)(2), criminal trespass in the first degree, makes it a crime when a person ‘enters or remains in a building or any other premises in violation of a ... protective order issued pursuant to [General Statutes §§] 46b-38c, 54-1k or 54-82r by the Superior Court....’ ” Id., at 77 n. 3, 904 A.2d 216. This court explained that criminal violation of a protective order and criminal trespass in the first degree as charged in the Quint case constituted the same offense because the defendant could not have committed one of the crimes without having committed the other. Id., at 80, 904 A.2d 216. We can discern no meaningful difference between Quint and the present case.
In the present case, the defendant was charged with criminal violation of a protective order, which stemmed from his possessing firearms in violation of that order, and he was charged with criminal possession of a firearm while subject to a protective order. As in Quint, we conclude that the defendant could not have committed one of these crimes without having committed the other. Our inquiry, however, does not end there.
J. Killian, G. Costello & K. Thomas, The Constitution of the United States of America Analysis and Interpretation (2002) pp. 1386-87. Essentially, there are two types of situations in which a single transaction may be split into separate crimes. ...
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State v. Bernacki
...the judgment of the trial court convicting him of violating both §§ 53a-217 (a) (3) (A) and 53a-223 (a). See State v. Bernacki, 122 Conn. App. 399, 988 A.2d 262 (2010). On appeal, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the legislature clearly intended to p......
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State v. East, AC 34715
...is adequate for review and the defendant's double jeopardy claim is of constitutional magnitude. See, e.g., State v. Bernacki, 122 Conn. App. 399, 403, 998 A.2d 262 (2010), aff'd, 307 Conn. 1, 52 A.3d 605 (2012), cert. denied, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 1804, 185 L. Ed. 2d 811 (2013). We conclude, h......
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State v. Johnson
...constitution presents an issue of constitutional and statutory interpretation over which our review is plenary. State v. Bernacki, 122 Conn. App. 399, 403, 998 A.2d 262, cert. granted on other grounds, 298 Conn. 912, 4 A.3d 833 (2010); State v. Bozelko, 119 Conn. App. 483, 507, 987 A.2d 110......
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State v. Bernacki
...affirmingthe judgment of the trial court convicting him of violating both §§ 53a–217 (a)(3)(A) and 53a–223 (a). See State v. Bernacki, 122 Conn.App. 399, 998 A.2d 262 (2010). On appeal, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the legislature clearly intende......
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2010 Appellate Review
...99. 123 Conn. App. 103, 998 A.2d 1279 (2010). 100. 124 Conn. App. 438, 5 A.3d 527 (2010). 101. Id. at 458 (Beach, J., dissenting). 102. 122 Conn. App. 399, 998 A.2d 262, cert. granted, 298 Conn 912, 4 A.3d 833 (2010). 103. 120 Conn. App. 330, 991 A.2d 728, cert. granted, 297 Conn. 916, 996 ......