State of La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank

Decision Date11 February 1985
Docket NumberNo. 82-3059,82-3059
Citation752 F.2d 1019
Parties, 88 A.L.R.Fed. 239, 1985 A.M.C. 1521, 53 USLW 2412, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,273 STATE OF LOUISIANA, ex rel. William J. GUSTE, Jr., Attorney General, et al., Plaintiffs, Ventura Trading Company, Ltd., Inc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. M/V TESTBANK, her engines, tackle, apparel, her owners, etc., et al., Partenreederei M/S Charlotta, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Gelpi, Sullivan, Carroll & LaBorde, Gerard T. Gelpi, Randall C. Coleman, III, New Orleans, La., Sidney D. Torres, III, Kenneth B. Krobert, Chalmette, La., for Ventura et al.

Phelps, Dunbar, Marks, Claverie & Sims, James B. Kemp, Jr., New Orleans, La., for Farrell Lines, Inc.

Leger & Mestayer, Walter J. Leger, Jr., Courtenay, Forstall, Grace & Hebert, Thomas J. Grace, Theodore W. Brin, New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs.

Christovich & Kearney, James F. Holmes, New Orleans, La., for Container Lift.

Patrick L. Burke, J. Dwight LeBlanc, Jr., Kenneth J. Servay, New Orleans, La., for Partenreederei.

Walter Carroll, Jr., Jean Melancon, New Orleans, La., for Fortune Sea & London S.S.

Robert B. Deane, New Orleans, La., for Partenreederei and United Kingdom.

Benjamin W. Yancey, New Orleans, La., for Fortune Sea Transp.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.



We are asked to abandon physical damage to a proprietary interest as a prerequisite to recovery for economic loss in cases of unintentional maritime tort. We decline the invitation. 1


In the early evening of July 22, 1980, the M/V SEA DANIEL, an inbound bulk carrier, and the M/V TESTBANK, an outbound container ship, collided at approximately mile forty-one of the Mississippi River Gulf outlet. At impact, a white haze enveloped the ships until carried away by prevailing winds, and containers aboard TESTBANK were damaged and lost overboard. The white haze proved to be hydrobromic acid and the contents of the containers which went overboard proved to be approximately twelve tons of pentachlorophenol, PCP, assertedly the largest such spill in United States history. The United States Coast Guard closed the outlet to navigation until August 10, 1980 and all fishing, shrimping, and related activity was temporarily suspended in the outlet and four hundred square miles of surrounding marsh and waterways.

Forty-one lawsuits were filed and consolidated before the same judge in the Eastern District of Louisiana. These suits presented claims of shipping interests, marina and boat rental operators, wholesale and retail seafood enterprises not actually engaged in fishing, seafood restaurants, tackle and bait shops, and recreational fishermen. They proffered an assortment of liability theories, including maritime tort, private actions pursuant to various sections of the Rivers & Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 and rights of action under Louisiana law. Jurisdiction rested on the proposition that the collision and contamination were maritime torts and within the court's maritime jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1333.

Defendants moved for summary judgment as to all claims for economic loss unaccompanied by physical damage to property. The district court granted the requested summary judgment as to all such claims except those asserted by commercial oystermen, shrimpers, crabbers and fishermen who had been making a commercial use of the embargoed waters. The district court found these commercial fishing interests deserving of a special protection akin to that enjoyed by seamen. See State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 524 F.Supp. 1170, 1173-74 (E.D.La.1981). 2

On appeal a panel of this court affirmed, concluding that claims for economic loss unaccompanied by physical damage to a proprietary interest were not recoverable in maritime tort. 728 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.1984). The panel, as did the district court, pointed to the doctrine of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 48 S.Ct. 134, 72 L.Ed. 290 (1927), and its development in this circuit. Judge Wisdom specially concurred, agreeing that the denial of these claims was required by precedent, but urging reexamination en banc. We then took the case en banc for that purpose. After extensive additional briefs and oral argument, we are unpersuaded that we ought to drop physical damage to a proprietary interest as a prerequisite to recovery for economic loss. To the contrary, our reexamination of the history and central purpose of this pragmatic restriction on the doctrine of foreseeability heightens our commitment to it. Ultimately we conclude that without this limitation foreseeability loses much of its ability to function as a rule of law.


Plaintiffs 3 first argue that the "rule" of Robins Dry Dock is that "a tort to the property of one which results in the negligent interference with contractual relationships of another does not state a claim," and that so defined, Robins Dry Dock is here inapplicable. Next and relatedly, plaintiffs urge that physical damage is not a prerequisite to recovery of economic loss where the damages suffered were foreseeable. Third, plaintiffs argue that their claims are cognizable in maritime tort because the pollution from the collision constituted a public nuisance and violated the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, as well as Louisiana law.

Defendants urge the opposite: that Robins Dry Dock controls these cases; that the physical damage limitation on foreseeability ought to be retained; and that plaintiffs stated no claim for "federal pollution," either as a nuisance or under the Rivers and Harbors Act. Finally, defendants reply that state law is not applicable to this maritime collision case and in any event provides plaintiffs no claim.


The meaning of Robins Dry Dock v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 48 S.Ct. 134, 72 L.Ed. 290 (1927) (Holmes, J.) is the flag all litigants here seek to capture. We turn first to that case and to its historical setting.

Robins broke no new ground but instead applied a principle, then settled both in the United States and England, which refused recovery for negligent interference with "contractual rights." Stated more broadly, the prevailing rule denied a plaintiff recovery for economic loss if that loss resulted from physical damage to property in which he had no proprietary interest. See, e.g., Byrd v. English, 117 Ga. 191, 43 S.E. 419 (1903); Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co., 10 Q.B. 453, 457 (C.A.1875). See also James, Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 Vand.L.Rev. 43, 44-46 (1972) (discussing history of the rule); Carpenter,Interference with Contract Relations, 41 Harv.L.Rev. 728 (1928). Professor James explains this limitation on recovery of pure economic loss: "The explanation ... is a pragmatic one: the physical consequences of negligence usually have been limited, but the indirect economic repercussions of negligence may be far wider, indeed virtually open-ended." James, supra, at 45.

Decisions such as Stockton illustrate the application of this pragmatic limitation on the doctrine of foreseeability. The defendant negligently caused its pipes to leak, thereby increasing the plaintiff's cost in performing its contract to dig a tunnel. The British court, writing fifty-two years before Robins, denied the plaintiff's claim. The court explained that if recovery were not contained, then in cases such as Rylands v. Fletcher, 1 L.R.--Ex. 265 (1866), the defendant would be liable not only to the owner of the mine and its workers "but also to ... every workman and person employed in the mine, who in consequence of its stoppage made less wages than he would otherwise have done." Id. at 457. See also Societe Anonyme de Remorquage a Helice v. Bennets, [1911] 1 K.B. 243.


In Robins, the time charterer of a steamship sued for profits lost when the defendant dry dock negligently damaged the vessel's propeller. The propeller had to be replaced, thus extending by two weeks the time the vessel was laid up in dry dock, and it was for the loss of use of the vessel for that period that the charterer sued. The Supreme Court denied recovery to the charterer, noting:

... no authority need be cited to show that, as a general rule, at least, a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the tort-feasor liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract with that other unknown to the doer of the wrong. (citation omitted). The law does not spread its protection so far.

275 U.S. at 309, 48 S.Ct. at 135. Justice Holmes did not stop with this delphic language, but with a citation to three cases added a further signal to his meaning:

A good statement, applicable here, will be found in Elliott Steam Tug Co., Ltd. v. The Shipping Controller, [1922] 1 K.B. 127, 139, 140; Byrd v. English, 117 Ga. 192, 43 S.E. 419; The Federal No. 2 (C.C.A. [1927] 21 F.2d 313.


The plaintiff in Elliott Steam Tug was a charterer of a tug boat who lost profits when the vessel was requisitioned by the admiralty under wartime legislative powers. In applying an indemnity statute that authorized recovery, the court noted that the charterer could not have recovered at common law: "[t]he charterer in collision cases does not recover profits, not because the loss of profits during repairs is not the direct consequence of the wrong, but because the common law rightly or wrongly does not recognize him as able to sue for such an injury to his mere contractual rights." Id. at 140. (emphasis supplied). In Byrd v. English, recovery of lost profits was denied when a utility's electrical conduits were negligently damaged by defendant, cutting off power to plai...

To continue reading

Request your trial
161 cases
  • S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Superior Court of L. A. Cnty.(In re S. Cal. Gas Leak Cases)
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • May 30, 2019
    ... ... State Farm General Ins. Co. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1070, 1079-1080, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d ... To wit: in State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V TESTBANK (5th Cir. 1985) 752 F.2d 1019 ( Testbank ), two ... ...
  • Neal v. Barisich, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
    • February 28, 1989
    ... ... -established that "the uniform `common law' of admiralty displaces state wrongful death statutes in territorial waters." 5 The same rule applies ... 1205, 89 L.Ed.2d 318 (1986). See generally State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1031-32 (5th Cir.1985) (en banc) ... ...
  • East River Steamship Corp v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • June 16, 1986
    ... ... that petitioners' dissatisfaction with product quality did not state" a claim cognizable in tort ...            Held: ...   \xC2" ... v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1046-1052 (CA5 1985) (en banc) ... ...
  • In re Glacier Bay
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Alaska
    • September 28, 1990
    ... ... damages under the Alaska Act are controlled by maritime law or by state law as a result of the non-preemption of state law subsection in TAPAA ... See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1031-1032 (5th Cir. 1985); In re ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
20 books & journal articles
  • Liability Under the Oil Pollution Act: Current Law and Needed Revisions
    • United States
    • Louisiana Law Review No. 71-3, April 2011
    • April 1, 2011
    ...191. Id. § 1321(o). 192. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Louisiana ex rel Gueste v. M/V TESTBANK, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986). 193. Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623 (1st Cir. 1994). 194. See 33 U......
  • Table of cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Proving Damages to the Jury Part 5
    • May 4, 2022
    ...422-25 427, 538, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003), §§19:16, 19:52, Form 19-1 State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank , 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985), §22:05 Stecyk v. Bell HelicopterTextron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408 (3rd Cir. 2002), §11:92 Sullivan v. National Football League , 34 ......
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Proving Damages to the Jury - 2016 Part 5: How to Handle Unique Issues in Damage Cases
    • August 13, 2016
    ...422-25 427, 538, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003), §§19:16, 19:52, Form 19-1 State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank , 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985), §22:05 Stecyk v. Bell HelicopterTextron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408 (3rd Cir. 2002), §11:92 Stocki v. Nunn, 351 P.3d 911 (Wyo. 2015), ......
  • The Exxon Valdez Case and Regularizing Punishment
    • United States
    • Duke University School of Law Alaska Law Review No. 26, January 2009
    • Invalid date
    ...275 U.S. 303 (1927); Getty Ref. and Mktg. Co. v. MT FADI B, 766 F.2d 829, 833 (3rd Cir. 1985); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testabank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1035 (5th Cir. 1985) (Wisdom, J., dissenting). [170] Commercial fishermen, for instance, were unable to recover for the devaluation in thei......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT