State of Idaho v. Horiuchi

• Decision Date: 05 June 2001
• Docket Number: No. 98-30149,PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,DEFENDANT-APPELLEE,98-30149
• Citation: 253 F.3d 359
• Parties: (9th Cir. 2001) STATE OF IDAHO,, v. LON T. HORIUCHI,
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 359

253 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 2001)

STATE OF IDAHO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. LON T. HORIUCHI, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

No. 98-30149

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Argued and Submitted December 20, 2000

June 5, 2001

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Stephen Yagman, Special Prosecutor for State of Idaho, on the brief and argued, Marion R. Yagman, Special Deputy Prosecutor, Joseph Reichmann, Special Deputy Prosecutor, Kathryn S. Bloomfield, Special Deputy Prosecutor, on the brief, Venice Beach, California, and Ramsey Clark, Special Deputy Prosecutor, New York, New York, argued the cause for the plaintiff-appellant.

Adam S. Hoffinger, Piper & Marbury, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., argued the cause for the defendant-appellee.

Seth Waxman, Solicitor General of the United States, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., argued the cause for Amicus Curiae, United States of America, on behalf of the defendant-appellee.

George Culvahouse, O'Melveny & Myers, Wastington, D.C., Griffin B. Bell, Benjamin Civiletti, William Barr, and William Webster, as amici curiae for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho Edward J. Lodge, Chief District Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. CR-97-00097-EJL

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge, and Procter Hug, Jr., Alex Kozinski, Pamela Ann Rymer, Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Michael Daly Hawkins, Sidney R. Thomas, Barry G. Silverman, Susan P. Graber, William A. Fletcher and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Kozinski; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge W. Fletcher; Dissent by Judge Hawkins

Kozinski, Circuit Judge

It was, in the words of Justice Kennedy, the genius of the Founding Fathers to "split the atom of sovereignty." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). What this means in practical terms is that, within the territory of every state, two sovereigns--the state government and the federal government--reign cheek to jowl. From the dawn of the Republic, this unusual arrangement has led to a fair degree of conflict, as the actions of one sovereign have encroached on the prerogatives of the other. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). This conflict reflects, not the defects of the system, but its virtues, because the beneficiaries of these competing sovereignties are the citizens of the United States. As Alexander Hamilton foresaw:

Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. . . . If [the people's] rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress.

The Federalist No. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).

We have grown accustomed to relying on the federal government to protect our liberties against the excesses of state law enforcement. Federal prosecutors may bring criminal charges against state police who violate the rights of citizens. See, e.g., Koon v. United States , 518 U.S. 81 (1996). Those citizens may also seek redress by bringing private suits in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While state prosecutions of federal officers are less common, they provide an avenue of redress on the flip side of the federalism coin. When federal officers violate the Constitution, either through malice or excessive zeal, they can be held accountable for violating the state's criminal laws.

If federal agents are to perform their duties vigorously, however, they cannot be unduly constrained by fear of state prosecutions. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that the Supremacy Clause cloaks federal agents with immunity if they act reasonably in carrying out their responsibilities. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1890). We explore the outer bounds of Supremacy Clause immunity in the context of Idaho's attempt to prosecute FBI Special Agent Lon T. Horiuchi for killing Vicki Weaver during the infamous Ruby Ridge incident.

I.

In the early morning hours of August 21, 1992, six Deputy United States Marshals, using night vision equipment and dressed in camouflage gear, conducted a reconnaissance mission on the Weaver property in preparation for serving an arrest warrant at a later date. The officers were armed but wore no visible law enforcement identification. They were still on the property at about 10:20 a.m., when they were detected by a party consisting of Kevin Harris, Randy Weaver, his son Samuel and their dog Striker. Accounts of what followed differ, but we know that a firefight erupted during the course of which the marshals killed Striker and Samuel Weaver. Samuel was shot twice, once in the arm and once, fatally, in the back. One of the Weaver party, probably Kevin Harris, shot and killed Deputy Marshal William Degan.¹ Randy Weaver and Harris retreated to the Weaver cabin. Later, Weaver and his wife retrieved Samuel's body and placed it in a structure near the cabin referred to as the birthing shed.

Special Agent Horiuchi and the other members of the FBI's Hostage Rescue Team arrived on the scene the following morning and were briefed on the situation. Part of the briefing concerned the Rules of Engagement. The Rules initially authorized agents to fire at any armed adult if the shot could be taken without endangering the children in the cabin. The Rules were later revised to authorize firing only at any armed adult male, subject to the same caveat. The agents were forbidden from firing into the cabin because of the risk of hitting the Weaver children who were inside.²

Sometime during the afternoon, Agent Horiuchi and his team of snipers, guided by a deputy marshal familiar with the area, ventured on foot into the hills surrounding the Weaver cabin. The agents made their way slowly up the steep and rocky terrain and only came within view of the cabin at 5:30 p.m. Once there, the agents broke into teams of two and three along a ridge overlooking the cabin. Horiuchi, armed with a high-powered rifle and scope, took a position about 200 yards from the cabin.

At around 6 p.m., Kevin Harris, Randy Weaver and Weaver's sixteen-year-old daughter, Sara, walked out of the Weaver cabin towards the birthing shed, where Samuel's body was located. Horiuchi did not know the identities of the individuals, but he determined that at least one of them was holding a "long gun."³ At the same time, Horiuchi says he heard the engines of the FBI helicopter in the general vicinity, although he was uncertain as to its location. According to Horiuchi, he saw the armed individual (later identified as Randy Weaver) look up to the sky as if he might fire at the helicopter.⁴ Horiuchi fired once, wounding Weaver and causing him to drop from sight.

Horiuchi's shot alerted the Weavers and Harris to the presence of snipers, and they took cover behind the nearest object, the birthing shed. They remained there for ten to twenty seconds, at which point they started running back toward the cabin. Horiuchi watched through his rifle's scope as Randy and Sara Weaver ran into the cabin through a door which opened outwards, perpendicular to Horiuchi's line of sight. Harris was the last of the three to disappear behind the cabin door and, as he did, Horiuchi pulled the trigger. The bullet penetrated the glass pane of the door and eventually found its mark. Before hitting Harris, however, it struck Randy's wife, Vicki, who had been standing behind the door cradling an infant in her arms. Shot through the head, Vicki Weaver died instantly.

After investigating the incident, the Department of Justice decided not to prosecute Horiuchi. The DOJ issued a press release announcing that a case of "willfulness, or knowing, intentional use of unreasonable force cannot be made out against FBI Agent Lon Horiuchi."⁵ Idaho thereupon charged Horiuchi with involuntary manslaughter, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-4006(2). The complaint alleged that Horiuchi:

did unlawfully, but without malice, kill Vicki J. Weaver, a human being, in the operation of a firearm in a reckless, careless or negligent manner, to wit: discharging the firearm through the front door of the Weaver residence in an attempt to shoot Kevin Harris as he entered the door from the outside, without first determining whether any person other than his intended target was present on the other side of the door.

State Magistrate Judge Quentin Harden held a preliminary hearing and, after taking live testimony and considering transcripts from Weaver's criminal trial,⁶ found sufficient evidence to support the complaint. The state then issued an information and, a week later, Horiuchi removed the case to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).

Once in district court, Horiuchi moved to dismiss the indictment on grounds of Supremacy Clause immunity. The district court granted Horiuchi's motion without an evidentiary hearing and Idaho appealed. A panel of this court affirmed, see 215 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2000), and we granted Idaho's petition for rehearing en banc. See 228 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2000).

II.

A. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, at its textual core, provides that states are bound by federal law, and nullifies any inconsistent state laws. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. However, it became clear from the early days of the Republic that states could interfere with the operation of the federal government in ways much subtler than passing inconsistent laws. In response, the McCulloch Court read the Supremacy Clause broadly as prohibiting any action by the states that would interfere with the operation of the federal government. See 17 U.S. at 427 ("It is of the very essence of supremacy, to remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its...