State of Ind. v. RENZULLI
| Decision Date | 10 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 32A04-1003-CR-194.,32A04-1003-CR-194. |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Amanda RENZULLI, Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Cynthia Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
David M. Seiter, Joshua Taylor, Garrison Law Firm, LLC, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellant-Plaintiff, State of Indiana, appeals the trial court's suppression of the evidence obtained after the stop of the vehicle that Appellee-Defendant, Amanda Renzulli (Renzulli), was driving.
We affirm.
The State presents one issue, which we restate as: Whether the trial court's grant of Renzulli's motion to suppress is contrary to law.
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on April 23, 2009, a caller phoned 911 and stated, (Appellant's App. p. 17). The caller initially said that the vehicle was a blue Volkswagen Jetta but later identified the vehicle as a Volkswagen Passat, a similarly shaped and sized vehicle. The caller did not get close enough to the vehicle to get a license plate number. The caller explained to the 911 dispatch officer that the vehicle had pulled into a gas station and gave the location of the gas station. When asked, the caller gave his name and phone number.
Police officers arrived at the gas station moments later. A blue Volkswagen was parked in a parking space and the officers observed it begin to back out of the space. One officer commanded the vehicle to stop and the driver complied after having moved only a few feet. The police officers began an investigation, determined that the driver of the vehicle at the time of the stop was Renzulli, and that she was intoxicated.
Later that same day, the State filed an Information charging Renzulli with operating a vehicle while intoxicated, as a Class A misdemeanor, Ind.Code § 9-30-5-2(b), and operating a vehicle while intoxicated, as a Class D felony, I.C. § 9-30-5-3. On September 3, 2009, Renzulli filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained after the stop of her vehicle.
On October 7, 2009, the trial court conducted a suppression hearing. The State called Officer Brian S. Stewart of the Plainfield Police Department (Officer Stewart) as its sole witness. Officer Stewart testified that he was not the officer that ordered the vehicle driven by Renzulli to stop, but was present when that order was made. Officer Stewart did not witness the vehicle make any maneuvers, other than when it began to back out of the space just prior to being ordered to stop. He admitted that he did not have personal knowledge as to who had been driving the vehicle prior to pulling into the parking spot. Officer Stewart testified that he did not know whether other blue cars or Volkswagens were located in the parking lot of the gas station at the time Renzulli was stopped. Further, Officer Stewart did not know who the 911 caller was and could not testify as to the credibility of the caller.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court took the motion to suppress under advisement. On October 16, 2009, the trial court granted the motion to suppress concluding that the officers responding to the 911 call did not “establish an independent and objective basis to create reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior necessary for an investigatory stop.” (Appellant's App. p. 18).
The State now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
The State contends that the trial court's grant of the motion to suppress was contrary to law. Specifically, the State contends that the 911 call was a sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle that Renzulli was driving.
[1] [2] [3] [4] When we review a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, we determine whether the record discloses “substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court's decision.” State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind.2008) (quoting State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind.2006)). We will not reweigh the evidence. Id. Because the State is appealing from a negative judgment, it must show that the trial court's ruling was contrary to law. Id.
[5] [6] [7] “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution protect the privacy and possessory interests of individuals by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.” Coleman v. State, 847 N.E.2d 259, 262 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Generally, a lawful search requires a judicially issued search warrant, but where a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search. Id. A police officer may make a brief investigatory stop without a warrant or probable cause if, “based upon specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences from those facts, the official intrusion is reasonably warranted and the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’ ” Moultry v. State, 808 N.E.2d 168, 170-71 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). “Reasonable suspicion is a ‘somewhat abstract’ concept, not readily reduced to ‘a neat set of legal rules.’ ” Ertel v. State, 928 N.E.2d 261, 264 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied (quoting Moultry, 808 N.E.2d at 171). Reasonable suspicion is determined on a case-by-case basis by looking at the totality of the circumstances, and is generally satisfied when the facts known to the officer at the moment of the stop, along with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to be that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. Coleman, 847 N.E.2d at 262.
The State argues that we should treat the 911 call as a tip from an identified informant or concerned citizen. In Kellems v. State, 842 N.E.2d 352, 353 (Ind.2006), reversed on reh'g on other grounds, our supreme court held that a “tip from an identified informant or concerned citizen coupled with some corroborative police investigation is sufficient to create reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop.” In that case, the Tell City Police Department received a telephone call from a woman who identified herself by name. Id. The woman reported seeing a man that she knew by name driving without a license or insurance, while intoxicated, and with children in his vehicle. Id. The woman gave a description of the vehicle, and his license plate number, along with information about where the vehicle was traveling. Id. A police officer responded to the call, caught up with the vehicle while it was traveling, and after confirming that the license plate number matched, stopped the vehicle. Id. at 354.
Our supreme court found that there was reasonable suspicion based largely upon the fact that the “tipster identified herself.” Id. at 355. The reasoning behind our supreme court's holding was the “limited scope and purpose” of a Terry stop, and also because an “identified informant's ‘reputation can be assessed and ... [they may] be held responsible if [their] allegations turn out to be fabricated....’ ” Id. (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000)). However, our supreme court did not hold that susceptibility to “prosecution for making a false report, standing alone, will in all cases constitute reasonable suspicion.” Id. Rather, potential prosecution is a “circumstance bearing on the reasonableness of suspicion,” which must be considered in the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 356.
[8] Here, we agree with the State that the 911 caller who spotted the blue Volkswagen should be considered an identified informant or concerned citizen, as opposed to an anonymous tip, and, thus, the tip was a circumstance which bore in favor of reasonable suspicion. However, we conclude that the police failed to ‘couple’ the concerned citizen's tip with corroborative investigation. See id. at 353 () (emphasis added). In Kellems, our supreme court twice noted that the police officer confirmed that the license plate of the vehicle driven by Kellems matched the number given by the concerned citizen tipster. Id. at 353 and 357. Here, however, the sole witness called by the State testified that he did not know whether another blue car, or another Volkswagen was parked in the gas station parking lot at the time Renzulli's vehicle was stopped. It may be possible that another officer checked to be sure that Renzulli's vehicle was the only vehicle at the gas station that matched the description given by the 911 caller, but the State did not introduce that evidence at the suppression hearing. As we have stated above, the State bears the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement is present. Coleman, 847 N.E.2d at 262. In light of the lack of any evidence that the police officers corroborated that Renzulli's car was the vehicle which the 911 caller referred to, we cannot conclude that the trial court's grant of the motion to suppress was contrary to law.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court's grant of Renzulli's motion to suppress was not contrary to law.
Affirmed.
I do so believing that the State's procedural decisions at the trial court level have forfeited its appeal. 2
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State v. Renzulli
...the time. 4. The Court of Appeals opinion affirmed the trial court. Judge Riley addressed the suppression ruling. State v. Renzulli, 935 N.E.2d 200, 201–204 (Ind.Ct.App.2011). Judge Mathias concurred in result and concluded sua sponte that the State cannot bring an appeal following the deni......
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